{{Short description|Concept in political philosophy}} {{Redirect|Social Agreement|the Greek political party|Social Agreement (Greece)|Rousseau's 1762 treatise on the concept|The Social Contract|other uses|Social Contract (disambiguation)}} [[File: Leviathan frontispiece cropped British Library.jpg|thumb|200px|The original cover of [[Thomas Hobbes]]'s work ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'' (1651), in which he discusses the concept of the social contract theory]] {{republicanism sidebar}} In [[Moral philosophy|moral]] and [[political philosophy]], the '''social contract''' is an idea, theory, or model that usually, although not always, concerns the [[Legitimacy (political)|legitimacy]] of the authority of the [[State (polity)|state]] over the [[individual]]."For the name social contract (or original contract) often covers two different kinds of contract, and, in tracing the evolution of the theory, it is well to distinguish The first] generally involved some theory of the origin of the state. The second form of social contract may be more accurately called the contract of government or the contract of submission... Generally, it has nothing to do with the origins of society, but, presupposing a society already formed, it purports to define the terms on which that society is to be governed: the people have made a contract with their ruler which determines their relations with him. They promise him obedience, while he promises his protection and good government. While he keeps his part of the bargain, they must keep theirs, but if he misgoverns the contract is broken and allegiance is at an end." [[J. W. Gough]], ''The Social Contract'' (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp.{{nbsp}}2–3. Conceptualized in the [[Age of Enlightenment]], it is a core concept of [[constitutionalism]], while not necessarily convened and written down in a [[constituent assembly]] and [[constitution]]. Social contract arguments typically are that individuals have [[consent of the governed|consented]], either explicitly or [[tacit consent|tacitly]], to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the authority (of the ruler, or to the decision of a majority) in exchange for protection of their remaining [[rights]] or maintenance of the [[social order]].{{cite web |language=en |title=Social Contract Theory |author=Celeste Friend |url=https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=26 December 2019 |archive-date=18 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191118145645/https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ |url-status=live }}{{cite journal|url=https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18609/Castiglione_Introduction.pdf?sequence=1|doi=10.1111/1478-9302.12080|title=Introduction the Logic of Social Cooperation for Mutual Advantage – the Democratic Contract|year=2015|last1=Castiglione|first1=Dario|journal=Political Studies Review|volume=13|issue=2|pages=161–175|hdl=10871/18609|s2cid=145163352|access-date=2019-02-03|archive-date=2017-09-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170922062821/https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/18609/Castiglione_Introduction.pdf?sequence=1|url-status=live}} The relation between [[natural and legal rights]] is often a topic of social contract theory. The term takes its name from ''[[The Social Contract]]'' (French: ''Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique''), a 1762 book by [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] that discussed this concept. Although the antecedents of social contract theory are found in antiquity, in [[Ancient Greek philosophy|Greek]] and [[Stoicism|Stoic]] philosophy and [[Roman law|Roman]] and [[Canon Law]], the heyday of the social contract was the mid-17th to early 19th centuries, when it emerged as the leading doctrine of [[political legitimacy]]. The starting point for most social contract theories is an examination of the [[human condition]] absent any political order (termed the "[[state of nature]]" by [[Thomas Hobbes]]).Ross Harrison writes that "Hobbes seems to have invented this useful term." See Ross Harrison, ''Locke, Hobbs, and Confusion's Masterpiece'' (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.{{nbsp}}70. The phrase "state of nature" does occur, in [[State of nature#History|Thomas Aquinas]]'s [http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer19.htm ''Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate'', Question 19, Article 1, Answer 13] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171019181354/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVer19.htm |date=2017-10-19 }}. However, Aquinas uses it in the context of a discussion of the nature of the soul after death, not in reference to politics. In this condition, individuals' actions are bound only by their personal [[power (philosophy)|power]] and [[conscience]], assuming that 'nature' precludes mutually beneficial [[social relationships]]. From this shared premise, social contract theorists aim to demonstrate why rational individuals would voluntarily relinquish their natural freedom in exchange for the benefits of political order. Prominent 17th- and 18th-century theorists of the social contract and natural rights included [[Hugo de Groot]] (1625), [[Thomas Hobbes]] (1651), [[Samuel von Pufendorf]] (1673), [[John Locke]] (1689), [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1762) and [[Immanuel Kant]] (1797), each approaching the concept of political authority differently. Grotius posited that individual humans had [[Natural and legal rights|natural rights]]. Hobbes famously said that in a "state of nature", human life would be "solitary, poor, [[nasty, brutish and short]]". In the absence of political order and law, everyone would have unlimited natural freedoms, including the "right to all things" and thus the freedom to plunder, rape and murder. There would be an endless "war of all against all" (''[[bellum omnium contra omnes]]''). To avoid this, free men contract with each other to establish political [[community]] ([[civil society]]) through a social contract in which they all gain security in return for subjecting themselves to an absolute sovereign, one man or an assembly of men. Though the sovereign's edicts may well be arbitrary and tyrannical, Hobbes saw absolute government as the only alternative to the terrifying anarchy of a state of nature. Hobbes asserted that humans consent to abdicate their rights in favor of the absolute authority of government (whether [[Monarchy|monarchical]] or [[Parliamentary system|parliamentary]]). Alternatively, Locke and Rousseau argued that individuals acquire civil rights by accepting the obligation to respect and protect the rights of others, thereby relinquishing certain [[Personal Freedom|personal freedoms]] in the process. The central assertion that social contract theory approaches is that law and political order are not natural, but human creations. The social contract and the political order it creates are simply the means toward an end—the benefit of the individuals involved—and legitimate only to the extent that they fulfill their part of the agreement. Hobbes argued that government is not a party to the original contract; hence citizens are not obligated to submit to the government when it is too weak to act effectively to suppress factionalism and civil unrest. == Model of the social contract == A general [[model]] for different social contract theories exists. Given that hypothetically: * '''''I''''' represents the "choosers in the contractual procedure" in the [[original position]] or [[state of nature]] * '''''I*''''' represents real individuals whose terms of interaction will be guided by the contract, who share their reasoning with '''''I''''' * '''''R''''' represents some rules, principles, or institutions * '''''M''''' represents the deliberative setting within which '''''I''''' endorses '''''R''''' It follows that a general model can be identified:
'''''I''''' chooses '''''R''''' in '''''M''''' and this gives '''''I*''''' reason to endorse and comply with '''''R''''' in the real world insofar as the reasons '''''I''''' has for choosing '''''R''''' in '''''M''''' are (or can be) shared by '''''I*'''''.{{Citation|last1=D'Agostino|first1=Fred|title=Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Fall 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-09-08|last2=Gaus|first2=Gerald|last3=Thrasher|first3=John|archive-date=2021-02-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210205032334/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/|url-status=live}}Being a model, the above is an abstraction of different theories which assists in identifying the relevant factors in the various theories. == History == ===Classical thought=== Social contract formulations are preserved in many of the world's oldest records.{{Cite web|url=https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/enlightenment--33?print=1|title=Enlightenment|website=www.timetoast.com|date=29 August 1632 |access-date=2016-11-10|archive-date=2016-11-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161110235657/https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/enlightenment--33?print=1|url-status=live}} The [[Arthashastra]] thus presents a deeply realist conception of political power. Governance, for [[Chanakya]], is not born of [[idealism]] or [[Right|divine right]], but of historical necessity: a response to the inherent vulnerabilities of [[human nature]]. In this sense, his political vision anticipates core concerns of [[political theory]], including the justification of state authority, the moral limits of power, and the role of legal institutions in curbing the excesses of human will. One of the most compelling passages in the [[Arthashastra]] (1.4.13–14) captures the essence of this [[philosophy]]: “When the law of punishment is not properly enforced, it gives rise to the law of the fish; for in the absence of a magistrate, the strong devour the weak.” The [[Indian Buddhist]] text of the second century BC ''[[Mahāvastu]]'' recounts the [[Mahāsammata|legend of Mahasammata]]. The story goes as follows: {{blockquote|In the early days of the cosmic cycle mankind lived on an immaterial plane, dancing on air in a sort of fairyland, where there was no need of food or clothing, and no private property, family, government or laws. Then gradually the process of cosmic decay began its work, and mankind became earthbound, and felt the need of food and shelter. As men lost their primeval glory, distinctions of class arose, and they entered into agreements with one another, accepting the institution of private property and the family. With this theft, murder, adultery, and other crime began, and so the people met together and decided to appoint one man from among them to maintain order in return for a share of the produce of their fields and herds. He was called "the Great Chosen One" (Mahasammata), and he received the title of raja because he pleased the people.AL Basham, ''The Wonder That Was India'', p. 83}} In his [[Rock Edicts]], the Indian Buddhist king [[Asoka]] was said to have argued for a broad and far-reaching social contract.{{Citation needed|date=June 2018}} The Buddhist ''[[Vinaya]]'' also reflects social contracts expected of the monks; one such instance is when the people of a certain town complained about monks felling saka trees, the Buddha tells his monks that they must stop and give way to [[Social norm|social norms]].{{Citation needed|date=April 2023}} In the [[Buddhist]] ''[[Aggañña Sutta]]'', an earlier more [[Egalitarianism|egalitarian]] state of harmonious and non-sedentary existence is envisioned as being first naturally followed by more settled forms of [[Agriculture|agricultural]] life. In the next stage, this societal progression leads to previously unheard-of customs – such as marriage and the recognition of private property. These new communal practices, in turn, give rise to robbery (‘''ādāna''’) and lying (‘''musāvāda''’) – and consequently, the need for censure (‘''garahā''’) and punishment (‘''daṇḍa''’) also emerges. It is only at this point, then, that the primordial social contract between the sovereign ruler and the people transpires: {{blockquote|Now those beings, Vāseṭṭha, gathered themselves together, and bewailed these things, saying: From our evil deeds, sirs, becoming manifest, inasmuch as stealing, censure, lying, punishment have become known, what if we were to select a certain being, who should be wrathful when indignation is right, who should censure that which should rightly be censured and should banish him who deserves to be banished? But we will give him in return a proportion of the rice. Then, Vāseṭṭha, those beings went to the being among them who was the handsomest, the best favoured, the most attractive, the most capable and said to him: Come now, good being, be indignant at that whereat one should rightly be indignant, censure that which should rightly be censured, banish him who deserves to be banished. And we will contribute to thee a proportion of our rice. And he consented, and did so, and they gave him a proportion of their rice. Chosen by the whole people, Vāseṭṭha, is what is meant by Mahā Sammata; so Mahā Sammata (the Great Elect) was the first standing phrase to arise [for such an one]. Lord of the Fields is what is meant by Khattiya; so Khattiya (Noble) was the next expression to arise. He charms the others by the Norm – by what ought (to charm) – is what is meant by Raja; so this was the third standing phrase to arise.}} In [[Western philosophy]], the concept of the social contract was originally posed by [[Glaucon]], as described by [[Plato]] in ''[[The Republic (Plato)|The Republic]]'', Book{{nbsp}}II. {{blockquote|They say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they affirm to be the origin and nature of justice;—it is a mean or compromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is tolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the inability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man would ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be mad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin of justice.The Republic, Book II. Quoted from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111016011312/http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.3.ii.html |date=2011-10-16 }}}} The social contract theory also appears in ''[[Crito]]'', another dialogue from Plato. [[Epicurus]] in the fourth century BC seemed to have had a strong sense of social contract, with justice and law being rooted in mutual agreement and advantage, as evidenced by these lines, among others, from his ''Principal Doctrines'' (see also [[Epicureanism#Ethics|Epicurean ethics]]): {{blockquote|31. Natural justice is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another. 32. Those animals which are incapable of making binding agreements with one another not to inflict nor suffer harm are without either justice or injustice; and likewise for those peoples who either could not or would not form binding agreements not to inflict nor suffer harm. 33. There never was such a thing as absolute justice, but only agreements made in mutual dealings among men in whatever places at various times providing against the infliction or suffering of harm.{{cite web |author=Vincent Cook |url=http://www.epicurus.net/en/principal.html |title=Principal Doctrines |publisher=Epicurus |date=2000-08-26 |access-date=2012-09-26 |archive-date=2007-04-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070407084128/http://www.epicurus.net/en/principal.html |url-status=live }}}} ===Renaissance developments=== [[Quentin Skinner]] has argued that several critical modern innovations in contract theory are found in the writings from [[French Calvinist|French Calvinists]] and [[Huguenots]], whose work in turn was invoked by writers in the [[Low Countries]] who objected to their subjection to [[Spain]] and, later still, by [[Catholicism in England|Catholics in England]].Quentin Skinner, ''The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume 2: The Age of the Reformation'' (Cambridge, 1978) [[Francisco Suárez]] (1548–1617), from the [[School of Salamanca]], might be considered an early theorist of the social contract, theorizing [[natural law]] in an attempt to limit the [[Divine Right of Kings|divine right]] of [[absolute monarchy]]. All of these groups were led to articulate notions of popular [[sovereignty]] by means of a social covenant or contract, and all of these arguments began with proto-"state of nature" arguments, to the effect that the basis of politics is that everyone is by nature free of subjection to any government. These arguments, however, relied on a corporatist theory found in [[Roman law]], according to which "a populus" can exist as a distinct legal entity. Thus, these arguments held that a group of people can join a government because it has the capacity to exercise a single will and make decisions with a single voice in the absence of sovereign authority—a notion rejected by Hobbes and later contract theorists. ==Philosophers== ===Thomas Hobbes' ''Leviathan'' (1651)=== {{main|Leviathan (Hobbes book)}} The first modern philosopher to articulate a detailed contract theory was [[Thomas Hobbes]] (1588–1679). According to Hobbes, the lives of individuals in the [[state of nature]] were "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short", a state in which self-interest and the absence of reliably protected rights and contracts prevented the "social", or society. Life was "anarchic" (without rulers or the concept of sovereignty). Individuals in the state of nature were apolitical and asocial. This state of nature is followed by the social contract. The social contract was seen as an "occurrence" during which individuals came together and ceded some of their [[natural rights|individual rights]] so that others would cede theirs.E.g. person{{nbsp}}A gives up his/her right to kill person{{nbsp}}B if person{{nbsp}}B does the same. This resulted in the establishment of the state—a sovereign entity like the individuals (now under its rule) used to be, which would create laws to regulate [[social interactions]]. Human life was thus no longer "a war of all against all". Notably, this theory features the ability of individuals to irrevocably relinquish their rights, even to a state which has absolute authority over life and death. How one could be said to do so "freely" while in the state of nature, i.e. under actual or potential duress, is not fully worked out by Hobbes or other social contract theorists (cf. "inalienable rights" in the U.S. [[United States Declaration of Independence|Declaration of Independence]], with marked Lockean influence, wherein rights are characterized as God-given and merely guaranteed or protected by the state. For a right to be "inalienable" arguably precludes its being given up under some or all circumstances by a rational autonomous agent bearing or possessing those rights as social contract theories require). The state system, which grew out of the social contract, was, however, also anarchic (without rulers). Just as the individuals in the state of nature had been sovereign and thus guided by self-interest and the absence of rights, so states now acted in their self-interest in competition with each other. Just like the state of nature, states were thus bound to be in conflict because there was no sovereign over and above the state (more powerful) capable of imposing some system such as social-contract laws on everyone by force. Indeed, Hobbes' work helped to serve as a basis for the [[Political realism|realism]] theories of international relations which consider the basic unit of analysis to be states with no overarching higher authority (akin to the "anarchy" of Hobbes' state of nature), advanced by [[E. H. Carr]] and [[Hans Morgenthau]]. Hobbes wrote in ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'' that humans ("we") need the "terrour of some Power" otherwise humans will not heed the [[Golden Rule|law of reciprocity]], "(in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to".{{cite book|last1=Hobbes|first1=Thomas|title=Leviathan|url=https://archive.org/details/leviathanpenguin00thom|url-access=registration|date=1985|publisher=Penguin|location=London|page=[https://archive.org/details/leviathanpenguin00thom/page/223 223]|isbn=9780140431957}} ===John Locke's ''Second Treatise of Government'' (1689)=== [[John Locke]]'s conception of the social contract differed from Hobbes' in several fundamental ways, retaining only the central notion that individuals in a state of nature would willingly come together to form a state. Locke believed that individuals in a state of nature would be bound morally, by the [[Natural law|Law of Nature]], in which man has the "power... to preserve his property; that is, his life, liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men". Without government to defend them against those seeking to injure or enslave them, Locke further believed people would have no security in their rights and would live in fear. Individuals, to Locke, would only agree to form a state that would provide, in part, a "neutral judge", acting to protect the lives, liberty, and property of those who lived within it.{{Cite journal|last=Gaba|first=Jeffery|date=Spring 2007|title=John Locke and the Meaning of the Takings Clause|url=https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3727&context=mlr|journal=Missouri Law Review|volume=72|issue=2|access-date=2018-04-19|archive-date=2021-03-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210305162433/https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3727&context=mlr|url-status=live}}{{Cite book|last=Locke|first=John|author-link=John Locke|date=1690|title=Two Treatises on Civil Government|publisher=Books on Demand |url=https://english.hku.hk/staff/kjohnson/PDF/LockeJohnSECONDTREATISE1690.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/https://english.hku.hk/staff/kjohnson/PDF/LockeJohnSECONDTREATISE1690.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live|isbn=9783749437412}} While Hobbes argued for near-absolute authority, Locke argued for inviolate freedom under law in his [[Two Treatises of Government#Second Treatise|''Second Treatise of Government'']]. Locke argued that a government's legitimacy comes from the citizens' delegation to the government of their absolute right of violence (reserving the inalienable right of self-defense or "self-preservation"), along with elements of other rights (e.g. property will be liable to taxation) as necessary to achieve the goal of security through granting the state a monopoly of violence, whereby the government, as an impartial judge, may use the collective force of the populace to administer and enforce the law, rather than each man acting as his own judge, jury, and executioner—the condition in the state of nature.{{citation needed|date=February 2017}}{{Cite web |last=Locke |first=John |orig-date=1690 |title=Second Treatise of Government |url=https://www.csus.edu/indiv/s/simpsonl/hist162/locke.pdf |pages=20–21}} ===Jean-Jacques Rousseau's ''Du Contrat social'' (1762)=== [[Jean-Jacques Rousseau]] (1712–1778), in his influential 1762 treatise ''[[The Social Contract]]'', outlined a different version of social-contract theory, as the foundations of society based on the sovereignty of the "[[general will]]". Rousseau's political theory differs in important ways from that of Locke and Hobbes. Rousseau's collectivist conception is most evident in his development of the "luminous conception" (which he credited to [[Denis Diderot]]) of the "[[general will]]". Summarised, the "[[general will]]" is the power of all the citizens' collective interest—not to be confused with their individual interests. Although Rousseau wrote that the British were perhaps at the time the freest people on earth, he did not approve of their representative government, nor any form of representative government. Rousseau believed that society was only legitimate when the sovereign (i.e. the "[[general will]]") were the sole [[legislator]]s. He also stated that the individual must accept "the total alienation to the whole community of each associate with all his rights".{{Cite book|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|title=The social contract; and, the first and second discourses / Jean-Jacques Rousseau; edited and with an introduction by Susan Dunn; with essays by Gita May [and others].|publisher=New Haven: Yale University Press|year=2002|isbn=9780300129434|location=|pages=163}} In short, Rousseau meant that in order for the social contract to work, individuals ''must'' forfeit their rights to the whole so that such conditions were "equal for all".{{Cite book|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|title=The social contract; and, the first and second discourses / Jean-Jacques Rousseau; edited and with an introduction by Susan Dunn; with essays by Gita May [and others].|publisher=New Haven : Yale University Press|year=2002|isbn=9780300129434|location=|pages=163}}{{blockquote|[The social contract] can be reduced to the following terms: ''Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.''Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ''Œuvres complètes'', ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond (Paris, 1959–95), III, 361; ''The Collected Writings of Rousseau'', ed. C. Kelley and R. Masters (Hanover, 1990–), IV, 139.}} Rousseau's other writings assert that his striking phrase that man must "be forced to be free"'' Oeuvres complètes'', III, 364; ''The Collected Writings of Rousseau'', IV, 141. should be understood{{according to whom|date=May 2019}} this way: since the indivisible and inalienable popular sovereignty decides what is good for the whole, if an individual rejects this "civil liberty"{{Cite book|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|title=The social contract; and, the first and second discourses / Jean-Jacques Rousseau; edited and with an introduction by Susan Dunn; with essays by Gita May [and others].|publisher=New Haven : Yale University Press|year=2002|isbn=9780300129434|location=|pages=167}} in place of "natural liberty" and self interest, disobeying the law, he will be forced to listen to what was decided when the people acted as a collective (as [[citizen]]s). Thus the law, inasmuch as it is created by the people acting as a body, is not a limitation of [[individual freedom]], but rather its expression. The individual, as a citizen, explicitly agreed to be constrained if, as a private individual, he did not respect his own will as formulated in the general will. Because laws represent the restraint of "natural liberty", they represent the leap made from humans in the state of nature into civil society. In this sense, the law is a civilizing force. Therefore, Rousseau believed that the laws that govern a people help to mould their character. Rousseau also analyses the social contract in terms of [[risk]] management, {{cite book | last1 = Gourevitch | first1 = Victor | translator1-last = Gourevitch | translator1-first = Victor | year = 1997 | chapter = Of the Social Contract | editor1-last = Gourevitch | editor1-first = Victor | title = The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=6L9tDwAAQBAJ | series = Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought | edition = 2nd | location = Cambridge | publisher = Cambridge University Press | publication-date = 2018 | page = 66 | isbn = 9781107150812 | access-date = 2019-05-11 | quote = Is it not nevertheless a gain to risk for the sake of what makes for our security just a portion of what we would have to risk for our own sakes as soon as we are deprived of it? }} thus suggesting the origins of the state as a form of mutual [[insurance]]. ===Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's individualist social contract (1851)=== While Rousseau's social contract is based on [[popular sovereignty]] and not on individual sovereignty, there are other theories espoused by [[individualist]]s, [[libertarians]], and [[Anarchism|anarchists]] that do not involve agreeing to anything more than [[Negative and positive rights|negative rights]] and creates only a limited state, if any. [[Pierre-Joseph Proudhon]] (1809–1865) advocated a conception of social contract that did not involve an individual surrendering sovereignty to others. According to him, the social contract was not between individuals and the state, but rather among individuals who refrain from coercing or governing each other, each one maintaining complete sovereignty upon him- or herself: {{blockquote|What really is the Social Contract? An agreement of the citizen with the government? No, that would mean but the continuation of [Rousseau's] idea. The social contract is an agreement of man with man; an agreement from which must result what we call society. In this, the notion of commutative justice, first brought forward by the primitive fact of exchange, ... is substituted for that of distributive justice ... Translating these words, contract, commutative justice, which are the language of the law, into the language of business, and you have commerce, that is to say, in its highest significance, the act by which man and man declare themselves essentially producers, and abdicate all pretension to govern each other.|Pierre-Joseph Proudhon|''[[The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century|General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century]]'' (1851)}} ===John Rawls' ''Theory of Justice'' (1971)=== Building on the work of Immanuel Kant with its presumption of limits on the state,• Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, 2011, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/ "Liberalism"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180908003440/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/ |date=2018-09-08 }}, 1.1, ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.