{{Short description|Division of a state's government into branches}}
{{Other uses}}
{{Distinguish|Separatism}}
{{Multiple issues|{{Original research|date=July 2024}}
{{Unbalanced|date=July 2024}}}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2025}}

{{Politics sidebar}}

The '''separation of powers''' principle functionally differentiates several types of [[state (polity)|state]] power (usually [[Legislature#Legislation|legislation]], [[adjudication]], and [[Executive (government)#Function|execution]]) and requires these operations of [[government]] to be conceptually and institutionally distinct and clearly articulated, thereby maintaining the integrity of each branch.{{sfn|Waldron|2013|pp=457–458}}<ref name=":0">{{Citation |last=Levy |first=Jacob T. |chapter=The Separation of Powers |date=2025 |title=The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory |pages=279–296 |editor-last=King |editor-first=Jeff |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-108-49131-0 |editor2-last=Bellamy |editor2-first=Richard}}</ref>{{sfn|Waldron|2013|pp=459–460}} Separation of powers is intended to prevent power centralization, [[democratic backsliding]] and [[Tyrant|tyrannical government]]. Separation of powers is closely linked to notions of checks and balances.<ref name=":0" />

== History ==
{{Republicanism sidebar}}

=== Antiquity ===
[[Polybius]] (''Histories'', Book 6, 11–13) described the [[Roman Republic]] as a [[mixed government]] ruled by the [[Roman Senate]], [[Roman consul|Consuls]] and the [[Roman assemblies|Assemblies]]. Polybius explained the system of checks and balances in detail, crediting [[Lycurgus of Sparta]] with the first government of this kind.<ref name="Polibius">Polibius. (~150 B.C.). The Rise of the Roman Empire. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert (1979). Penguin Classics. London, England.</ref>

=== Tripartite system ===
During the [[English Civil War]], the parliamentarians viewed the English system of government as composed of three branches – the King, the [[House of Lords]] and the [[House of Commons of England|House of Commons]] – where the first should have executive powers only, and the latter two legislative powers. One of the first documents proposing a tripartite system of separation of powers was the [[Instrument of Government]], written by the English general [[John Lambert (general)|John Lambert]] in 1653, and soon adopted as the constitution of England for a few years during [[The Protectorate]]. The system comprised a legislative branch (the Parliament) and two executive branches, the [[English Council of State]] and the [[Lord Protector]], all being elected (though the Lord Protector was elected for life) and having checks upon each other.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |author-last = Vile |author-first = Maurice J. C. |author-link = Maurice Vile |chapter = The separation of powers |encyclopedia = A companion to the American Revolution |editor-last1 = Greene |editor-first1 = Jack P. |editor-link1 = Jack P. Greene |editor-last2 = Pole |editor-first2 = J. R. |editor-link2 = Jack Pole |pages = 686–690 |publisher = Wiley (Blackwell imprint) |publication-date = Apr 2008 |isbn = 978-0-470-75644-7 |doi= 10.1002/9780470756454.ch87}}</ref>

A further development in English thought was the idea that the judicial powers should be separated from the executive branch. This followed the use of the juridical system by the Crown to prosecute opposition leaders following [[The English Restoration|the Restoration]], in the late years of [[Charles II of England|Charles II]] and during the short reign of [[James II of England|James II]] (namely, during the 1680s).<ref>Marshall J. (2013). Whig Thought and the Revolution of 1688–91. In: Harris, T., & Taylor, S. (Eds.). (2015). ''The final crisis of the Stuart monarchy: the revolutions of 1688–91 in their British, Atlantic and European contexts'', Chapter 3. Boydell & Brewer.</ref>

=== John Locke's legislative, executive, and federative powers ===
[[File:John Locke by John Greenhill.jpg|thumb|upright|[[John Locke]]]]

An earlier forerunner to Montesquieu's tripartite system was articulated by [[John Locke]] in his work ''[[Two Treatises of Government]]'' (1690).{{Sfn|Kurland|1986|page=595}} In the ''Two Treatises'', Locke distinguished between legislative, executive, and federative power. Locke defined legislative power as having "the right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed" (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;143), while executive power entailed the "execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force" (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;144). Locke further distinguished federative power, which entailed "the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all transactions with all persons and communities without [outside] the commonwealth" (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;145), or what is now known as [[foreign policy]]. Locke distinguishes between separate powers, but not between discretely separate institutions, and notes that one body or person can share in two or more of the powers.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Tuckness |first=Alex |title=Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=2002 |isbn=0691095043 |page=133 |chapter=Institutional Roles, Legislative View |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i-YA3RtI5boC&pg=PA133}}</ref> For instance, Locke noted that while the executive and federative powers are different, they are often combined in a single institution (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;148).

Locke believed that the legislative power was supreme over the executive and federative powers, which are subordinate.<ref>Tuckness, ''Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law'', at p. 126</ref> Locke reasoned that the legislative was supreme because it has law-giving authority; "[F]or what can give laws to another, must need to be superior to him" (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;150). According to Locke, legislative power derives its authority from the people, who have the right to make and unmake the legislature. He argues that once people consent to be governed by laws, only those representatives they have chosen can create laws on their behalf, and they are bound solely by laws enacted by these representatives.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Locke |first=John |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=K1UBAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA215 |title=Two Treatises of Government |publisher=C. and J. Rivington |year=1824 |publication-date=1824 |page=215 |author-link=John Locke}}</ref>

Locke maintained that there are restrictions on the legislative power. Locke says that the legislature cannot govern arbitrarily, cannot levy taxes, or confiscate property without the [[consent of the governed]] (cf. "[[No taxation without representation]]"), and cannot transfer its law-making powers to another body, known as the [[nondelegation doctrine]] (''Second Treatise'', §&nbsp;142).

=== Montesquieu's system ===
[[File:Montesquieu 1.png|thumb|upright|[[Montesquieu]]]]

The term "tripartite system" is commonly ascribed to French [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] [[political philosopher]] [[Montesquieu]], although he did not use such a term but referred to the "distribution" of powers. In ''[[The Spirit of Law]]'' (1748),<ref name="Espritdeslois3">{{Cite web |title=Esprit des lois (1777)/L11/C6 - Wikisource |url=https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Esprit_des_lois_(1777)/L11/C6 |access-date=11 March 2018 |website=fr.wikisource.org |language=fr}}</ref> Montesquieu described the various forms of distribution of [[political power]] among a [[legislature]], an [[executive (government)|executive]], and a [[judiciary]]. Montesquieu's approach was to present and defend a form of government whose powers were not excessively centralized in a single monarch or similar ruler (a form known then as "aristocracy"). He based this model on the [[Constitution of the Roman Republic]] and the [[Constitution of the United Kingdom|British constitutional system]]. Montesquieu took the view that the Roman Republic had powers separated so that no one could usurp complete power.<ref>{{Citation |last=Price |first=Sara |title=The Roman Republic in Montesquieu and Rousseau – Abstract |date=22 February 2011 |ssrn=1766947}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Schindler |first=Ronald |title=Montesquieu's Political Writings |url=http://www.rschindler.com/montesquieu.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131012023735/http://www.rschindler.com/montesquieu.htm |access-date=19 November 2012 |archive-date=12 October 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Citation |last=Lloyd |first=Marshall Davies |title=Polybius and the Founding Fathers: the separation of powers |date=22 September 1998 |url=http://mlloyd.org/mdl-indx/polybius/intro.htm |access-date=17 November 2012}}</ref> In the British constitutional system, Montesquieu discerned a separation of powers among the monarch, Parliament, and the courts of law.<ref>Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, ''The Spirit of Laws'', trans. by Thomas Nugent, revised ed. (New York: Colonial Press, 1899), Book 11, s. 6, pp. 151–162 at 151.</ref>

{{Blockquote
|In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.

By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes public security, and provides against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the state.
| |source=}}

Montesquieu argues that each Power should only exercise its own functions, or "there would be an end to everything". If the same person or body of magistrates held legislative and executive powers, liberty would be lost since the same monarch or senate could both enact and execute tyrannical laws. Similarly, a political entity holding both judiciary and legislative powers would exert arbitrary control over subjects, and one holding both judiciary and executive powers would be oppressive.<ref>Montesquieu, ''The Spirit of Laws'', at pp. 151–52.</ref>

Separation of powers requires a different source of legitimization, or a different act of legitimization from the same source, for each of the separate powers. If the legislative branch appoints the executive and judicial powers, as Montesquieu indicated, there will be no separation or division of its powers, since the power to appoint carries with it the power to revoke. Executive power would be given to a monarch, as that branch's need to be quick is best fulfilled by one, while legislative power is better regulated by many. If executive power were given to selected members of the legislation rather than the monarch, liberty would be lost since the members would always be able to have both powers.<ref>Montesquieu, ''The Spirit of Laws'', at p. 156.</ref>
=== Checks and balances ===
<!--"Checks and balances" redirects here.-->
{{Redirect|Checks and balances|the conservative-libertarian organization|Checks and Balances (organization)}}

In most modern constitutions, the separation of powers doctrine is modified by the notion of moderate, balanced government or '''checks and balances'''<ref>For the case of the United States constitution: {{harvnb|Kurland|1986|p=593}}</ref> – a distinct idea that was developed from the ancient theory of [[mixed government]].{{sfn|Vile|1967|p=18}} Since the two concepts developed alongside each other,{{sfn|Vile|1967|pp=2–3}} they have been closely associated, even though they are in conflict to some extent.{{sfn|Vile|1967|pp=33–34}} Further, constitutional provisions – notably those of the United States Constitution{{sfn|Vile|1967|pp=120–121}} – may reflect compromises between the two principles,{{sfn|Vile|1967|pp=71–72}} leading the terms "separation of powers" and "checks and balances" to become shorthand for the institutional distribution of legal authority under a specific constitution. They are at times even used interchangeably.

A government with checks and balances comprises more than one institution (often called a "branch" or "a power") exercising state power, and intends for each institution to have some influence over the other (interdependence). One institution may then "check" the other, or hinder it from using its power to pursue its ends – such as by declaring one of its actions a legal nullity or by questioning and removing one of its officers from their position. For instance, many parliaments consist of two houses; both of which are required to pass a bill before it becomes a law. A system of checks and balances also requires a balance of power between the institutions, so that the goals and actions of one are not completely determined by the other (independence); if both institutions were always in agreement by dint of one dominating the other, they would never challenge each other.

In a democratic state, where all government institutions are constituted by popular elections or through appointment by an elected body, disagreement between institutions may arise from conflicting institutional identities, fostered by differing internal power structures, decision-making processes or appointment procedures.{{Sfn|Magill|2000|pp=1170–72}} To continue the example of a bicameral parliament, members of the upper house of the United States Congress are each elected by the entire people of one federal state; whereas each member of its lower house is elected by their electoral district, a smaller and more localized constituency. A member representing a larger and more diverse base may require a broader coalition, composed of people with opposing interests, to win election, and is thus incentivized to moderate their stance; and vice versa.

One branch's efforts to prevent another branch from becoming supreme are thought to perpetually hinder any branch from imposing unduly severe measures on the governed. [[Immanuel Kant]] took this view, saying that "the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils,"<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |date=1971 |title=Political Writings |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=9781107268364 |editor-last=Reiss |editor-first=Hans |location=Cambridge, England |pages=112–13 |chapter=Perpetual Peace |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=v7v3CwAAQBAJ&pg=PT79 }}</ref> so long as they possess an appropriate constitution to pit opposing factions against each other.

Checks and balances are designed to maintain the system of separation of powers keeping each branch in its place. The idea is that it is not enough to separate the powers and guarantee their independence but the branches need to have the constitutional means to defend their own legitimate powers from the encroachments of the other branches.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Federalist No 48 |url=http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed48.asp |access-date=28 March 2018 |website=Avalon Project |publisher=Yale University }}</ref> Under this influence, it was implemented in 1787 in the [[Separation of powers under the United States Constitution|Constitution of the United States separation of powers]]. In [[Federalist No. 78]], [[Alexander Hamilton]], citing Montesquieu, redefined the judiciary as a separately distinct branch of government with the legislative and the executive branches.<ref name="Wood">{{cite book |last1=Wood |first1=Gordon S. |author-link1=Gordon S. Wood |editor1-last=Scalia |editor1-first=Antonin |editor-link=Antonin Scalia |chapter=Comment |title=A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law |date=2018 |pages=49–64 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l3CYDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA54 |access-date=12 December 2020|publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton|doi=10.2307/j.ctvbj7jxv.6 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference |url=https://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/mchughj/mchughj_2july04.html |title=The Strengths of the Weakest Arm |conference=Australian Bar Association Conference |location=Florence, Italy |date=2 July 2004 |access-date=22 August 2023 |archive-date=22 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230822215018/https://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/mchughj/mchughj_2july04.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> Before Hamilton, many colonists in the American colonies had adhered to British political ideas and conceived of government as divided into executive and legislative branches (with judges operating as appendages of the executive branch).<ref name="Wood" />

James Madison wrote about checks and balances in [[Federalist No. 51]]. For Madison, no government would be necessary if men were angels, but since men must govern men, the challenge is to have a government control both the governed and itself. While the government is primarily controlled by its dependence on the public, other precautions are necessary. Having rival interests creates "the defect of better motives" in both private and public life, displayed in distributing power to make everybody's private interests defend public rights through checking each other.<ref name="federalistNo51">{{cite web |url = http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed51.asp |website = The Avalon Project |title=Federalist No. 51 |last=James|first=Madison|publisher=Yale University|access-date=24 March 2018}}</ref>

[[Thomas Paine]] wrote about balances in ''[[Common Sense]]''. According to Paine, two houses on behalf of the king and the people respectively creates a house divided against itself. While "pleasantly arranged", this system will end up being dominated by the power made strongest in the constitution. Other powers can check its speed, but they will be ineffectual if they cannot stop it.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Paine |first1=Thomas |title=Common Sense |chapter=Republican Government: On the Origin and Design of Government in General, With Concise Remarks on the English Constitution |date=1776 |url=https://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch4s4.html}}</ref> Importantly, Paine rejected the theory that English liberty was secured by constitutionally guaranteed checks and balances. He denounced the whole notion of checks and balances, at least as far as the English constitution was concerned, in that "it is wholly owing to the constitution of the people and not to the constitution of the government that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey."<ref>{{cite book |last1=Kuklick |first1=Bruce |title=Thomas Paine |date=2018 |publisher=Taylor & Francis}}</ref>

Checks and balances, such as veto rights in a separation of powers systems can result in [[Gridlock (politics)|gridlock]] when [[veto players]] in each of the branches are not aligned.<ref name="f951">{{cite journal | last=Krehbiel | first=Keith | title=Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock: A Theory of Divided and Unified Government | journal=Journal of Theoretical Politics | volume=8 | issue=1 | date=1996 | issn=0951-6298 | doi=10.1177/0951692896008001002 | pages=7–40 | url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692896008001002 | access-date=2026-08-20| url-access=subscription }}</ref>

== Theories of division of state power ==
{{refimprove section|date=August 2026}}
There are different theories about how to differentiate the functions of the state (or types of government power), so that they may be distributed among multiple structures of government (usually called branches of government, or arms).<ref>{{harvnb|Möllers|2019|p=239}}: "The modern theory of separated powers [...] addresses the necessary or possible relations between [institutional] actors and their normative 'functions'. Legislation, execution of laws and adjudication are 'functions' that the states or other public authorities fulfil and that are carried out by respective 'branches'. In this context, the notion of 'function' refers to different types of legally relevant actions."</ref> There are analytical theories that provide a conceptual lens through which to understand the separation of powers as realized in real-world governments (developed by the academic discipline of [[comparative government]]); there are also [[Normativity|normative]] theories,<ref>On this distinction, see {{harvnb|Möllers|2019|p=231}}.</ref> both of [[political philosophy]] and [[constitutional law]], meant to propose a reasoned (not conventional or arbitrary) way to separate powers. Disagreement arises between various normative theories in particular about what is the (desirable, in the case of political philosophy, or prescribed, in the case of legal studies) allocation of functions to specific governing bodies or branches of government.{{sfn|Möllers|2019|p=234}} How to correctly or usefully delineate and define the 'state functions' is another major point of contention.{{sfn|Möllers|2019|p=240}}

=== Legislation ===
{{See also|Legislature#Legislation|Statute}}

The function of the legislative branch of government broadly consists of authoritatively issuing binding rules.

=== Execution ===
{{See also|Executive (government)#Function}}
{{Expand section|date=July 2024}}

The function of the executive branch of government includes many exercises of powers in fact, whether in carrying into effect legal decisions or affecting the real world on its own initiative.

=== Adjudication ===
{{See also|Adjudication|Judgment (law)}}
{{Expand section|date=July 2024}}

The function of the judicial branch of government is the binding application of legal rules to a particular case, which usually involves creatively interpreting and developing these rules.

=== Electoral ===
{{See also|Election commission}}
The function of an electoral branch of government is the oversight of the process surrounding elections, typically to the other branches of government. This may include [[electoral boundary delimitation]] or the administration of an election. In some governments such as Bolivia, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, it forms its own distinct branch, while in others it may be fused variably into the executive, judicial, or legislative branches.

=== Auditory ===
The function of an auditory branch of government is to monitor the performance of the government in its operation. In [[Taiwan]], the [[Control Yuan]] forms its own branch of government tasked with the oversight and [[Government performance auditing|auditing]] of the government, and holds the ability to [[impeach]] public officials for misconduct. In other nations these functions may be fused under the legislative branch, such as in the [[United States]] where the [[United States Government Accountability Office|Government Accountability Office]] performs auditing while the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] and [[United States Senate|Senate]] oversee the process of impeachment.

== See also ==
* [[Consociationalism]]
* {{Annotated link|Constitutionalism}}
* {{Annotated link|Parliamentary sovereignty}}
* {{Annotated link|Philosophy of law}}
* {{Annotated link|Pith and substance}}
* {{Annotated link|Reserve power}}
* [[Separation of duties]]

== Notes ==

=== Citation footnotes ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Works cited ===
* {{cite journal
  | last = Barber
  | first = Nicholas W.
  | title = Prelude to the Separation of Powers
  | url = https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:8b474593-88ae-41ab-967a-6994fe8e3779/files/me4aa7240386346f431b3ed13501aeb37
  | journal = The Cambridge Law Journal
  | volume = 60
  | issue = 1
  | date = Mar 2001
  | pages = 59–88
  | doi = 10.1017/S0008197301000629
  | jstor = 4508751
}}
* {{cite book
  | last = Gwyn
  | first = William B.
  | year = 1965
  | title = The Meaning of the Separation of Powers. An Analysis of the Doctrine from its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution
  | series = Tulane Studies in Political Science
  | volume = IX
  | publication-place = New Orleans/The Hague
  | publisher = Tulane University Press/Martinus Nijhoff
  | oclc = 174573519
}}
* {{Cite journal
 |last=Kurland
 |first=Philip B.
 |author-link = Philip B. Kurland
 |date=Dec 1986
 |title=The Rise and Fall of the 'Doctrine' of Separation of Powers
 |url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/8021
 |journal=Michigan Law Review
 |volume=85
 |issue=3
 |pages=592–613
 |doi=10.2307/1288758
 |jstor=1288758
}}
* {{cite journal
  | last = Magill
  | first = M. Elizabeth
  | author-link = Liz Magill
  | title = The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law
  | url = https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2863/
  | journal = Virginia Law Review
  | volume = 86
  | issue = 6
  | date = 2000
  | pages = 1127–1198
  | jstor = 1073943
  | ssrn = 224797
}}
* {{cite book
  | last1 = Möllers
  | first1 = Christoph
  | author-link1 = :de:Christoph Möllers
  | date = 2013
  | title = The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers
  | publisher = Oxford University Press
  | isbn = 9780198738084
  | oclc = 818450015
}}
* {{cite encyclopedia
  | author-last = Möllers
  | author-first = Christoph
  | title = Separation of Powers (ch. 9)
  | url = https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-comparative-constitutional-law/separation-of-powers/3A31875119575C2579078E364117393A
  | url-access = subscription
  | encyclopedia = The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Constitutional Law
  | series = Cambridge Companions to Law
  | editor-last1 = Masterman
  | editor-first1 = Roger
  | editor-last2 = Schütze
  | editor-first2 = Robert
  | date = Sep 2019
  | pages = 230‒257
  | publisher = Cambridge University Press
  | isbn = 978-1-107-16781-0
  | oclc = 1099539425
  | doi = 10.1017/9781316716731
}}
* {{cite book
  | last1 = Sandro
  | first1 = Paolo
  | date = 2022
  | title = The Making of Constitutional Democracy: From Creation to Application of Law
  | url = https://www.bloomsburycollections.com/monograph?docid=b-9781509905249
  | publisher = Bloomsbury (Hart imprint)
  | publication-place = Oxford
  | series = Law and Practical Reason
  | volume = 13
  | isbn = 978-1-50990-524-9
  | oclc = 1274231156
  | doi = 10.5040/9781509905249
  | id = [[OAPEN]] [https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/74777 20.500.12657/74777]
}}
* {{cite book
  | last = Vile
  | first = Maurice J. C.
  | author-link = Maurice Vile
  | year = 1967
  | title = Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers
  | publication-place = Oxford
  | publisher = Clarendon Press
  | oclc = 390050
}}
* {{cite journal
  | last = Waldron
  | first = Jeremy
  | author-link = Jeremy Waldron
  | title = Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?
  | url = https://bclawreview.bc.edu/articles/702
  | journal = Boston College Law Review
  | volume = 54
  | issue = 2
  | date = 28 March 2013
  | pages = 433–468
}}

== Further reading ==
* Biancamaria Fontana (ed.), ''[http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521033764 The Invention of the Modern Republic]'' (2007) {{ISBN|978-0-521-03376-3}}
* Bernard Manin, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=GhAJ2x2coEoC Principles of Representative Government]'' (1995; English version 1997) {{ISBN|0-521-45258-9}} (hbk), {{ISBN|0-521-45891-9}} (pbk)
* José María Maravall and [[Adam Przeworski]] (eds), ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=EMB-F6Forx8C Democracy and the Rule of Law]'' (2003) {{ISBN|0-521-82559-8}} (hbk), {{ISBN|0-521-53266-3}} (pbk)
* Paul A. Rahe, [https://web.archive.org/web/20110716145832/http://www.hillsdalesites.org/personal/prahe/logicofliberty.html ''Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty''] (2009) {{ISBN|978-0-300-14125-2}} (hbk), {{ISBN|978-0-300-16808-2}} (pbk)
*  Iain Stewart, [https://web.archive.org/web/20120319161702/http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/law_journals/macquarie_law_journal/ "Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on 'Separation of Powers' and 'the Rule of Law'"] 4 ''Macquarie Law Journal'' 187 (2004)
* Iain Stewart, [https://web.archive.org/web/20110408194916/http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/montesquieu.shtml "Montesquieu in England: his 'Notes on England', with Commentary and Translation"] (2002)
* [[Alec Stone Sweet]], ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=61AzsGk7EW0C Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe]'' (2000) {{ISBN|978-0-19-829730-7}}
* Evan C. Zoldan, ''[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3106780 Is the Federal Judiciary Independent of Congress?]'', 70 Stan. L. Rev. Online 135 (2018).

== External links ==
{{Wikiquote}}

* [http://www.mlloyd.org/mdl-indx/polybius/intro.htm Polybius and the Founding Fathers: the separation of powers]
* [http://www.bartleby.com/43/9.html Arbitrary Government Described and the Government of the Massachusetts Vindicated from that Aspersion (1644)]

{{Separation of powers}}
{{Political philosophy}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Separation of powers| ]]
[[Category:Concepts in political philosophy]]
[[Category:Constitutional law]]
[[Category:Montesquieu]]
[[Category:Philosophy of law]]
[[Category:Political science terminology]]