{{short description|Concept in political philosophy}}
{{distinguish|Right to resist}}
{{revolution sidebar|expanded=none}}
In [[political philosophy]], the '''right of revolution''' or '''right of rebellion''' is the right or duty of a people to "alter or abolish" a government that acts against their common interests or threatens the safety of the people without justifiable cause. Stated throughout history in one form or another, the belief in this right has been used to justify various revolutions, including the [[American Revolution]], [[French Revolution]], [[Texas Revolution]], [[Syrian revolution|Syrian Revolution]], [[Russian Revolution]], and the [[Iranian Revolution]].
==History==
===Early examples===
====Ancient China====
To justify their overthrowing of the earlier [[Shang dynasty]], the kings of the [[Zhou dynasty]] (1122–256 BCE) of [[China]] promulgated the concept known as the [[Mandate of Heaven]], that [[Tian|Heaven]] would bless the authority of a just ruler, but would be displeased and withdraw its mandate from a despotic ruler.Perry, Elizabeth (2002). ''Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China''. Sharpe. {{ISBN|0-7656-0444-2}} The Mandate of Heaven would then transfer to those who would rule best. Chinese historians interpreted a successful revolt as evidence that the Mandate of Heaven had passed on. Throughout Chinese history, rebels who opposed the ruling dynasty made the claim that the Mandate of Heaven had passed, giving them the right to revolt. Ruling dynasties were often uncomfortable with this, and the writings of the Confucian philosopher [[Mencius]] (372–289 BCE) were often suppressed for declaring that the people have the right to overthrow a ruler that did not provide for their needs.
====Ancient Rome====
[[File:Suicide lucretia.jpg|thumb|upright=1.8|The [[Roman Republic]] was established following the [[overthrow of the Roman monarchy]].]]
The populist leader [[Tiberius Gracchus]] tried to justify depriving power from tribune Marcus Octavius by arguing that a [[tribune]] "stands deprived by his own act of honours and immunities, by the neglect of the duty for which the honour was bestowed upon him". For Gracchus, he "who assails the power of the people is no longer a tribune at all".
He strengthened his argument by highlighting the precedent of the overthrow of [[Tarquin the Proud]] "when he acted wrongfully; and for the crime of one single man, the ancient government under which Rome was built was abolished forever."Plutarch (1952). ''Tiberius Gracchus'' (J. Dryden, trans.). In R. M. Hutchins (ed.), ''Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans'' (1st ed., Vol. 14, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 671–681). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1927) As historian [[Edward Gibbon]] observes, after Tarquin's overthrow, "the ambitious Roman who should dare to assume their title or imitate [Tarquin's] tyranny was devoted to the infernal gods: each of his fellow-citizens was armed with the sword of justice; and the act of [[Lucius Junius Brutus|Brutus]], however repugnant to gratitude or prudence, had been already sanctified by the judgement of his country."E. Gibbon (1952). ''The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire''. In R. M. Hutchins (ed.), ''Gibbon II'' (1st ed., Vol. 41, ''Great Books of the Western World'', p. 92). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica.
After the death of [[Augustus]], the soldier Percennius fomented mutiny in the legions of [[Pannonia]]. Believing they had the right to violently rebel to get better treatment and greater appreciation from the state, he rhetorically asked the common soldiery why they submitted to the centurions while military life entailed such low pay and so many years in service. Many soldiers shared his feelings. According to the historian [[Tacitus]], "The throng applauded from various motives, some pointing to the marks of the lash, others to their grey locks, and most of them to their threadbare garments and naked limbs."P. Cornelius Tacitus (1952). ''The Annals'', Book I (A. J. Church, trans.). In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), ''The Annals and Histories of Tacitus'' (1st ed., vol. 15, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 1–184). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1927)
The Praetorian [[Subrius Flavus]] justified his right of revolution against [[Emperor Nero]] on the grounds that Nero's crimes meant he no longer deserved the love of the people: "I began to hate you when you became the murderer of your mother and your wife, a charioteer, an actor, and an incendiary."Tacitus, ''The Annals'', Book XV, p. 174
In 285 C.E., [[Maximian]] suppressed a rebellion of Gallic peasants violently resisting exploitation by their masters. These fought for their natural rights against the miserable conditions they were placed under. Gibbon says that they "asserted the natural rights of men, but they asserted those rights with the most savage cruelty".E. Gibbon (1952). ''The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire''. In R. M. Hutchins (ed.), ''Gibbon I'' (1st ed., Vol. 40, ''Great Books of the Western World'', p. 144). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica.
====Medieval Europe====
[[File:Magna Carta (British Library Cotton MS Augustus II.106).jpg|thumb|right|''[[Magna Carta]]'' marks one of the earliest attempts to limit a sovereign's authority and it is seen as a symbol of the rule of law.]]
One example of the emergence of a right of revolution can be traced back to [[Þorgnýr the Lawspeaker]], who in 1018 had a dramatic confrontation with the King of Sweden. The lawspeaker claimed the King of Sweden was accountable to the people and would be overthrown by them if he continued with his unpopular war with Norway.
Another example were the semi-mythical [[Fueros de Sobrarbe|Charters of Sobrarbe]], allegedly issued in the Pyrenees in the 850s, which enshrined the Iberian legal principle that "''laws come before kings''."Ramos Loscertales, José María, ''«Los fueros de Sobrarbe»'', Cuadernos de Historia de España, 7 (1947). Specifically, the 6th charter of Sobrarbe (first mentioned in 1117) specified that "''If He [the King] should hereafter tyrannise the kingdom against the fueros or liberties, the kingdom should be free to choose another king, even if he were a pagan,"''{{Citation |chapter=Chapter VI. Royal Oaths in Aragon and the Oath of the Aragonese |date=1968-12-31 |title=If Not, Not |pages=158–226 |chapter-url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400875443-008 |access-date=2024-09-25 |publisher=Princeton University Press |doi=10.1515/9781400875443-008 |isbn=978-1-4008-7544-3 |chapter-url-access=subscription }} thereby enshrining the right of rebellion against the King. During the [[High Middle Ages]], the ''Charters of Sobrarbe'' were used both in the [[kingdom of Navarre]]Martín Duque, Ángel Juan, ''«Hacia la edición crítica del Fuero de Tudela»'', Revista Jurídica de Navarra, núm. 4 (1987). and in the [[kingdom of Aragon]] to thwart royal authority, and in the medieval [[kingdom of Aragon]] to create the figure of the [[Justicia de Aragón]], an office first mentioned in 1115, appointed by the [[Catalan Courts|Aragonese parliament]], and with ample powers to veto any action of the King deemed to against the customs and laws of the kingdom; this provided a uniquely complete institutional and constitutional framework with which to disobey the King.{{cite book |last=Danvila y Collado |first=Manuel |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8XuLLqQr3r8C |title=Las libertades de Aragón: ensayo histórico, jurídico y político |publisher=Imprenta de Fortanet |year=1881}} The legal lemma "''[[Obedezco pero no cumplo]]''" [I obey, but do not comply] found in [[Castile (historical region)|Castilian law]], likewise stemming from this tradition, was used to justify disobeying the King's orders that were deemed to go against the law; this legal principle was used in everything from bypassing censorshipAdorno, R. (2020). "Obedezco pero no cumplo": Surviving Censorship in Early Modern Spain. ''Textual Cultures: Texts, Contexts, Interpretation'' ''13''(1), 29-74.
We are, therefore, forced to the melancholy conclusion, that the Mexican people have acquiesced in the destruction of their liberty, and the substitution therefor of a military government; that they are unfit to be free, and incapable of self government. The necessity of self-preservation, therefore, now decrees our eternal political separation. We, therefore, the delegates with plenary powers of the people of Texas, in solemn convention assembled, appealing to a candid world for the necessities of our condition, do hereby resolve and declare, that our political connection with the Mexican nation has forever ended, and that the people of Texas do now constitute a free, Sovereign, and independent republic, and are fully invested with all the rights and attributes which properly belong to independent nations; and, conscious of the rectitude of our intentions, we fearlessly and confidently commit the issue to the decision of the Supreme arbiter of the destinies of nations.====American Civil War==== The inherent (rather than constitutional) right to revolt was cited in the year prior the civil war's start as justifying the secession of the [[Confederate States of America]].{{cite news |publisher=Congressional Globe Office |location=Washington |title=The Congressional Globe: containing The Debates and Proceedings of the Second Session of the Thirty-Sixth Congress: also, of the Special Session of the Senate |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f2igzdMF59EC&pg=PA11 |first=John C. |last=Rives |work=The Congressional Globe |year=1861 |page=11 |quote=But, sir, while a State has no power under the Constitution conferred upon it, to secede from the Federal Government or from the Union, '''each State has the right of revolution''', which all admit. Whenever the burdens of the Government under which it acts become so onerous that it cannot bear them, or if anticipated evil shall be so great that the State believes it would be better off – even risking the perils of secession – out of the Union than in it, then that State, in my opinion, like all people upon earth, has the right to exercise the great fundamental principle of self-preservation, and go out of the Union – though, of course, at its own peril – and bear the risk of the consequences. And while no State may have the constitutional right to secede from the Union, the President may not be wrong when he says the Federal Government has no power under the Constitution to compel the State to come back into the Union. It may be a ''casus omissus'' in the constitution; but I should like to know where the power exists in the Constitution of the United States to authorize the Federal Government to coerce a sovereign State. It does not exist in any terms, at any rate, in the Constitution.}} (Iverson said this in 1860; 1861 is when Globe published it.) ==== Coups in El Salvador ==== The [[Right to insurrection (El Salvador)|right to insurrection]] was invoked in the [[Revolution of the 44]], [[1931 Salvadoran coup d'état]], and [[1979 Salvadoran coup d'état]]. ==Nature of the right== {{Rights}} ===Individual or collective right=== Although some explanations of the right of revolution leave open the possibility of its exercise as an individual right, it was clearly understood to be a collective right under English constitutional and political theory.See Christian G. Fritz, ''American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 14 (noting that under English constitutional law the right of revolution "belonged to the community as a whole, as one of the parties to the original constitutional contract"). See also John Phillip Reid, ''Constitutional History of the American Revolution'' (4 vols., [[University of Wisconsin Press]], 1986–1993), I:111 (identifying the collective right of the people "to preserve their rights by force and even rebellion against constituted authority"), III:427n31 (quoting Viscount Bolingbroke that the "collective Body of the People" had the right to "break the Bargain between the King and the Nation"). As [[Pauline Maier]] has noted in her study ''From Resistance to Revolution'', "private individuals were forbidden to take force against their rulers either for malice or because of private injuries".Pauline Maier, ''From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain, 1765–1776'' (Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 33. Instead, "not just a few individuals, but the 'Body of the People' had to feel concerned" before the right of revolution was justified and with most writers speaking of a {{"'}}whole people who are the Public', or the body of the people acting in their 'public Authority', indicating a broad consensus involving all ranks of society".Maier, ''From Resistance to Revolution'', 35–36. In the second of his ''Two Treatises of Government'', John Locke quotes the jurist [[William Barclay (jurist)|William Barclay]] as stating "That particular men are allowed ... to have no other remedy but patience; but the body of the people may with, with respect, resist intolerable tyranny, for when it is moderate they ought to endure it."Barclay, ''Contra Monarchomachos'', iii. 8. in Locke, ''Concerning Civil Government'', chapter XIX, Section 233, p. 79 ===Right versus duty=== Some philosophers argue that it is not only the right of a people to overthrow an oppressive government but also their ''duty'' to do so. Jeanne Hersch opines, "It seems to me that the ''duty'' to rebel is much more understandable than that ''right'' to rebel, because the right to rebellion ruins the order of power, whereas the duty to rebel goes beyond and breaks it."{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1R8bi1m9NvIC&dq=%22duty+to+rebel%22&pg=PA327|title=Ethics and Social Justice|isbn=9780873950541|access-date=30 June 2015|last1=Kiefer|first1=Howard Evans|last2=Munitz|first2=Milton Karl |publisher=SUNY Press }} [[Morton White]] writes of the American revolutionaries, "The notion that they had a ''duty'' to rebel is extremely important to stress, for it shows that they thought they were complying with the ''commands'' of natural law and of nature's God when they threw off absolute despotism."{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z0thewbdTMsC&dq=%22duty+to+rebel%22&pg=PA48|title=Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America|isbn=9780814719244|access-date=30 June 2015|last1=Darsey|first1=James|date=September 1999 |publisher=NYU Press }} The [[U.S. Declaration of Independence]] states that "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their ''duty'', to throw off such Government" (emphasis added). The phrase "long train of abuses" is a reference to John Locke's similar statement in the ''Second Treatise of Government'', where he explicitly established overthrow of a tyrant as an obligation. [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] likewise held that it is the duty of the people to resist unjust laws. ==Preconditions== ===In philosophical discourse=== Certain theories of the right of revolution impose significant preconditions on its exercise, sometimes limiting its invocation to the most dire circumstances. Aristotle insisted that "men of rank" who "excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel".Aristotle, ''Politics'', Book V, Chapter 1 Although [[Plato]] argued that a dissident should openly criticise his nation's policies, "provided that his words are not likely either to fall on deaf ears or to lead to the loss of his own life", he also stipulated against seemingly necessary violent insurrection: "force against his native land he should not use in order to bring about a change of constitution, when it is not possible for the best constitution to be introduced without driving men into exile or putting them to death".Plato (1952). ''The Seventh Letter'' (J. Harward, trans.). In M. J. Adler (ed.), ''Plato'' (1st ed., Vol. 7, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 800–814). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1928) Thinkers often emphasise the great responsibility in taking hold of the right to revolution. Aquinas believed that would-be revolutionaries held no right to rebel against a tyrant if "the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinantly that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government".Aquinas, ''Summa Theologica'', Part II–II, Question 42, Article 2, Reply 3 [[Michel de Montaigne]] was equally cautious, warning that "to establish a better regimen in the stead of that which a man has overthrown, many who have attempted it have foundered".M. de Montaigne (1952). "Of Presumption" (C. Cotton, trans.). In W. C. Hazlitt (ed.), ''The Essays of Michel Eyquem de Montaigne'' (1st ed., vol. 25, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 318–319). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1877) Even the American Declaration of Independence admits that "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes".T. Jefferson, Declaration of Independence, p. 1 In ''[[Leviathan (Hobbes book)|Leviathan]]'', [[Thomas Hobbes]] argued that, since they have consented to invest their sovereign with the right of rulership, monarchical subjects can only change rulers with the original sovereign's permission. He states that "they that are subjects to a monarch cannot without his leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it to another man, or other assembly of men".T. Hobbes (1952). ''Leviathan'', Part II, Chapter XVIII. In N. Fuller (ed.), ''Hobbes'' (1st ed., Vol. 23, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 101–104). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. Elsewhere he emphasises this point by saying that "the commands of them that have the right to command are not by their subjects to be censured nor disputed".Hobbes, ''Leviathan'', Part II, Chapter XX, p. 112 John Locke believed in the precondition that the right of violent insurrection could only be retained by those challenging tyranny, stipulating "that force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force".Locke, ''Concerning Civil Government'', Chapter XVIII, Section 204, p. 72 The right of revolution only gave a people the right to rebel against unjust rule, not any rule: "whoever, either ruler or subject, by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people, and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government, he is guilty of the greatest crime I think a man is capable of".Locke, ''Concerning Civil Government'', Chapter XIX, Section 230, p. 78 In ''Two Treatises of Government'', Locke discusses the pro-monarchy philosopher William Barclay's notions about the preconditions for the right of revolution against a monarch: "First. He says it must be with reverence. Secondly. It must be without retribution or punishment; and the reason he gives is, 'because an inferior cannot punish a superior'." Locke disagreed with both these preconditions, explaining that it is impossible to strike against any opposition 'with reverence' and that an oppressor loses his superiority by being an oppressor.Locke, ''Concerning Civil Government'', Chapter XIX, Section 235, p. 79 Elsewhere Barclay insists that a king must be dethroned as a precondition for the right of revolution against a monarchy: "The people, therefore, can never come by a power over him unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king", which may only happen if the king tries to overturn his kingdom or make his rule dependent on force provided by another country.Barclay, ''Contra Monarchomachus'', I. iii. c. 16. in Locke, ''Concerning Civil Government'', Chapter XIX, Section 235–237, p. 80 In his treatise ''[[Politics (Aristotle)|Politics]]'', [[Aristotle]] disapproves of the Cretan constitution's provision for the aristocratic right of revolution against the Cosmi, the ten most important magistrates in the country: "Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice." For Aristotle, this is evidence of oligarchical interference codified into supposedly constitutional, republican government.Aristotle (1952). ''Politics'', Book II, Chapter 10 (B. Jowett, trans.). In R. M. Hutchins (ed.), ''Aristotle II'' (1st ed., vol. 9, ''Great Books of the Western World'', pp. 445–548). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1915) In contrary to this view, the [[French Enlightenment]] thinker [[Montesquieu]] believed that this institution successfully hindered the abuse of power, thanks to the existing precondition of a powerful patriotism felt by the Cretans towards their island.Baron de Montesquieu (1952). ''The Spirit of Laws'' (T. Nugent, trans.). In M. J. Adler (ed.), ''Montesquieu'' (1st ed., vol. 38, ''Great Books of the Western World'', p. 54). Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopædia Britannica. (Original work published 1914) ===During the American Revolution=== [[File:Declaration of Independence (1819), by John Trumbull.jpg|right|upright=1.6|thumb|The presentation of the draft of the Declaration of Independence in [[John Trumbull]]'s ''[[Declaration of Independence (Trumbull)|Declaration of Independence]]'' depicts another idealization of the exercise of the right of revolution.]] In the American Revolutionary context, one finds expressions of the right of revolution both as subject to precondition and as unrestrained by conditions. On the eve of the American Revolution, for example, Americans considered their plight to justify exercise of the right of revolution. [[Alexander Hamilton]] justified American resistance as an expression of "the law of nature" redressing violations of "the first principles of civil society" and invasions of "the rights of a whole people".Alexander Hamilton, ''The Farmer Refuted'' (February 23, 1775), ''The Papers of Alexander Hamilton'', I:136 For [[Thomas Jefferson]], the Declaration was the last-ditch effort of an oppressed people—the position in which many Americans saw themselves in 1776. Jefferson's litany of colonial grievances was an effort to establish that Americans met their burden to exercise the natural law right of revolution. Certain scholars, such as legal historian [[Christian Fritz]], have written that with the end of the Revolution, Americans did not renounce the right of revolution. In fact they codified it in their new constitutionsSee Christian G. Fritz, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpKCvUacmSwC&dq=christian+g+fritz+%22american+sovereigns%22&pg=RA1-PA168 American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War]''. (Cambridge University Press, 2008) at p. 25 {{ISBN|978-0-521-88188-3}}. In Chapter 2, "Revolutionary Constitutionalism", Professor Fritz notes that after the Revolution, "[i]ncreasingly, as Americans included it in their constitutions, the right of revolution came to be seen as a constitutional principle permitting the people as the sovereign to control government and revise their constitutions without limit." and even today 35 constitutions of American states have the same or similar provisions on the right of revolution as in the preamble of the [[American Declaration of Independence]].See Marsavelski, A. [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2329401 "The Crime of Terrorism and the Right of Revolution in International Law"], ''Connecticut Journal of International Law'', vol. 28, p. 270 For instance, constitutions considered to be "conservative", such as those of post-revolutionary [[Massachusetts]] in 1780, preserved the people's right "to reform, alter, or totally change" government not only for their protection or safety but also whenever their "prosperity and happiness require[d] it".Massachusetts 1780 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Art. 7. This expression was not unusual in the early American constitutions. [[Connecticut]]'s 1818 constitution articulated the people's right "at all times" to alter government "in such a manner as they may think expedient".Connecticut 1818 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 2. Fritz, in ''American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War'', describes a duality in American views on preconditions to the right of revolution: "Some of the first state constitutions included 'alter or abolish' provisions that mirrored the traditional right of revolution" in that they required dire preconditions to its exercise.Christian G. Fritz, ''American Sovereigns: The People and America's Constitutional Tradition Before the Civil War'' (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 24. [[Maryland]]'s 1776 constitution and [[New Hampshire]]'s 1784 constitution required the perversion of the ends of government and the endangering of public liberty and that all other means of redress were to no avail.See Maryland 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 4; New Hampshire 1784 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Art. 10. But in contrast, other states dispensed with the onerous preconditions on the exercise of the right. In the 1776 [[Virginia]] constitution the right would arise simply if government was "inadequate" and [[Pennsylvania]]'s 1776 constitution required only that the people considered a change to be "most conducive" to the public welfare.Virginia 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 3; Pennsylvania 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 5. ==Natural law or positive law== Descriptions of the right of revolution also differ in whether that right is considered to be a [[natural law]] (a law whose content is set by nature and that therefore has validity everywhere) or [[positive law]] (law enacted or adopted by proper authority for governing of the state). An example of the dual nature of the right of revolution as both a natural law and as positive law is found in the American revolutionary context. Although the [[American Declaration of Independence]] invoked the natural law right of revolution, natural law was not the sole justification for American independence. English constitutional doctrine also supported the colonists' actions, at least up to a point. By the 1760s, English law recognized what [[William Blackstone]]'s ''[[Commentaries on the Laws of England]]'' called "the law of redress against public oppression".William Blackstone, ''Commentaries on the Laws of England'' (4 vols., Oxford, 1765–1769, Facsimile ed., repr., 1979), I:238. Like the natural law's right of revolution, this constitutional law of redress justified the people resisting the sovereign. This law of redress arose from a contract between the people and the king to preserve the public welfare. This original contract was "a central dogma in English and British constitutional law" since "time immemorial".John Phillip Reid, "The Irrelevance of the Declaration", in Hendrik Hartog, ed., ''Law in the American Revolution and the Revolution in the Law'' (1981), 72. The Declaration's long list of grievances declared that this bargain had been breached.New Jersey 1776 Constitution, Preamble in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., ''The Federal and State Constitutions Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the ... United States of America'', V:2594 (noting that the King breached his contract with the people). This well-accepted law of redress justified a people resisting unconstitutional acts of government. Liberty depended upon the people's "ultimate" right to resist. Unconstitutional commands breaching the "voluntary compact between the rulers and the ruled" could be "ignored" and arbitrary commands opposed with force.John Phillip Reid, ''Constitutional History of the American Revolution'' (4 vols., 1986–1993), III:140. This right implied a duty on the part of the people to resist unconstitutional acts. As Alexander Hamilton noted in 1775, government exercised powers to protect "the absolute rights" of the people and government forfeited those powers and the people could reclaim them if government breached this constitutional contract.Alexander Hamilton, "The Farmer Refuted" (February 23, 1775), ''The Papers of Alexander Hamilton'', I:88. The law of redress had limits like the right of revolution under natural law. The law of redress, like the right of revolution, was not an individual right. It belonged to the community as a whole, as one of the parties to the original constitutional contract.See Reid, ''Constitutional History'', I:111 (identifying the collective right of the people “to preserve their rights by force and even rebellion against constituted authority”), III:427n31 (quoting Viscount Bolingbroke that the "collective Body of the People" had the right to "break the Bargain between the King and the Nation"); Pauline Maier, ''From Resistance to Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development of American Opposition to Britain'', 1765–1776, 33–34 ("Private individuals were forbidden to take force against their rulers either for malice or because of private injuries, even if no redress for their grievances were afforded by the regularly constituted government"). It was not a means of first resort, or response to trivial or casual errors of government.Some commentators endorsed the right of resistance if Parliament "jeopardized the constitution", but most identified the need for oppression and tyranny before its exercise. See Reid, ''Constitutional History'', III:121, 427n31; Maier, ''Resistance'', 33–35. Blackstone's ''Commentaries'' suggested that using the law of redress would be "extraordinary", for example applying if the king broke the original contract, violated "the fundamental laws", or abandoned the kingdom.Blackstone, ''Commentaries'', I:243 and 238. During the Stamp Act crisis of the 1760s the Massachusetts Provincial Congress considered resistance to the king justified if freedom came under attack from "the hand of oppression" and "the merciless feet of tyranny".Reid, ''Constitutional History'', I:112 A decade later the "indictment" of George III in the Declaration of Independence sought to end his sovereign reign over the colonies because he violated the original constitutional contract.Reid, "Irrelevance of the Declaration", 84. As explained in legal historian Christian Fritz's description of the role of the right of revolution in American Revolution, American independence was justified by conventional theories under Anglo-American constitutional thought at the time about the people's collective right to cast off an arbitrary king. "Both natural law and English constitutional doctrine gave the colonists a right to revolt against the sovereign's oppression."Fritz, ''American Sovereigns'', 14. But these understandings about the right of revolution on the eve of the American Revolution rested on a traditional model of government. That model posited the existence of a hypothetical bargain struck in the mists of antiquity between a king and a people. "In this bargain, the people were protected by the monarch in exchange for the people giving the king allegiance. This was a contractual relationship. American revolutionaries accused George III of breaching his implied duty of protection under that contract, thereby releasing the people in the colonies from their allegiance. The sovereign's breach of the hypothetical contract gave rise to the subjects' right of revolution{{snd}}grounded on both natural law and English constitutional doctrine."Fritz, ''American Sovereigns'', 13. ===Examples as positive law=== Although many [[declaration of independence|declarations of independence]] seek legitimacy by appealing to the right of revolution, far fewer [[constitution]]s mention this right or guarantee this right to citizens because of the destabilizing effect such a guarantee would likely produce. Among the examples of an articulation of a right of revolution as positive law include: {{unordered list |The [[szlachta]], nobles of the [[Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth]], maintained a right of rebellion, known as ''[[rokosz]]''. |The [[Constitutions of El Salvador]] have recognized "[[Right to insurrection (El Salvador)|the right to insurrection]]" since 1886.{{cite web|url=https://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/DocumentosBoveda/E/1/2020-2029/2020/10/E8D9E.HTML|title=Derecho a la Insurrección|language=Spanish|publisher=Government of El Salvador|access-date=February 1, 2024}} |[[New Hampshire]]'s [[Constitution of New Hampshire|constitution]]{{cite web |title=State Constitution – Bill of Rights|url=http://www.nh.gov/glance/bill-of-rights.htm|publisher=New Hampshire State Government |access-date=13 February 2019}} guarantees its citizens the right to reform government, in Article 10 of the New Hampshire constitution's [[Bill of rights|Bill of Rights]]: {{blockquote|Whenever the [[Purpose of government|ends of government]] are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.}} |The [[Kentucky]] [[Constitution of Kentucky|constitution]][http://courts.ky.gov/research/history.htm Constitution of the Commonwealth of Kentucky] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090703062053/http://courts.ky.gov/research/history.htm |date=2009-07-03 }} guarantees a right to alter, reform or abolish their government in the Kentucky Bill of Rights: {{blockquote|All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety, happiness and the protection of property. For the advancement of these ends, they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may deem proper.}} |Similar wording is used in [[Pennsylvania]]'s [[Constitution of Pennsylvania|constitution]],[http://sites.state.pa.us/PA_Constitution.html Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] under Article 1, Section 2 of the Declaration of Rights: {{blockquote|All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think proper.}} |Article I, §1 of the [[Tennessee]] [[Constitution of Tennessee|constitution]][http://state.tn.us/sos/bluebook/05-06/46-tnconst.pdf Constitution of the State of Tennessee] states: {{blockquote|That all power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness; for the advancement of those ends they have at all times, an unalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform, or abolish the government in such manner as they may think proper}} |[[North Carolina]]'s [[Constitution of North Carolina|constitution]] of November 21, 1789 contains in its Declaration of Rights:[http://friesian.com/nullif.htm#dread Randy Barnett, The Rights Retained by the People, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, George Mason University Press, 1989), p. 364] {{blockquote|3d. That Government ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people; and that the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive to the good and happiness of mankind.}} |The [[Constitution of Texas]][http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/pubslegref/TxConst.pdf The Texas Constitution] contains similar wording in Article 1, Sect 2: {{blockquote|All political power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority, and instituted for their benefit. The faith of the people of Texas stands pledged to the preservation of a republican form of government, and, subject to this limitation only, they have at all times the inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such manner as they may think expedient.}} | The preface to the [[French Constitution of 1793]] is a "[[Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen]]" with several right of revolution provisions which stated in {{blockquote|Article 11: Any act directed against a person, apart from the cases and without the forms determined by law, is arbitrary and tyrannical; if attempt is made to execute such act by force, the person who is the object thereof has the right to resist it by force.{{cite web|title=Preface to the Constitution of 1793 (Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) |url=http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/sites/core/files/text/Preface%20to%20the%20Constitution%20of%201793.pdf |work=National Assembly of France |publisher=college.columbia.edu |access-date=5 November 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140227022845/http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/sites/core/files/text/Preface%20to%20the%20Constitution%20of%201793.pdf |archive-date=February 27, 2014 }} Article 12: Those who incite, dispatch, sign, or execute arbitrary acts, or cause them to be executed, are guilty and must be punished. ... Article 27: Let any individual who would usurp sovereignty be put to death instantly by free men. ... Articles 33–35: Resistance to oppression is the consequence of the other rights of man. There is oppression against the social body when a single one of its members is oppressed. There is oppression against every member when the social body is oppressed. When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people, and for every portion thereof, the most sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties.}} |The 1949 [[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany]], the federal constitution, contains both entrenched, un-amendable clauses protecting human and [[natural and legal rights|natural rights]], as well as a clause in its Article 20 (since 1968) recognizing the right of the people to resist unconstitutional tyranny, if all other measures have failed: {{blockquote|All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.[https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf ''Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany''] (English translation; PDF)}} |All [[Greece|Greek]] constitutions since the [[Greek Revolution]] have contained a right to resist in their concluding article. The current [[Greek Constitution]] states in [[Article 120 of the Greek Constitution|Article 120]]: {{blockquote|Observance of the constitution is entrusted to the patriotism of the Greeks who shall have the right and the duty to resist by all possible means against anyone who attempts the violent abolition of the Constitution.[http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf The official English language translation of the Greek Constitution as of May 27, 2008] on the website of Hellenic Parliament}} |The [[Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms]], a part of the constitutional systems of both the [[Czech Republic]] and [[Slovak Republic]], states in Article 23: {{blockquote|Citizens have the right to resist anybody who would do away with the democratic order of human rights and fundamental freedoms, established by this Charter, if the actions of constitutional bodies or the effective use of legal means have been frustrated.[http://www.usoud.cz/en/charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-freedoms/ English translation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130613083740/http://www.usoud.cz/en/charter-of-fundamental-rights-and-freedoms |date=2013-06-13 }} on the website of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic}} |This right is inferred in the third paragraph of the preamble to the [[Universal Declaration of Human Rights]], which states: {{blockquote|Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that [[human rights]] should be protected by [[rule of law]].[https://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ Universal Declaration of Human Rights], United Nations website.}} }} ==Modern relevance== Some have argued that because in modern times [[Democracy|democratic governments]] can be overthrown by [[election|popular vote]], the right of the people to remove the government has become embedded into the [[political system]]. In a study of the idea of rule by the people in the American Revolution and in early post-revolutionary America, legal historian [[Christian G. Fritz]] writes: {{blockquote|The constitutional logic of recognizing the people, not a king, as the sovereign implied the irrelevance of a right of revolution in America. This did not develop instantly or uniformly after the establishment of American governments. Some of the first state constitutions included "alter or abolish" provisions that mirrored the traditional right of revolution. ... Other state constitutions adopted different versions of this right to "alter or abolish" government that did not sound like the traditional right of revolution. In these provisions, the ability of the people to revise constitutions existed regardless of the traditional preconditions for the right of revolution. ... Increasingly, as Americans included it in their constitutions, the right of revolution came to be seen as a constitutional principle permitting the people as the sovereign to control government and revise their constitutions without limit. In this way, the right broke loose from its traditional moorings of resistance to oppression. The alter or abolish provisions could now be interpreted consistent with the constitutional principle that in America, the sovereign was the people.Fritz, American Sovereigns, 24–25.}} ==See also== {{Portal|Philosophy}} *[[Citizen suit]] *[[Civil resistance]] *[[Confederation (Poland)]] *[[Political corruption]] *[[Qui tam]] *[[Regulatory capture]] *[[Right to protest]] ==References== {{Reflist|2}} ==External links== {{wikiquote}} *[http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4n.htm Locke and the Social Order] *[http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch3I.html The Founders Constitution, Vol. 1 Chapter 3, Right of Revolution] *[http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnc.htm North Carolina Constitution of 1789] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120125030731/http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/ratnc.htm |date=2012-01-25 }} {{Group rights}} {{Authority control}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Right Of Revolution}} [[Category:Political concepts]] [[Category:Collective rights]] [[Category:Enlightenment philosophy]] [[Category:Popular sovereignty]] [[Category:Control (social and political)]] [[Category:Revolution]] [[Category:Concepts in political philosophy]]