{{short description|Divergence of political attitudes}}
{{For|the social psychology concept|Group polarization}}
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'''Political polarization''' (spelt ''polarisation'' in [[American and British English spelling differences|British English]], [[Australian English]], and [[New Zealand English]]) is the divergence of political attitudes away from the [[Centrism|center]], towards [[ideological]] [[extremism|extremes]].<ref name="dimaggio-96">{{cite journal|last=DiMaggio|first=Paul|author2=Evans, John|author3=Bryson, Bethany|date=1 November 1996|title=Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?|url=http://educ.jmu.edu/~brysonbp/pubs/PBJ.pdf|journal=American Journal of Sociology|volume=102|issue=3|pages=690–755|doi=10.1086/230995|s2cid=144020785|access-date=22 April 2013|archive-date=4 March 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304022840/http://educ.jmu.edu/~brysonbp/pubs/PBJ.pdf}}</ref><ref name="baldassarri-08" /><ref name="fiorina-08" /> Scholars distinguish between '''ideological polarization''' (differences in the policy positions) and '''affective polarization''' (an emotional dislike and distrust of political out-groups).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Iyengar|first1=Shanto|last2=Lelkes|first2=Yphtach|last3=Levendusky|first3=Matthew|last4=Malhotra|first4=Neil|last5=Westwood|first5=Sean J.|date=2019|title=The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=22|issue=1|pages=129–146|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034|s2cid=102523958|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Most discussions of polarization in [[political science]] consider polarization in the context of [[political parties]] and [[democratic system]]s of government. In [[two-party system]]s, political polarization usually embodies the tension of its binary political ideologies and partisan identities.<ref name="dimaggio-96" /><ref name="baldassarri-08">{{cite journal|last=Baldassarri|first=Delia|author2=Gelman, Andrew|date=1 September 2008|title=Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion|journal=American Journal of Sociology|volume=114|issue=2|pages=408–446|citeseerx=10.1.1.69.255|doi=10.1086/590649|bibcode=2008AmJSo.114..408B |s2cid=222436264}}</ref><ref name="fiorina-08">{{cite journal|last=Fiorina|first=Morris P.|author2=Abrams, Samuel J.|date=1 June 2008|title=Political Polarization in the American Public|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=11|issue=1|pages=563–588|doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="abramowitz-08">{{cite journal|last=Abramowitz|first=Alan I.|author2=Saunders, Kyle L.|date=27 March 2008|title=Is Polarization a Myth?|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=70|issue=2|page=542|doi=10.1017/S0022381608080493|s2cid=44020272}}</ref><ref name="bafumi-09">{{cite journal|last=Bafumi|first=Joseph|author2=Shapiro, Robert Y.|date=27 January 2009|title=A New Partisan Voter|url=http://ftp.columbia.edu/cu/alliance/documents/EDF/Monday/Shapiro_Bafumi_reading.pdf|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=71|issue=1|page=1|doi=10.1017/S0022381608090014|s2cid=154400302}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Segovia-Martin |first1=Jose |last2=Rivero |first2=Oscar |title=Cross-border political competition |journal=PLOS ONE |date=May 29, 2024 |volume=19 |issue=5 |article-number=e0297731 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0297731 |doi-access=free |pmid=38809861 |pmc=11135741 |bibcode=2024PLoSO..1997731S }}</ref> However, some political scientists assert that contemporary polarization is less dependent on policy differences between [[left-wing]] and [[right-wing]] ideologies and is increasingly influenced by other divisions, such as [[Theocracy|religious]] against [[Secularity|secular]], [[nationalist]] against [[Globalism|globalist]], [[Traditionalist conservatism|traditional]] against [[Modernization|modern]], or [[Ruralism|rural]] against [[Urban culture|urban]].<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=McCoy|first1=Jennifer|last2=Rahman|first2=Tahmina|last3=Somer|first3=Murat|date=January 2018|title=Polarization and the Global Crisis of Democracy: Common Patterns, Dynamics, and Pernicious Consequences for Democratic Polities|journal=[[American Behavioral Scientist]]|volume=62|issue=1|pages=16–42|doi=10.1177/0002764218759576|issn=0002-7642|doi-access=free}}</ref> Polarization is associated with the process of [[politicization]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chinn |first1=Sedona |last2=Hart |first2=P. Sol |last3=Soroka |first3=Stuart |title=Politicization and Polarization in Climate Change News Content, 1985-2017 |journal=Science Communication |date=February 2020 |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=119–125 |doi=10.1177/1075547019900290|s2cid=212781410 }}</ref>

During the ongoing third wave of [[autocratization]] that has been ongoing since 2010, V-Dem has recorded that political polarization is increasing across nearly every region of the world, including in the United States, Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Introduction |url=https://voxdev.org/voxdevlit/political-polarisation/introduction |access-date=2026-03-27 |website=VoxDev |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web| title=Inexorable Force or Dying Wave? The long term trends of democratization and the third wave of autocratization | author=David Randahl | url=https://v-dem.net/media/publications/WP_152.pdf | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250401215608/https://v-dem.net/media/publications/WP_152.pdf | archive-date=2025-04-01}}</ref>

==Definitions and measurements==

Polarization in itself is typically understood as "a prominent division or conflict that forms between major groups in a society or political system and that is marked by the clustering and radicalisation of views and beliefs at two distant and antagonistic poles." as defined by the Institute for Integrated Transitions and [[Ford Foundation]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Closing the Divide: Inside Our Global Initiative on Polarization |url=https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/learning/learning-reflections/closing-the-divide-inside-our-global-initiative-on-polarization/ |access-date=2024-06-10 |website=Ford Foundation |date=29 May 2024 |language=en-US}}</ref> Political scientists typically distinguish between two levels of political polarization: elite and mass. "Elite polarization" focuses on the polarization of the political elites, like [[party organizer]]s and [[elected officials]]. "Mass polarization" (or popular polarization) focuses on the polarization of the masses, most often the electorate or general public.<ref name="mccarty-06">{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/polarizedamerica0037mcca/page/|title=Polarized America: the dance of ideology and unequal riches|last=McCarty|first=Nolan|author2=Poole, Keith T.|author3=Rosenthal, Howard|publisher=MIT Press|year=2006|isbn=978-0-262-13464-4|at=[https://archive.org/details/polarizedamerica0037mcca/page/ Cambridge, Mass.]}}</ref><ref name="hetherington-09">{{cite journal|last=Hetherington|first=Marc J.|title=Review Article: Putting Polarization in Perspective|journal=British Journal of Political Science|date=17 February 2009|volume=39|issue=2|page=413|doi=10.1017/S0007123408000501}}</ref><ref name="layman-06">{{cite journal|author1-link=Geoffrey Layman|last=Layman|first=Geoffrey C.|author2-link=Thomas M. Carsey|author2=Carsey, Thomas M. |author3=Horowitz, Juliana Menasce |title=Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|date=1 June 2006|volume=9|issue=1|pages=83–110|doi=10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105138|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="carmines-12">{{cite journal|last=Carmines|first=E. G.|author2=Ensley, M.J. |author3=Wagner, M.W. |title=Who Fits the Left–Right Divide? Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|date=23 October 2012|volume=56|issue=12|pages=1631–1653|doi=10.1177/0002764212463353|s2cid=147108446}}</ref>

===Elite polarization===
Elite polarization refers to polarization between the party-in-government and the party-in-opposition.<ref name=baldassarri-08/> Polarized political parties are internally cohesive, unified, programmatic, and ideologically distinct; they are typically found in a [[parliamentary system]] of democratic governance.<ref name="mann-12">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CQORs1_S2sgC|title=It's Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American constitutional system collided with the new politics of extremism|last=Mann|first=Thomas E.|author2=Ornstein, Norman J.|publisher=[[Basic Books]]|year=2012|isbn=978-0-465-03133-7|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140705154533/http://books.google.com/books?id=CQORs1_S2sgC&printsec=frontcover|archive-date=2014-07-05}}</ref><ref name=mccarty-06/><ref name=layman-06/><ref name=carmines-12/>

In a [[two-party system]], a polarized [[legislature]] has two important characteristics: first, there is little-to-no ideological overlap between members of the two parties; and second, almost all conflict over legislation and policies is split across a broad ideological divide. This leads to a conflation of political parties and ideologies (i.e., Democrat and Republican become nearly perfect synonyms for liberal and conservative) and the collapse of an ideological center;<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="mccarty-06" /><ref name="layman-06" /><ref name="carmines-12" /> however, using a cross-national design that covers 25 European countries, a 2022 study shows that it is not the number of parties itself, but the way a party interacts with another that influences the magnitude and nature of affective polarization.<ref name="doi.org">{{Cite journal |last1=Hahm |first1=Hyeonho |last2=Hilpert |first2=David |last3=König |first3=Thomas |date=2022-11-07 |title=Divided by Europe: affective polarisation in the context of European elections |journal=West European Politics |volume=46 |issue=4 |pages=705–731 |doi=10.1080/01402382.2022.2133277 |s2cid=253432411 |issn=0140-2382 |url=https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/21514722 }}</ref>

The vast majority of studies on elite polarization focus on legislative and deliberative bodies. For many years, political scientists measured polarization in the US by examining the ratings of party members published by interest groups, but now, most analyze [[recorded vote|roll-call voting]] patterns to investigate trends in party-line voting and party unity.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="mccarty-06" /> Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy used the text of the Congressional Record to document differences in speech patterns between Republicans and Democrats as a measure of polarization, finding a dramatic increase in polarized speech patterns starting in 1994.<ref>Gentzkow, Matthew, and Shapiro, Jesse, and Taddy, Matt [https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/politext.pdf Measuring Polarization in High-Dimensional Data: Method and Application to Congressional Speech]"</ref>

=== Mass polarization ===
Mass polarization, or popular polarization, occurs when an electorate's attitudes towards political issues, policies, celebrated figures, or other citizens are neatly divided along party lines.<ref name="mccarty-06" /><ref name="layman-06" /><ref name="carmines-12" /><ref name="claassen-08">{{cite journal|last=Claassen|first=R.L.|author2=Highton, B.|date=9 September 2008|title=Policy Polarization among Party Elites and the Significance of Political Awareness in the Mass Public|journal=Political Research Quarterly|volume=62|issue=3|pages=538–551|doi=10.1177/1065912908322415|s2cid=154392221}}</ref> At the extreme, each camp questions the moral legitimacy of the other, viewing the opposing camp and its policies as an existential threat to their way of life or the nation as a whole.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2016-06-22|title=Partisanship and Political Animosity in 2016|url=https://www.people-press.org/2016/06/22/partisanship-and-political-animosity-in-2016/|access-date=2019-10-26|website=Pew Research Center for the People and the Press}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=García-Guadilla|first1=María Pilar|last2=Mallen|first2=Ana|date=2019-01-01|title=Polarization, Participatory Democracy, and Democratic Erosion in Venezuela's Twenty-First Century Socialism|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=681|issue=1|pages=62–77|doi=10.1177/0002716218817733|issn=0002-7162|doi-access=free|s2cid=149617060}}</ref>

There are multiple types or measures of mass polarization. ''Ideological polarization'' refers to the extent to which the electorate has divergent beliefs on ideological issues (e.g., abortion or affirmative action) or beliefs that are consistently conservative or liberal across a range of issues (e.g., having a conservative position on both abortion and affirmative action even if those positions are not "extreme").<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Abramowitz|first1=Alan I.|last2=Saunders|first2=Kyle L.|date=2008|title=Is Polarization a Myth?|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=70|issue=2|pages=542–555|doi=10.1017/s0022381608080493|jstor=10.1017/s0022381608080493|s2cid=44020272|issn=0022-3816}}</ref> ''[[Partisan sorting]]'' refers to the extent to which the electorate "sorts" or identifies with a party based on their ideological, racial, religious, gender, or other demographic characteristics.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mason|first=Lilliana|date=2015|title="I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=59|issue=1|pages=128–145|doi=10.1111/ajps.12089|jstor=24363600|issn=0092-5853|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mason|first1=Lilliana|last2=Wronski|first2=Julie|date=2018|title=One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments Strengthen Partisanship|journal=Political Psychology|language=en|volume=39|issue=S1|pages=257–277|doi=10.1111/pops.12485|issn=1467-9221|doi-access=free}}</ref> ''Affective polarization'' refers to the extent to which the electorate "dislikes" or "distrusts" those from other parties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Iyengar|first1=Shanto|last2=Lelkes|first2=Yphtach|last3=Levendusky|first3=Matthew|last4=Malhotra|first4=Neil|last5=Westwood|first5=Sean J.|date=2019-05-11|title=The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=129–146|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Political scientists who study mass polarization generally rely on data from [[opinion polls]] and election surveys. They look for trends in respondents' opinions on a given issue, their voting history, and their political ideology (conservative, liberal, moderate, etc.), and they try to relate those trends to respondents' party identification and other potentially polarizing factors (like geographic location or income bracket).<ref name="dimaggio-96" /><ref name="hetherington-09" /> Political scientists typically limit their inquiry to issues and questions that have been constant over time, in order to compare the present day to what the political climate has historically been.<ref name="claassen-08" /> Some of 2020s studies also use decision-making games to measure the extent to which ingroup members discriminate outgroup members relative to their group members.<ref name="doi.org" />

2020s academic work suggests that intolerance at the ideological extremes can lead to polarization with opinions more polarized than identities, intolerance among moderates improves cohesion.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Genicot |first1=Garance |year=2022 |title=Tolerance and Compromise in Social Networks |url=https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/717041 |journal=Journal of Political Economy |volume=130 |pages=94–120 |doi=10.1086/717041 |ssrn=3328373 |s2cid=242818458 |access-date=2021-01-29|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Some political scientists argue that polarization requires divergence on a broad range of issues,<ref name="dimaggio-96" /><ref name="fiorina-08" /> while others argue that only a few issues are required.<ref name="baldassarri-08" /><ref name="abramowitz-08" /><ref name="bafumi-09" /> Another debate involves the differentiation between ''issue extremism'' and ''issue alignment''. Some scholars argue that polarization is defined as the growing distance in issue positions between two groups (issue extremism), while others suggest that the hallmark of polarization is the extent to which people's opinions systematically sort into different groups (e.g., parties), called issue alignment.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=DellaPosta |first=Daniel |date=June 2020 |title=Pluralistic Collapse: The "Oil Spill" Model of Mass Opinion Polarization |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122420922989 |journal=American Sociological Review |language=en |volume=85 |issue=3 |pages=507–536 |doi=10.1177/0003122420922989 |issn=0003-1224}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Baldassarri |first=Delia |last2=Gelman |first2=Andrew |date=September 2008 |title=Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion |url=http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/590649 |journal=American Journal of Sociology |language=en |volume=114 |issue=2 |pages=408–446 |doi=10.1086/590649 |issn=0002-9602}}</ref> The latter involves a systematic clustering of different positions in different groups, such that politics becomes a differentiating axis across many issues, lifestyle profiles, and demographics.[[File:ANES Affective Polarization through 2020.jpg|thumb|330x330px|Affective polarization in the U.S. (1976–2020)<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior |url=https://electionstudies.org/data-tools/anes-guide/anes-guide.html?chart=affective_polarization_parties |access-date=2024-09-16 |website=electionstudies.org |publisher=American National Election Studies}}</ref>]]

=== Affective polarization ===
Affective polarization refers to the phenomenon where individuals' feelings and emotions towards members of their own political party or group become more positive, while their feelings towards members of the opposing party or group become more negative. This can lead to increased hostility and a lack of willingness to compromise or work together with people who hold different political views.<ref>Iyengar, S., Lelkes, Y., Levendusky, M., Malhotra, N., & Westwood, S. J. (2019). The
Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review
of Political Science, 22(1), 129–146. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-
073034</ref> This phenomenon can be seen in both online and offline settings, and has been on the rise in several countries in the early 2020s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Boxell |first1=Levi |last2=Gentzkow |first2=Matthew |last3=Shapiro |first3=Jesse M. |date=2022-01-25 |title=Cross-Country Trends in Affective Polarization |url=https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/doi/10.1162/rest_a_01160/109262/Cross-Country-Trends-in-Affective-Polarization |journal=The Review of Economics and Statistics |volume=106 |issue=2 |language=en |pages=557–565 |doi=10.1162/rest_a_01160 |issn=0034-6535}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{Cite journal |last1=Hahm |first1=Hyeonho |last2=Hilpert |first2=David |last3=König |first3=Thomas |date=2023-03-30 |title=Divided We Unite: The Nature of Partyism and the Role of Coalition Partnership in Europe |journal=American Political Science Review |language=en |volume=118 |pages=69–87 |doi=10.1017/S0003055423000266 |issn=0003-0554 |s2cid=257873474 |doi-access=free}}</ref> Affective polarization has been estimated via a variety of methods, including the Affective Polarization Scale and regression methods applied to social media data.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McMurtrie |first1=Brandon |last2=Philipp |first2=Michael |last3=Hebden |first3=Ross |last4=Williams |first4=Matt |date=2024 |title=Development and Validation of the Affective Polarization Scale |journal=[[International Review of Social Psychology]] |volume=37 |issue=1 |article-number=11 |doi=10.5334/irsp.926|doi-access=free |pmid=40950749 |pmc=12372659 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Nettasinghe |first1=Buddhika |last2=Rao |first2=Ashwin |last3=Jiang |first3=Bohan |last4=Percus |first4=Allon G. |last5=Lerman |first5=Kristina |chapter=In-Group Love, Out-Group Hate: A Framework to Measure Affective Polarization via Contentious Online Discussions |date=2025-04-22 |title=Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025 |chapter-url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3696410.3714935 |series=WWW '25 |location=New York, NY, USA |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery |pages=560–575 |doi=10.1145/3696410.3714935 |isbn=979-8-4007-1274-6|arxiv=2412.14414 }}</ref>

Affective polarization may lead to aggressive attitudes and behaviors toward members of other ideological groups within the same country.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hetherington |first1=Marc J. |title=Why Washington Won't Work |last2=Rudolph |first2=Thomas J. |date=2015 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-29935-8 |location=Chicago}}</ref> Extreme affective polarization may even lead to dangerous consequences like societal disintegration and ideological sorting.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Orian Harel |first1=Tal |last2=Maoz |first2=Ifat |last3=Halperin |first3=Eran |title=A conflict within a conflict: Intragroup ideological polarization and intergroup intractable conflict |journal=Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences |date=2020 |volume=34 |pages=52–57 |doi=10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.11.013 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Nettasinghe |first1=Buddhika |last2=Percus |first2=Allon G |last3=Lerman |first3=Kristina |date=2025-03-01 |title=How out-group animosity can shape partisan divisions: A model of affective polarization |url=https://academic.oup.com/pnasnexus/article/4/3/pgaf082/8069205 |journal=PNAS Nexus |volume=4 |issue=3 |article-number=pgaf082 |doi=10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf082  |doi-access=free|pmid=40125444 |pmc=11927084 |issn=2752-6542|arxiv=2403.16940 }}</ref> Affective polarization can be reduced by various means, such as feeling sadness together as a group (which often happens during Memorial Days).<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Gur |first1=Tamar |last2=Ayal |first2=Shahar |last3=Wagner |first3=Magnus |last4=Adler |first4=Eli |last5=Halperin |first5=Eran |title=A Group that Grieves Together Stays Together: Examining the Impact of Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel on Affective Polarization |journal=Political Psychology |doi=10.1111/pops.1295|doi-broken-date=13 April 2026 }}</ref> A high prevalence of respectful discussions with political others may also reduce affective polarization by increasing political tolerance and inter-party trust.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kubin |first1=Emily |last2=Puryear |first2=Curtis |last3=Schein |first3=Chelsea |last4=Gray |first4=Kurt |title=Personal experiences bridge moral and political divides better than facts |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |date=2021 |volume=118 |issue=6 |article-number=e2008389118 |doi=10.1073/pnas.2008389118|doi-access=free |pmid=33495361 |pmc=8017692 |bibcode=2021PNAS..11808389K }}</ref> High salience of a national common identity may also reduce affective polarization, as members of other parties are suddenly seen as in-group members.{{cn|date=May 2026}}

==Causes==
There are various causes of political polarization and these include political parties, [[redistricting]], the public's [[political ideology]], the mass media, political context and [[zero-sum thinking]].<ref name="m767">{{cite journal | last=McCoy | first=Jennifer | title=Latin America's Polarization in Comparative Perspective | journal=Latin American Politics and Society | volume=66 | issue=2 | date=2024 | issn=1531-426X | doi=10.1017/lap.2024.17 | pages=161–178 | url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1531426X24000177/type/journal_article | access-date=2026-06-09}}</ref>

===Party polarization===
Some scholars argue that diverging parties has been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy platforms have become more distant. This theory is based on 2010s trends in the [[United States Congress]], where the [[majority party]] prioritizes the positions that are most aligned with its [[party platform]] and political ideology.<ref name="ura-12">{{cite journal|last=Ura|first=Joseph Daniel|author2=Ellis, Christopher R.|title=Partisan Moods: Polarization and the Dynamics of Mass Party Preferences|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=10 February 2012|volume=74|issue=1|pages=277–291|doi=10.1017/S0022381611001587|hdl=1969.1/178724|s2cid=55325200|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The adoption of more ideologically distinct positions by political parties can cause polarization among both elites and the electorate. For example, after the passage of the [[Voting Rights Act]], the number of conservative Democrats in Congress decreased, while the number of conservative Republicans increased. Within the electorate during the 1970s, [[Southern Democrats]] shifted toward the [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]], showing polarization among both the elites and the electorate of both main parties.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="abramowitz-98">{{cite journal|last=Abramowitz|first=Alan I.|author2=Saunders, Kyle L.|title=Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=August 1998|volume=60|issue=3|page=634|doi=10.2307/2647642|jstor=2647642|s2cid=154980825}}</ref><ref name="galston-09">{{cite journal|last=Galston|first=William A.|title=Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary|journal=UKMC Law Review|year=2009|volume=77|issue=207|url=http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/umkc77&div=15&g_sent=1&collection=journals}}</ref> In this sense, political polarization could be a top-down process, in which elite polarization leads to—or at least precedes—popular polarization;<ref>{{cite book|last1=Benkler|first1=Yochai|url=https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/oso/9780190923624.001.0001/oso-9780190923624-chapter-10|title=Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics|publisher=Oxford Scholarship Online|year=2018|publication-date=2018-10-01|doi=10.1093/oso/9780190923624.003.0010|isbn=978-0-19-092366-2}}</ref> however, polarization among elites does not necessarily produce polarization within the electorate, and polarized electoral choices can often reflect elite polarization rather than voters' preferences.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="mccarty-06" /><ref name="hetherington-09" /><ref name="carmines-12" /><ref name="claassen-08" />

Political scientists have shown politicians have an incentive to advance and support polarized positions.<ref name="beniers-07">{{cite journal|last=Beniers|first=Klaas J.|author2=Dur, Robert|title=Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition|journal=International Tax and Public Finance|date=1 February 2007|volume=14|issue=1|pages=29–54|doi=10.1007/s10797-006-8878-y|hdl=1765/6632 |s2cid=39796862|url=https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04065.pdf}}</ref> These argue that during the early 1990s, the Republican Party used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the [[United States House of Representatives]]—which political scientists [[Thomas E. Mann]] and [[Norman Ornstein]] refer to as [[Newt Gingrich]]'s "guerrilla war".<ref name="mann-12" /> What political scientists have found is that moderates are less likely to run than are candidates who are in line with party doctrine, otherwise known as "party fit".<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Thomsen|first1=Danielle M.|title=Ideological Moderates Won't Run: How Party Fit Matters for Partisan Polarization in Congress|journal=The Journal of Politics|date=2014|volume=76|issue=3|pages=786–797|doi=10.1017/s0022381614000243|jstor=0022381614000243|hdl=10161/8931|s2cid=154980416|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Other theories state that politicians who cater to more extreme groups within their party tend to be more successful, helping them stay in office while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar extreme.<ref name="hirano-09">{{cite journal|last=Hirano|first=Shigeo Jr. |author2=James M. Snyder|author3=Michael M. Ting|title=Distributive Politics with Primaries|journal=Journal of Politics|year=2009|volume=71|issue=4|pages=1467–1480|url=http://www.yale.org/leitner/resources/docs/snyder.pdf|doi=10.1017/s0022381609990247|s2cid=11453544|access-date=2013-04-22|archive-date=2014-05-31|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140531104933/http://www.yale.org/leitner/resources/docs/snyder.pdf}}</ref> A study by Nicholson found voters are more polarized by contentious statements from leaders of the opposing party than from the leaders of their own party. As a result, political leaders may be more likely to take polarized stances.<ref name="nicholson-12">{{cite journal|last=Nicholson|first=Stephen P.|title=Polarizing Cues|journal=American Journal of Political Science|date=1 January 2012|volume=56|issue=1|pages=52–66|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00541.x|pmid=22400143|s2cid=147497906 }}</ref>

With regards to [[multi-party system]]s, [[Giovanni Sartori]] claims the splitting of ideologies in the public constituency causes further divides within the political parties of the countries. He theorizes that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of highly polarized multi-party systems. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon [[polarized pluralism]] and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions (as opposed to in simply two directions, as in a polarized two-party system) over policy issues.<ref name="sartori-66">{{cite journal|last=Sartori|first=Giovanni|title=European political parties: the case of polarized pluralism|journal=Political Parties and Political Development|pages=137–176|year=1966|doi=10.1515/9781400875337-006|isbn=978-1-4008-7533-7}}</ref><ref name="sartori-76">{{cite book|last=Sartori|first=Giovanni|title=Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis|year=1976|publisher=ECPR|location=Colchester|isbn=978-0-9547966-1-7|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ywr0CcGDNHwC|edition=[Nouvelle édition]}}</ref><ref name="johnston-08">{{cite journal|last=Johnston|first=Richard|title=Polarized Pluralism in the Canadian Party System: Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, June 5, 2008|journal=Canadian Journal of Political Science|date=17 December 2008|volume=41|issue=4|page=815|doi=10.1017/S0008423908081110|s2cid=154599342}}</ref> Polarization in multi-party systems can also be defined along two ideological extremes, like in the case of [[India]] in the 1970s. Ideological splits within a number of India's major parties resulted in two polarized coalitions on the right and left, each consisting of multiple political parties.<ref name="davey-72">{{cite journal|last=Davey|first=Hampton|title=Polarization and Consensus in Indian Party Politics|journal=Asian Survey|date=1 August 1972|volume=12|issue=8|pages=701–716|doi=10.2307/2643110|jstor=2643110}}</ref>

Political fund-raisers and donors can also exert significant influence and control over legislators. Party leaders are expected to be productive fund-raisers, in order to support the party's campaigns. Following ''[[Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission]]'', special interests in the U.S. were able to greatly impact elections through increased undisclosed spending, notably through [[Super PACs|super political action committees]]. Some, such as ''[[Washington Post]]'' opinion writer [[Robert G. Kaiser|Robert Kaiser]], argued this allowed wealthy people, corporations, unions, and other groups to push the parties' policy platforms toward ideological extremes, resulting in a state of greater polarization.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="kaiser-10">{{cite book|last=Kaiser|first=Robert G.|title=So damn much money: the triumph of lobbying and the corrosion of American government|year=2010|publisher=Vintage Books|location=New York|isbn=978-0-307-38588-8|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AJxU1MzQZVoC|edition=1st Vintage Books}}</ref> Other scholars, such as Raymond J. La Raja and David L. Wiltse, say that this does not necessarily hold true for mass donors to political campaigns. These scholars argue a single donor who is polarized and contributes large sums to a campaign does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes.<ref name="la-raja-11">{{cite journal|last=La Raja|first=R.J.|author2=Wiltse, D.L.|title=Don't Blame Donors for Ideological Polarization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972–2008|journal=American Politics Research|date=13 December 2011|volume=40|issue=3|pages=501–530|doi=10.1177/1532673X11429845|s2cid=143588919}}</ref><ref name="tam-cho-07">{{cite journal|last=Tam Cho|first=Wendy K.|author2=Gimpel, James G.|title=Prospecting for (Campaign) Gold|journal=American Journal of Political Science|date=1 April 2007|volume=51|issue=2|pages=255–268|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00249.x|url=http://cho.pol.illinois.edu/wendy/papers/krige.pdf|access-date=22 April 2013|archive-date=3 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403154456/http://cho.pol.illinois.edu/wendy/papers/krige.pdf}}</ref>

===The public===
In democracies and other [[Representative democracy|representative governments]], citizens vote for the political actors who will represent them. Some scholars argue that political polarization reflects the public's ideology and voting preferences.<ref name="galston-09" /><ref name="garner-10">{{cite journal | last1 = Garner | first1 = Andrew | last2 = Palmer | first2 = Harvey | title = Polarization and issue consistency over time | journal = [[Political Behavior]] | volume = 33 | issue = 2 | pages = 225–246 | publisher = [[Springer Science+Business Media|Springer]] | doi = 10.1007/s11109-010-9136-7 | date = June 2011 | s2cid = 143137236 }}</ref><ref name="mason-12">{{cite journal|last=Mason|first=Lilliana |title=The rise of uncivil agreement: issue versus behavioral polarization in the American electorate|journal=[[American Behavioral Scientist]]|date=January 2013|volume=57|issue=1|pages=140–159 | publisher = [[SAGE Publications|SAGE]] |doi= 10.1177/0002764212463363 |s2cid=147084342 }}</ref><ref name="murakami-07">{{cite journal|last=Murakami|first=Michael H.|title=How party polarization affects candidate evaluations: the role of ideology|journal=Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, Illinois|year=2007|url=http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/3/3/pages210336/p210336-1.php|access-date=2013-04-22|archive-date=2015-04-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150403113327/http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/3/3/pages210336/p210336-1.php}}</ref> Dixit and Weibull claim that political polarization is a natural and regular phenomenon. Party loyalism is a strong element of voters' thinking. Individuals who have higher political knowledge will not be influenced by anything a politician says. The polarization is merely a reflection of the party that the voter belongs to, and whichever direction it moves in.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Barber |first1=Michael |last2=Pope |first2=Jeremy C. |title=Does Party Trump Ideology? Disentangling Party and Ideology in America |journal=American Political Science Review |date=February 2019 |volume=113 |issue=1 |pages=38–54 |doi=10.1017/S0003055418000795|s2cid=150286388 }}</ref> They argue that there is a link between public differences in ideology and the polarization of representatives, but that an increase in preference differences is usually temporary and ultimately results in compromise.<ref name="dixit-07">{{cite journal|last1=Dixit|first1=Avinash K. | last2 = Weibull |first2= Jörgen W. |title=Political polarization|journal=[[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences]]|date=1 May 2007|volume=104|issue=18 |pages=7351–7356 |doi=10.1073/pnas.0702071104 |pmid=17452633 |pmc=1863477 | jstor = 25427490 | publisher = [[National Academy of Sciences]] |bibcode=2007PNAS..104.7351D |doi-access=free }}</ref> Fernbach, Rogers, Fox and Sloman argue that it is a result of people having an exaggerated faith in their understanding of complex issues. Asking people to explain their policy preferences in detail typically resulted in more moderate views. Simply asking them to list the reasons for their preferences did not result in any such moderation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fernbach |first1=Philip M. |last2=Rogers |first2=Todd |last3=Fox |first3=Craig R. |last4=Sloman |first4=Steven A. |date=25 April 2013 |title=Political Extremism Is Supported by an Illusion of Understanding |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797612464058 |journal=Psychological Science |language=en |volume=24 |issue=6 |pages=939–946 |doi=10.1177/0956797612464058 |pmid=23620547 |issn=0956-7976 |s2cid=6173291}}</ref>

Studies undertaken in the U.S. (2019) and the UK (2022) have found that political polarization is generally less acute among the public than is portrayed in the media.<ref>{{cite web
 |url= https://perceptiongap.us/
 |title= The Perception Gap
 |work= More in Common
 |author= Stephen Hawkins, Daniel Yudkin, Tim Dixon
 |date =June 2019
|access-date= 11 May 2022
}}</ref><ref name ="InCommon">{{cite web
 |url= https://ourglobalfuture.com/reports/the-centre-holds/
 |title= The Centre holds
 |work= Global Future
 |author= Renie Anjeh, Isabel Doraisamy
 |date= April 2022
 |access-date= 11 May 2022
 |archive-date= 1 May 2022
 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20220501112852/https://ourglobalfuture.com/reports/the-centre-holds/
 }}</ref> Moreover, non-nuanced reporting by the media about poll data and public opinions can even aggravate political polarization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Willems |first1=Jurgen |last2=Meyfroodt |first2=Kenn |date=2024-01-30 |title=Debate: Reporting pre-election polls: it is less about average Jane and Joe, and more about polarized Karen and Kevin |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09540962.2024.2306912 |journal=Public Money & Management |volume=44 |issue=3 |language=en |pages=185–186 |doi=10.1080/09540962.2024.2306912 |issn=0954-0962|hdl=1854/LU-01HNDE8TMQF8BFNFMTD2P3A21T |hdl-access=free }}</ref> [[Morris Fiorina]] posits the hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public, and instead is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="fiorina-06">{{cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/culturewarmythof00fior|title=Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America|last=Fiorina|first=Morris P.|author2=Samuel J. Abrams|author3=Jeremy C. Pope|publisher=[[Pearson Longman]]|year=2006|isbn=978-0-321-27640-7}}</ref><ref name="born-94">{{cite journal|last=Born|first=Richard|title=[Split-ticket voters, divided government, and Fiorina's policy-balancing model]: rejoinder|journal=[[Legislative Studies Quarterly]]|date=February 1994|volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=126–129| publisher = [[American Political Science Association]] |doi=10.2307/439804 |jstor=439804}}</ref> Fiorina connects this phenomenon to what he describes as "party sorting", which is where political ideologies tend to associate with specific political parties (conservatives with the Republican Party and liberals with the Democratic party).<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Fiorina |first1=Morris |last2=Mathew |first2=Levendusky |date=2006 |title=Disconnected: The political class versus the people. Red and Blue Nation: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences of America's Polarized Politics |url=https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.upenn.edu/dist/9/244/files/2016/10/fl_brookings_volume-1aluxd6.pdf |access-date=12 March 2024}}</ref> Other studies indicate that cultural differences focusing on ideological movements and geographical polarization within the United States constituency is correlated with rises in overall political polarization between 1972 and 2004.<ref name="abramowitz-08" /><ref name="abramowitz-05">{{cite journal | url = http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf | last1 = Abramowitz | first1 = Alan | last2 = Saunders | first2 = Kyle L. | title = Why can't we all just get along? The reality of polarized America | journal = The Forum | volume = 3 | issue = 2 | pages = 1–22 | publisher = [[De Gruyter]] | doi = 10.2202/1540-8884.1076 | date = July 2005 | article-number = 0000102202154088841076 | s2cid = 145471342 | url-status = bot: unknown | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131019203620/http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf | archive-date = 2013-10-19 }}</ref>

Religious, ethnic, and other cultural divides within the public have often influenced the emergence of polarization. According to Layman et al., the ideological split between U.S. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have generally become more [[moderate]] in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. For example, political scientists have shown that in the United States, voters who identify as Republican are more likely to vote for a strongly [[evangelical]] candidate than Democratic voters.<ref name="campbell-11">{{cite journal|last1=Campbell|first1=David E.|last2 = Green | first2 = John C. | last3 = Layman | first3 = Geoffrey C. |title=The party faithful: partisan images, candidate religion, and the electoral impact of party identification|journal=[[American Journal of Political Science]]|date= January 2011|volume=55|issue=1|pages=42–58 |doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00474.x | publisher = [[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]] |doi-access=free}}</ref> This correlates with the rise in polarization in the United States.<ref name="layman-05">{{cite journal|last1=Layman |first1= Geoffrey C. | last2 =Green | first2 = John C. |title=Wars and rumours of wars: the contexts of cultural conflict in American political behaviour|journal=[[British Journal of Political Science]]|date=January 2006|volume=36|issue=1 |pages=61–89 | publisher = [[Cambridge Journals]] |doi=10.1017/S0007123406000044 | jstor = 4092316 |s2cid= 144870729 }}</ref> Another theory contends that religion does not contribute to full-group polarization, but rather, [[coalition]] and party activist polarization causes party shifts toward a political extreme.<ref name="brooks-04">{{cite journal|url=http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf|last=Brooks|first=Clem|author2=Manza, Jeff|title=A great divide? Religion and political change in U.S. national elections, 1972–2000|journal=[[The Sociological Quarterly]]|date=1 May 2004|volume=45|issue=3|pages=421–450|doi=10.1111/j.1533-8525.2004.tb02297.x|publisher=[[Wiley-Blackwell|Wiley]]|s2cid=1887424|access-date=22 April 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100611202750/http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf|archive-date=11 June 2010}}</ref>

In some post-colonial countries, the public may be polarized along ethnic divides that remain from the colonial regime.<ref name="bhavnani-08">{{cite journal|last1=Bhavnani|first1=Ravi | last2 =Miodownik | first2= Dan|title=Ethnic polarization, ethnic salience, and Civil War |journal=[[Journal of Conflict Resolution]] |date=February 2009 |volume=53 |issue=1 |pages=30–49 |doi=10.1177/0022002708325945 | publisher = [[SAGE Publications|SAGE]] |s2cid=145686111 |url=http://repository.graduateinstitute.ch/record/15416 }}</ref> In [[South Africa]] in the late 1980s, members of the conservative, pro-apartheid [[National Party (South Africa)|National Party]] were no longer supportive of [[apartheid]], and, therefore, no longer ideologically aligned with their party. [[Afrikaners]], white English-speakers, and [[Indigenous peoples of Africa|Indigenous Africans]] split based on racial divisions, causing polarization along ethnic lines.<ref name="sisk-89">{{cite journal|last=Sisk|first=Timothy D.|title=White politics in South Africa: politics under pressure|journal=[[Africa Today]]|date=January 1989|volume=36|issue=1 |pages=29–39 | publisher = [[Indiana University Press]] |jstor=4186531}}</ref><ref name="darity-09">{{citation | url = http://www.cpc.unc.edu/research/publications/3710 | last = Darity | first = William A. | contribution = Economic theory and racial economic inequality | editor-last1 = Dodson | editor-first1 = Howard | editor-last2 = Palmer | editor-first2 = Colin A. | title = The Black condition | pages = 1–43 | publisher = Michigan State University Press | location = East Lansing, Michigan | year = 2009 | isbn = 978-0-87013-838-6 | postscript = . | access-date = 2016-02-12 | archive-date = 2017-05-10 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170510105746/http://www.cpc.unc.edu/research/publications/3710 }}</ref> [[Economic inequality]] can also motivate the polarization of the public.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stewart |first1=Alexander J. |last2=McCarty |first2=Nolan |last3=Bryson |first3=Joanna J. |title=Polarization under rising inequality and economic decline |journal=[[Science Advances]] |date=2020 |volume=6 |issue=50 |article-number=eabd4201 |doi=10.1126/sciadv.abd4201 |pmid=33310855 |pmc=7732181 |arxiv=1807.11477 |bibcode=2020SciA....6.4201S |doi-access=free}}</ref> For example, in post-[[World War I]] [[Germany]], the [[Communist Party of Germany]], and the [[National Socialists]], a [[fascist]] party, emerged as the dominant political ideologies and proposed to address Germany's economic problems in drastically different ways.<ref name="sartori-66" /><ref name="sartori-76" /> In [[Venezuela]], in the late 20th century, presidential candidate [[Hugo Chávez]] used economic inequality in the country to polarize voters, employing a popular and aggressive tone to gain popularity.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |last1=Márquez |first1=Laureano |title=Historieta de Venezuela: De Macuro a Maduro |last2=Eduardo |first2=Sanabria |publisher=Gráficas Pedrazas |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-7328777-1-9 |edition=1st |page=151 |chapter=Llegó la dictablanda |author-link=Laureano Márquez}}</ref>

===The media===
Also stated by Sheena Peckham, algorithms used by social media to operate creates an echo-chamber for the user causing selective exposure and thus leading to online hate, misinformation, malinformation and more (Peckham, 2023). A number of techniques were employed by the researchers and social scientist to trace the relationship between internet usage. Lelkes, along with his colleagues, use state right-of-way laws, which affect the cost of internet infrastructure, as an instrument used for internet access in their country, and discovered a positive relation between internet access and affective polarization in the country. At the same time, another experiment was conducted in which individuals in the US. were asked to deactivate their Facebook account for a $102 incentive, prior to the US. midterm election. It was found that those who deactivated their accounts and did not use Facebook were less polarized as compared to those individuals whose accounts were still activated during the experiment.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Peckham |first=Sheena |date=13 April 2023 |title=What are algorithms? How to prevent echo chambers and keep children safe online |url=https://www.internetmatters.org/hub/news-blogs/what-are-algorithms-how-to-prevent-echo-chambers/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20260311184733/https://www.internetmatters.org/hub/news-blogs/what-are-algorithms-how-to-prevent-echo-chambers/ |archive-date=11 March 2026 |access-date=14 February 2024 |work=Internet Matters |language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lelkes |first1=Yphtach |last2=Sood |first2=Gaurav |last3=Iyengar |first3=Shanto |date=January 2017 |title=The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.12237 |journal=American Journal of Political Science |language=en |volume=61 |issue=1 |pages=5–20 |doi=10.1111/ajps.12237 |issn=0092-5853}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Allcott |first1=Hunt |last2=Braghieri |first2=Luca |last3=Eichmeyer |first3=Sarah |last4=Gentzkow |first4=Matthew |date=1 March 2020 |title=The Welfare Effects of Social Media |url=https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20190658 |journal=American Economic Review |language=en |volume=110 |issue=3 |pages=629–676 |doi=10.1257/aer.20190658 |issn=0002-8282}}</ref>

In addition, Boxell assess ANEX data from 1972–2016 by age cohorts analyzing their likelihood of using social media. The study found that the largest polarization index occurred among the oldest cohort, which was less likely to use social media (Boxell et al., 2017).<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Boxell |first1=Levi |last2=Gentzkow |first2=Matthew |last3=Shapiro |first3=Jesse M. |date=3 October 2017 |title=Greater Internet use is not associated with faster growth in political polarization among US demographic groups |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |language=en |volume=114 |issue=40 |pages=10612–10617 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1706588114 |doi-access=free |issn=0027-8424 |pmc=5635884 |pmid=28928150 |bibcode=2017PNAS..11410612B }}</ref> Thus, he found a small or negative relation between internet usage and polarization. Also, Markus Prior in his article tried to trace the causal link between social media and affective polarization but he found no evidence that partisan media are making ordinary American voters more partisan, thus negating the role of partisan media as a cause of affective polarization (Prior, 2013).<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Prior |first=Markus |date=11 May 2013 |title=Media and Political Polarization |url=https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242 |journal=Annual Review of Political Science |language=en |volume=16 |issue=  |pages=101–127 |doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135242 |issn=1094-2939}}</ref>

The mass media has grown as an institution over the past half-century. Political scientists argue that this has particularly affected the voting public in the last three decades, as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news media choices. The mass media's current, fragmented, high-choice environment has induced a movement of the audience from more even-toned political programming to more antagonistic and one-sided broadcasts and articles. Media bias charts can also visualize ideological differences among news outlets by placing sources along a left-to-right political spectrum, providing a spectrum, providing a simplified representation of partisan orientation within the media landscape.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Media Bias Chart {{!}} Liberal Media Bias & News Source Ratings |url=https://www.biasly.com/media-bias-chart/ |access-date=2026-08-13 |website=Biasly |language=en-US}}</ref> These programs tend to appeal to partisan viewers who watch the polarized programming as a self-confirming source for their ideologies.<ref name="mann-12" /><ref name="hetherington-09" /><ref name="hollander-08">{{cite journal|last=Hollander|first=B.A.|title=Tuning Out or Tuning Elsewhere? Partisanship, Polarization, and Media Migration from 1998 to 2006|journal=Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly|date=1 March 2008|volume=85|issue=1|pages=23–40|doi=10.1177/107769900808500103|s2cid=144996244}}</ref>

Countries with less diversified but emerging media markets, such as [[China]] and [[South Korea]], have become more polarized due to the diversification of political media.<ref name="yuan-07">{{cite book|last=Yuan|first=Elaine Jingyan|title=The New Multi-channel Media Environment in China: Diversity of Exposure in Television Viewing|year=2007|publisher=Northwestern University|isbn=978-1-109-94021-3}}</ref><ref name="kim-11">{{cite book|last=Kim|first=S.J.|title=Emerging patterns of news media use across multiple platforms and their political implications in south korea|year=2011|publisher=Northwestern University|id={{ProQuest|873972899}}}}</ref> In addition, most search engines and social networks (e.g., Google, Facebook) now utilize computer algorithms as filters, which personalize web content based on a user's search history, location, and previous clicking patterns, creating more polarized access to information.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Rushkoff |first1=Douglas |title=Program or be programmed: ten commands for a digital age |last2=Purvis |first2=Leland |date=2011 |publisher=Soft Skull Press |isbn=978-1-59376-426-5 |location=Berkeley, Calif}}</ref> This method of personalizing web content results in ''[[filter bubble]]s'', a term coined by digital activist [[Eli Pariser]] that refers to the polarized ideological bubbles that are created by computer algorithms filtering out unrelated information and opposing views.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Pariser |first=Eli |title=The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you |date=2012 |publisher=Penguin books |isbn=978-1-59420-300-8 |location=London}}</ref>

A 2011 study found ideological segregation of online news consumption is lower than the segregation of most offline news consumption and lower than the segregation of face-to-face interactions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Gentzkow|first1=Matthew|last2=Shapiro|first2=Jesse M.|date=2011-11-01|title=Ideological Segregation Online and Offline *|journal=The Quarterly Journal of Economics|volume=126|issue=4|pages=1799–1839|doi=10.1093/qje/qjr044|issn=0033-5533|hdl=1811/52901|s2cid=9303073|url=https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/1811/52901/1/Mershon_ShapiroJ_photos_2011-10-27.pdf|hdl-access=free}}</ref> This suggests that the filter bubbles effects of online media consumption are exaggerated. Other research also shows that online media does not contribute to the increased polarization of opinions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Hohenberg|first1=Clemm von|last2=Bernhard|last3=Maes|first3=Michael|last4=Pradelski|first4=Bary S.R.|date=2017-05-25|title=Micro influence and macro dynamics of opinions|doi=10.2139/ssrn.2974413 |ssrn=2974413|s2cid=157851503 }}</ref> [[Solomon Messing]] and Sean J. Westwood state that individuals do not necessarily become polarized through media because they choose their own exposure, which tends to already align with their views.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Messing|first1=Solomon|last2=Westwood|first2=Sean|date=31 Dec 2012|title=Selective Exposure in the Age of Social Media|journal=Communication Research|volume=41|issue=8|pages=1042–1063|doi=10.1177/0093650212466406|s2cid=35373607}}</ref> For instance, in an experiment where people could choose the content they wanted, people did not start to dislike their political opponents more after selecting between pro- or anti-immigration content;<ref name="Dahlgren, P. M. 2021">{{cite journal |last1=Dahlgren |first1=Peter M. |title=Forced vs. Selective Exposure: Threatening Messages Lead to Anger but Not Dislike of Political Opponents |journal=Journal of Media Psychology |date=2021 |doi=10.1027/1864-1105/a000302|s2cid=266491415 }}</ref> however, people started to counterargue the content.<ref name="Dahlgren, P. M. 2021" />

Academic studies found that providing people with impartial, objective information has the potential to reduce political polarization, but the effect of information on polarization is highly sensitive to contextual factors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Duhaime|first1=Erik|last2=Apfelbaum|first2=Evan|date=2017|title=Can Information Decrease Political Polarization? Evidence From the U.S. Taxpayer Receipt |journal=Social Psychological and Personality Science|volume=8|issue=7|page=736|doi=10.1177/1948550616687126|s2cid=151758489}}</ref> Specifically, polarization over government spending was reduced when people were provided with a "Taxpayer Receipt," but not when they were also asked how they wanted the money to be spent. This suggests that subtle factors like the mood and tone of partisan news sources may have a large effect on how the same information is interpreted. This is confirmed by another study that shows that different emotions of messages can lead to polarization or convergence: joy is prevalent in emotional polarization, while sadness and fear play significant roles in emotional convergence.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Hilbert |first1=Martin |last2=Ahmed |first2=Saifuddin |last3=Cho |first3=Jaeho |last4=Liu |first4=Billy |last5=Luu |first5=Jonathan |date=2018-10-02 |title=Communicating with Algorithms: A Transfer Entropy Analysis of Emotions-based Escapes from Online Echo Chambers |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19312458.2018.1479843 |journal=Communication Methods and Measures |language=en |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=260–275 |doi=10.1080/19312458.2018.1479843 |issn=1931-2458}}</ref> These findings can help to design more socially responsible algorithms by starting to focus on the emotional content of algorithmic recommendations. Research has primarily focused on the United States, a country with high polarization that has also increased over time. In Sweden, there is a stable ideological polarization over time.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Oscarsson |first1=Henrik |last2=Bergman |first2=Torbjörn |last3=Bergström |first3=Annika |last4=Hellström |first4=Johan |title=Demokratirådets rapport 2021: polarisering i Sverige |location=Stockholm |publisher=SNS |year=2021 |isbn=978-91-88637-56-7 }}</ref> Experiments and surveys from Sweden also give limited support to the idea of increased ideological or affective polarization due to media use.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Dahlgren |first1=Peter M. |title=Media Echo Chambers: Selective Exposure and Confirmation Bias in Media Use, and its Consequences for Political Polarization |date=2020 |publisher=University of Gothenburg |location=Gothenburg |isbn=978-91-88212-95-5 |url=https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/67023?locale=en}}</ref>

{{further|Social media#Political polarization|Echo chamber (media)}}

===Political context===
Some 2020s studies emphasize the role of electoral context and the way parties interact with each other. For example, a 2023 study shows that coalition partnership can moderate the extent of affective polarization over parties;<ref name="auto"/> however, this study does not find evidence that the number of political parties and district magnitude that captures the proportionality of electoral systems would influence the extent of affective polarization. Electoral context, such as electoral salience, involvement in elections, elite polarization, and the strength of Eurosceptic parties, can also intensify the divide.<ref name="doi.org"/> Furthermore, while earlier literature suggested that political tensions peak during campaigns and subside afterward, a 2024 study analyzing the 2022 United States elections found that partisan animosity remained durable and consistently high post-election, regardless of whether a voter's preferred candidate won or lost.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Fasching |first1=Neil |last2=Iyengar |first2=Shanto |last3=Westwood |first3=Sean J. |date=2024-09-04 |title=Persistent polarization: The unexpected durability of political animosity around US elections |journal=Science Advances |volume=10 |issue=36 |article-number=eadm9198 |doi=10.1126/sciadv.adm9198}}</ref> The impact of redistricting (potentially through [[gerrymandering]] or the manipulation of electoral borders to favor a political party) on political polarization in the United States has been found to be minimal in research by leading political scientists.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Prokop |first=Andrew |date=2014-08-05 |title=Does gerrymandering cause political polarization? |url=https://www.vox.com/2014/8/5/17991982/gerrymandering-political-polarization-partisan |access-date=2024-07-15 |website=Vox |language=en-US}}</ref> [[Ranked-choice voting in the United States|Ranked-choice voting]] has also been put forward as a solution to political polarization.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Slaughter |first=Anne-Marie |date=2019 |title=Idea: Ranked-Choice Voting |url=https://www.politico.com:443/interactives/2019/how-to-fix-politics-in-america/polarization/ranked-choice-voting/ |access-date=2024-07-15 |website=politico.com |language=en}}</ref> When politicians repeatedly favor partisan media outlets, they reinforce their supporters' existing biases, which can further fuel political polarization within the public.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Six ways the media influence elections {{!}} School of Journalism and Communication |url=https://journalism.uoregon.edu/news/six-ways-media-influences-elections |access-date=2024-10-14 |website=journalism.uoregon.edu |language=en}}</ref>

==Consequences==
The implications of political polarization "are not entirely clear and may include some benefits as well as detrimental consequences."<ref name="epstein-07">{{cite journal|last=Epstein|first=Diana|author2=John D. Graham|year=2007|title=Polarized Politics and Policy Consequences|url=https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP197.pdf|journal=RAND Corporation}}</ref> Polarization can be benign, natural, and democratizing, or it can be pernicious, having long term malignant effects on society and congesting essential democratic functions.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Varieties of Democracy Report 2019|url=https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf|access-date=2019-10-26|archive-date=2019-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190605230333/https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf}}</ref> Where voters see the parties as less divergent, they are less likely to be satisfied with how their democracy works.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ridge|first=Hannah M|date=2021-01-20|title=Just like the others: Party differences, perception, and satisfaction with democracy|journal=Party Politics|volume=28|issue=3|pages=419–430|doi=10.1177/1354068820985193|s2cid=234162430|issn=1354-0688}}</ref> While its exact effects are disputed, it clearly alters the political process and the political composition of the general public.<ref name="fiorina-08" /><ref name="abramowitz-08" /><ref name="nivola-06">{{cite book|title=Red and blue nation? Volume One: characteristics and causes of America's polarized politics|publisher=Brookings Institution|year=2006|isbn=978-0-8157-6083-2|editor=Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady|location=Washington, DC}}</ref><ref name="nivola-08">{{cite book|title=Red and blue nation? Volume Two: Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics|publisher=Brookings Institution|year=2008|isbn=978-0-8157-6080-1|editor=Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady|edition=[Online-Ausg.]|location=Washington, DC}}</ref>

=== Pernicious polarization ===
In political science, pernicious polarization occurs when a single [[political cleavage]] overrides other divides and commonalities to the point it has boiled into a single divide which becomes entrenched and self-reinforcing.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=McCoy|first1=Jennifer|last2=Rahman|first2=Tahmina|date=2016-07-25|title=Polarized Democracies in Comparative Perspective: Toward a Conceptual Framework|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336830321}}</ref> Unlike most types of polarization, pernicious polarization does not need to be [[Ideological continuum|ideological]]. Rather, pernicious polarization operates on a single political cleavage, which can be [[Political party|partisan identity]], [[religious]] vs [[Secularism|secular]], [[Globalism|globalist]] vs [[nationalist]], [[Urban area|urban]] vs [[rural]], etc.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=McCoy|first1=Jennifer|last2=Somer|first2=Murat|date=2019-01-01|title=Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|language=en|volume=681|issue=1|pages=234–271|doi=10.1177/0002716218818782|issn=0002-7162|doi-access=free|s2cid=150169330}}</ref> This political divide creates an explosion of mutual group [[distrust]] which hardens between the two political parties (or [[Coalitions of parties|coalitions]]) and spreads beyond the political sphere into societal relations.<ref name=":3" /> People begin to perceive politics as "us" vs "them."<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Somer|first1=Murat|last2=McCoy|first2=Jennifer|date=2019-01-01|title=Transformations through Polarizations and Global Threats to Democracy|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|volume=681|issue=1|pages=8–22|doi=10.1177/0002716218818058|issn=0002-7162|doi-access=free|s2cid=149764414}}</ref> The office of Ombudsman of Argentina has been vacant since 2009, along with a companion Public Defender's office, allegedly because of pernicious polarization.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Stropparo |first=Pablo Ezequiel |date=2023-07-09 |title=Pueblo desnudo y público movilizado por el poder: Vacancia del Defensor del Pueblo: algunas transformaciones en la democracia y en la opinión pública en Argentina |url=https://revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmop/article/view/85516 |journal=Revista Mexicana de Opinión Pública |language=Spanish |issue=35 |doi=10.22201/fcpys.24484911e.2023.35.85516 |issn=2448-4911}}</ref>

====Causes====
According to Carothers & O'Donohue (2019), pernicious polarization is a process most often driven by a single political cleavage dominating an otherwise pluralistic political life, overriding other cleavages.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|last=and|date=2019-04-01|title=Democracies Divided|url=https://www.brookings.edu/book/democracies-divided/|access-date=2019-11-24|website=Brookings|language=en-US}}</ref> On the other hand, Slater & Arugay (2019) have argued that it's not the depth of a single social cleavage, but the political elite's process for removing a leader which best explains whether or not polarization truly becomes pernicious.<ref name=":7">{{Cite journal|last=Arugay, Slater|first=Aires, Dan|date=2019|title=Polarizing Figures: Executive Power and Institutional Conflict in Asian Democracies|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=62|pages=92–106|doi=10.1177/0002764218759577|doi-access=free}}</ref> Lebas & Munemo (2019) have argued pernicious polarization is marked by both deeper societal penetration and segregation than other forms of political polarization, making it less amenable to resolution;<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last1=LeBas|first1=Adrienne|last2=Munemo|first2=Ngonidzashe|date=2019-01-01|title=Elite Conflict, Compromise, and Enduring Authoritarianism: Polarization in Zimbabwe, 1980–2008|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|language=en|volume=681|issue=1|pages=209–226|doi=10.1177/0002716218813897|issn=0002-7162|doi-access=free|s2cid=150337601}}</ref> however, it is agreed that pernicious polarization reinforces and entrenches itself, dragging the country into a downward spiral of anger and division for which there are no easy remedies.<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":4" />

====Effect on governance====
Pernicious polarization makes [[compromise]], [[Consensus decision-making|consensus]], interaction, and [[Toleration|tolerance]] increasingly costly and tenuous for individuals and political actors on both sides of the divide.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal|last=Somer, McCoy|first=Murat, Jennifer|date=2018|title=Deja Vu? Polarization and Endangered Democracies in the 21st Century|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=62|pages=3–15|doi=10.1177/0002764218760371|doi-access=free}}</ref> Pernicious polarization routinely weakens respect for democratic norms, corrodes basic [[legislative]] processes, undermines the nonpartisan nature of the [[judiciary]] and fuels public disaffection with political parties. It exacerbates intolerance and [[discrimination]], diminishes societal [[Trust (social science)|trust]], and increases [[violence]] throughout the society. As well as potentially leading to [[democratic backsliding]].<ref name=":6" /> In country-by-country instances of pernicious polarization, it is common to see the winner exclude the loser from positions of power or using means to prevent the loser from becoming a threat in the future. In these situations, the loser typically questions the legitimacy of the institutions allowing the winner to create a [[hegemony]], which causes citizens to grow [[cynical]] towards politics. In these countries, politics is often seen as a self-referential power game that has nothing to do with people.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Vegetti|first=Federico|date=2019-01-01|title=The Political Nature of Ideological Polarization: The Case of Hungary|journal=The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science|language=en|volume=681|issue=1|pages=78–96|doi=10.1177/0002716218813895|issn=0002-7162|doi-access=free|s2cid=199896426}}</ref>

====Effect on public trust====
{{Further|Post-truth politics}}
Perniciously polarized societies often witness public [[controversies]] over factually provable questions. During this process, [[fact]]s and moral truths increasingly lose their weight, as more people [[conform]] to the messages of their own bloc. Social and political actors such as [[journalist]]s, [[Academic staff|academics]], and [[politician]]s either become engaged in [[Partisan (politics)|partisan]] storytelling or else incur growing [[social]], [[political]], and [[Economics|economic]] costs. Electorates lose confidence in [[Public institution (United States)|public institutions]]. Support for norms and [[democracy]] decline. It becomes increasingly difficult for people to act in a [[Morality|morally principled]] fashion by appealing to the [[truth]] or acting in line with one's [[values]] when it conflicts with one's party interests.<ref name=":9" /> Once pernicious polarization takes hold, it takes on a life of its own, regardless of earlier [[intention]]s.<ref name=":5" />

===Benefits of polarization===
Several political scientists have argued that most types of political polarization are beneficial to democracy, as well as a natural feature. The simplifying features of polarization can help [[democratization]]. Strategies which depend on [[Opposition (politics)|opposition]] and [[Social exclusion|exclusion]] are present in all forms of observed politics.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Schattschneider|first=E. E. (Elmer Eric)|url=https://catalyst.library.jhu.edu/catalog/bib_5918589|title=The semisovereign people: a realist's view of democracy in America|date=1975|publisher=Wadsworth Cengage Learning|isbn=978-0-03-013366-4|location=Boston, MA|access-date=2019-10-26|archive-date=2023-04-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406025447/https://catalyst.library.jhu.edu/catalog/bib_5918589}}</ref> Political polarization can help transform or disrupt the [[status quo]], sometimes addressing [[injustice]]s or imbalances in a [[Populism|popular]] vs. [[oligarchic]] [[Class conflict|struggle]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Stavrakakis|first=Yannis|date=January 2018|title=Paradoxes of Polarization: Democracy's Inherent Division and the (Anti-) Populist Challenge|journal=American Behavioral Scientist|volume=62|issue=1|pages=43–58|doi=10.1177/0002764218756924|issn=0002-7642|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Slater|first=Dan|date=2013|editor-last=Diamond|editor-first=Larry|editor2-last=Kapstein|editor2-first=Ethan B.|editor3-last=Converse|editor3-first=Nathan|editor4-last=Mattlin|editor4-first=Mikael|editor5-last=Phongpaichit|editor5-first=Pasuk|editor6-last=Baker|editor6-first=Chris|title=Democratic Careening|journal=World Politics|volume=65|issue=4|pages=729–763|doi=10.1017/S0043887113000233|issn=0043-8871|jstor=42002228|s2cid=201767801}}</ref>

Political polarization can serve to unify, invigorate, or mobilize potential [[allies]] at the elite and mass levels. It can also help to divide, weaken, or pacify competitors. Even the most celebrated [[social movement]]s can be described as a "group of people involved in a conflict with clearly defined opponents having a conflictual orientation toward an opponent and a common identity."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Kriesi|first=Hanspeter|title=Comparative Politics|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2017|isbn=978-0-19-185101-8|editor-last=Caramani|editor-first=Daniele|edition=4th|chapter=16. Social movements|doi=10.1093/hepl/9780198737421.003.0018|doi-broken-date=13 April 2026 |chapter-url=https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198737421.001.0001/hepl-9780198737421-chapter-16|access-date=2019-10-26|archive-date=2019-10-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191026233348/https://www.oxfordpoliticstrove.com/view/10.1093/hepl/9780198737421.001.0001/hepl-9780198737421-chapter-16}}</ref> Political polarization can also provide voting [[heuristic]]s to help voters choose among [[candidate]]s, enabling political parties to mobilize supporters and provide programmatic choices.<ref name="Polarized">{{Cite book|last1=Campbell|first1=James E.|url=https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691172163/polarized|title=Polarized|date=2016|publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0-691-17216-3}}</ref> Polarizing politics can also help to overcome internal differences and frame a common identity, based in part on a common opposition to those resisting [[reform]]s. Still, polarization can be a risky political tool even when intended as an instrument of democratization, as it risks turning pernicious and self-propagating.<ref name=":4" />

==United States perspective==
{{main|Political polarization in the United States}}

==Turkish perspective==
{{main|Political polarization in Turkey}}

==See also==
* {{anl|Adversarial collaboration}}
* [[Bipolarisation]]
* {{anl|Civil war}}
* {{anl|Contentious politics}}
* [[Cultural pluralism]] – In contrast
* {{anl|False dilemma}}
* {{anl|Hate speech}}
* {{anl|Horseshoe theory}}
* {{anl|Ideocracy}}
* ''[[Ideological Turing test]]'' – In contrast
* {{anl|Left–right politics}}
* {{anl|Moral foundations theory}}
* {{anl|Multi-party system}}
* {{anl|Outrage industrial complex}}
* {{anl|Political stability}}
* {{anl|Pillarisation}}
* {{anl|Social polarization}}
* {{anl|State collapse}}
* {{anl|Urban–rural political divide}}

=== Groups and Work ===
* {{Annotated link |Allsides}}
* {{Annotated link |Braver Angels}}
* {{Annotated link |Bridge the Divide}}
* {{Annotated link |Citizens for Civil Discourse}}
* {{Annotated link |Heterodox Academy}}
* {{Annotated link |One America Initiative}}
* {{Annotated link |Problem Solvers Caucus}}
* {{Annotated link |Resetting the Table}}
* {{Annotated link |Seeds of Peace}}
* The Better Arguments Project – [[Aspen Institute]], [[Allstate]], and [[Facing History and Ourselves]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite journal |last1=Keefer |first1=Philip |last2=Knack |first2=Stephen |year=2002 |title=Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links between Inequality and Growth |journal=Public Choice |volume=111 |issue=1/2 |pages=127–154 |jstor=30026274 |doi=10.1023/A:1015168000336 |s2cid=9467286 |url=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/1173.pdf?abstractid=632489&mirid=3 }}
* {{cite journal | last1 = Sunstein | first1 = Cass R | year = 2001 | title = Deliberative Trouble – Why Groups Go to Extremes | url = http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ylr110&div=13&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=7&men_tab=srchresults&terms=polarization–political&type=matchall#89| journal = [[Yale Law Journal]] | volume = 110 | issue = 71| pages = 71–120 | doi = 10.2307/797587 | jstor = 797587 }}

=== Region-specific ===
* {{cite journal | last1 = Clark | first1 = Cal | last2 = Tan | first2 = Alexander C. | year = 2012 | title = Political Polarization in Taiwan: A Growing Challenge to Catch-all Parties? | url = http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/jocca/v41i3/f_0026803_21893.pdf | journal = Journal of Current Chinese Affairs | volume = 41 | issue = 3| pages = 7–31 | doi = 10.1177/186810261204100302 | s2cid = 73640516 | doi-access = free }}
* Hahm, Hyeonho, David Hilpert and Thomas König (2023) "Divided We Unite: The Nature of Partyism and the Role of Coalition Partnership in Europe". ''American Political Science Review'', [[doi:10.1017/S0003055423000266|DOI: 10.1017/S0003055423000266]]
* Hahm, Hyeonho, David Hilpert and Thomas König (2022) "Divided by Europe: Affective Polarisation in the Context of European Elections". ''West European Politics'', [[doi:10.1080/01402382.2022.2133277|DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2022.2133277]]
* {{cite journal | last1 = Simon | first1 = Sheldon W. | year = 1979 | title = China, Vietnam, and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarization | journal = Asian Survey | volume = 19 | issue = 12| pages = 1171–1188 | doi = 10.2307/2643963 | jstor=2643963}}
{{Media and human factors}}

[[Category:Politics]]
[[Category:Political discrimination]]
[[Category:Political science]]
[[Category:Political terminology]]
[[Category:Sectarianism]]