{{Short description|Indian Mahayana Buddhist philosopher (c. 150–c. 250)}}
{{Other uses}}
{{Use British English|date=April 2026}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=April 2026}}
{{Infobox philosopher
| name               = Nāgārjuna
| image              = Nagarjuna with 84 mahasiddha cropped.jpg
| image_size         = 200px
| caption            = Painting of Nāgārjuna (18th century) 
| birth_date         = c. 150 CE
| birth_place        = [[South India]]{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=160}}
| death_date         = c. 250 CE
| death_place        = India
| occupation         = [[Buddhism|Buddhist]] teacher, [[Bhikkhu|monk]] and philosopher
| notable_works      = ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]''
| notable_ideas      = {{plainlist|
* [[Madhyamaka]]
* [[Śūnyatā]]
* [[Two truths doctrine]]}}
| school_tradition   = {{plainlist|
* [[Mahayana|Mahāyāna]] [[Buddhism]]
* [[Madhyamaka]]
* [[Pure Land Buddhism]]
* [[Tiantai]] [[Buddhism]]}}
|region=[[Eastern philosophy]]
* [[Indian philosophy]]
| era=[[Ancient philosophy]]
}}
'''Nāgārjuna''' ([[Sanskrit]], from [[Nāga]] + [[Arjun (name)|Arjuna]]; [[Chinese language|Chn]]. Lóngshù 龍樹; [[Tibetic languages|Tib]]. Klu sgrub; {{Circa|150|250 CE}}) was an Indian scholar-monk, philosopher, and teacher ([[acharya]]) of [[Mahayana Buddhism]] from south India. He is considered the founder of the [[Madhyamaka]] (Centrism, Middle Way) school.<ref>Walser (2005) p. 1-3.</ref><ref name=":5" />

Nāgārjuna is widely considered to be the most important Buddhist philosopher after [[the Buddha]] himself.<ref name="Garfield">Garfield, Jay L. (1995), ''The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way'', Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref><ref name=":5" /> Indeed, in Tibetan Buddhism, he is even called the "second Buddha".<ref name=":8">Ye Shaoyong, 2019. “Nāgārjuna''”, in Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism'', Volume II: Lives. pp. 335-347.</ref> He was a well known defender of the [[Mahāyāna]] movement and his  treatises ([[Shastra|śāstras]]) are the foundational texts of a school of [[Buddhist philosophy]] known as the view of emptiness (Śūnyatāvāda) or Madhyamaka.<ref name="Garfield" /><ref>Walser (2005) p. 3.</ref><ref name=":8" /> Nāgārjuna remains a key figure in all contemporary traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and his philosophical writings on the doctrine of “emptiness” (''[[śūnyatā]]'') influenced [[Indian philosophy]] for a millennium, as well as being an indispensable doctrinal source for Mahāyāna doctrine in [[East Asian Buddhism]] and [[Vajrayana|Indo-Tibetan Buddhism]].<ref name=":5" />

Nāgārjuna's ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' (''Root Verses on Madhyamaka'', MMK) is the most important text on the Madhyamaka philosophy of [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]]. The MMK inspired a large number of commentaries in Sanskrit, Chinese, Tibetan, Korean and Japanese and continues to be studied today.<ref>Garfield (1995), p. 87.</ref>

== History ==
[[File:Satvahana.svg|thumb|right|A map of the Satavahana Kingdom, showing the location of [[Amaravathi, Guntur district|Amaravathi]] (where Nāgārjuna may have lived and worked according to Walser) and [[Vidarbha]] (the birthplace of Nāgārjuna according to Kumārajīva)]]

=== Background ===
India in the first and second centuries CE was politically divided into various states, including the [[Kushan Empire]] and the [[Satavahana dynasty|Satavahana Kingdom]]. At this point in [[History of Buddhism|Buddhist history]], the Buddhist community was already divided into various [[Schools of Buddhism|Buddhist schools]] and had spread throughout India.

At this time, there was already a small and nascent Mahāyāna movement. Mahāyāna ideas were held by a minority of Buddhists in India at the time. As Joseph Walser writes, "Mahāyāna before the fifth century was largely invisible and probably existed only as a minority and largely unrecognized movement within the fold of nikāya Buddhism."<ref>Walser (2005), p. 43.</ref> By the second century, early [[Mahayana sutras|Mahāyāna Sūtras]] such as the ''[[Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra|Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā]]'' were already circulating among certain Mahāyāna circles.<ref>Mäll, Linnart. ''Studies in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā and other essays.'' 2005. p. 96</ref>

=== Life ===
Very little is reliably known of the life of Nāgārjuna and modern historians do not agree on a specific date or place (multiple places in India suggested) for him.<ref name=":0">Walser (2005), p. 60.</ref> Nevertheless, most scholars place him somewhere in [[South India]] at some time between 1st to 3rd century CE.<ref name=":8" /> The surviving accounts were written in Chinese and Tibetan centuries after his death and are mostly [[Hagiography|hagiographical]] accounts that are historically unverifiable.<ref name=":0" /> The earliest accounts date to [[Kumārajīva]]'s time (350−409 or 344−413) and are quite sparse in detail, while Tibetan accounts date from much later (11th century onwards).<ref name=":8" />  

Some scholars such as Joseph Walser argue that Nāgārjuna was an advisor to a king of the [[Satavahana dynasty|Sātavāhana]] dynasty which ruled the [[Deccan Plateau]] in the second century.<ref name=":1">Walser (2005), p. 61.</ref>{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=160}} This is supported by most of the traditional hagiographical sources as well.<ref name=":3"/> Archaeological evidence at [[Amaravati Stupa|Amarāvatī]] indicates that if this is true, the king may have been [[Yajna Sri Satakarni|Yajña Śrī Śātakarṇi]] (c. second half of the 2nd century). On the basis of this association, Nāgārjuna is conventionally placed at around 150–250 CE.<ref name=":1" />{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=160}}
[[File:Amaravati stupa. Model. Amaravati.JPG|thumb|right|A model of the [[Amaravati Stupa]]]]
Walser also thinks that it is most likely that when Nāgārjuna wrote the ''Ratnavali'', he lived in a mixed monastery (with Mahāyānists and non-Mahāyānists) in which Mahāyānists were the minority. The most likely sectarian affiliation of the monastery according to Walser was Purvasailya, Aparasailya, or [[Caitika|Caityaka]] (which were [[Mahāsāṃghika]] sub-schools).<ref name=":9">Walser (2005), p. 87.</ref> He also argues that "it is plausible that he wrote the ''Ratnavali'' within a thirty-year period at the end of the second century in the [[Andhra Pradesh|Andhra]] region around Dhanyakataka (modern-day [[Amaravati]])."<ref name=":1" />

=== Traditional accounts ===
The earliest biographical sources on Nāgārjuna are associated with the [[Kucha|Kuchan]] translator monk [[Kumārajīva]] (344–413) and his circle of scholars.<ref name=":3">Walser (2005), p. 66.</ref><ref name=":7">Young, Stuart H, 2019. “''Nāgārjuna in China''”, in ''Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism'', Volume II: Lives. pp. 728-734.</ref> They include the Zhu weimo-jie jing (注維摩詰經; T. 1775, a commentary on the ''[[Vimalakirti Sutra|Vimalakirti]]''), the Maming pusa zhuan (馬鳴菩薩傳, ''Tradition of Aśvaghoṣa Bodhisattva'', a combined biography of Nāgārjuna and [[Aśvaghoṣa]]) and also various prefaces to the Chinese translations to Nāgārjuna's works, such the preface to the Zhong lun (中論; *Madhyamaka-śāstra, T. 1564) and the preface to the [[Da Zhidu Lun|Da zhidu lun]] (大智度論; T.1509).<ref name=":7" />

These writings paint a minimal picture of Nāgārjuna, who is depicted as the greatest [[bodhisattva]] since Śākyamuni himself. He is depicted as living during a time when the Dharma was "decadent and weak" and as saving the Mahāyāna by championing its teachings through debate and textual composition. According to Huiyuan's preface to the Da zhidu lun, Nāgārjuna was a virtuous gentleman who, saddened at the delusion of the masses, took the vows of a monk and "dwelt in seclusion in the woods and swamps, lived as a hermit and practiced [[Dhyana in Buddhism|dhyāna]]. He stilled his mind and studied the subtle, his thoughts penetrating the supranormal."<ref name=":7" /> According to Huiyuan, Nāgārjuna had an awakening, and then travelled to the [[Himalayas|Himālayas]], where he received the Mahāyāna teachings from a [[śramaṇa]]. He then travelled to the palace of the [[nāga]]s, where "there was no important canon or secret text that he did not master."<ref name=":7" /> Then, according to Huiyuan, <blockquote>When the roots of his [[Kleshas (Buddhism)|impediments]] had been pulled up, his name crowned the [[Bhūmi (Buddhism)|stages of the [bodhisattva] path]] … Consequently, the non-Buddhists esteemed his manner and famous gentlemen submitted to his dictates. From that time, the enterprise of the Greater Vehicle flourished again.<ref name=":7" /> </blockquote>This basic account of Nāgārjuna as a great Mahāyāna revivalist is echoed by the writings of [[Sengzhao]], and [[Sengrui]], both students of [[Kumārajīva]]. For example, Sengrui writes that at the end of [[Decline of the Dharma|the age of Semblance Dharma]] false teachings flourished, and then Nāgārjuna's writings "opened the great road in such a manner that the carriage of the Greater Vehicle could advance straight ahead".<ref name=":7" /> Sengzhao also tells a story of Nāgārjuna defeating a non-buddhist in debate.<ref name=":7" />

Later [[Hagiography|hagiographies]] were composed in China and in Tibet. Chinese hagiographies include the Longshu pusa zhuan (T. 2047), which, while traditionally attributed to [[Kumārajīva]], is likely a later composition, and the Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan (T. 2058).<ref name=":7" /> These texts state that Nāgārjuna was a [[Brahmin]] who had mastered all the Vedas and traditional Brahmin arts and then converted to Buddhism, later travelling to the palace of the dragons (nagas) under the ocean. They also contain various miraculous stories, depicting Nāgārjuna as a spellcasting wonderworker who is a master of [[mantra]]s as well as [[alchemy]], able to defeat haughty Brahmins in battles of intellect and magic duels.<ref name=":7" /><ref>"Notes on the Nagarjunikonda Inscriptions", Dutt, Nalinaksha. ''The Indian Historical Quarterly'' 7:3 1931.09 pp. 633–53 "..Tibetan tradition which says that Nāgārjuna was born of a brahmin family of [[Amaravati]]."</ref><ref>Geri Hockfield Malandra, ''Unfolding A Mandala: The Buddhist Cave Temples at Ellora'', SUNY Press, 1993, p. 17</ref><ref>Shōhei Ichimura, ''Buddhist Critical Spirituality: Prajñā and Śūnyatā'', Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (2001), p. 67</ref><ref>Bkra-śis-rnam-rgyal (Dwags-po Paṇ-chen), Takpo Tashi Namgyal, ''Mahamudra: The Quintessence of Mind and Meditation'', Motilal Banarsidass Publishers (1993), p. 443</ref> The traditional religious hagiographies place Nāgārjuna in various Indian regions. Chinese sources, as well as [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]], place him in [[Vidarbha]], South India,<ref>{{cite book |author=Buddhist Text & Research Society |title=Journal |date=1895 |volume=3-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ubwoAAAAYAAJ |page=16}}</ref><ref>Transaction - Indian Institute of World Culture, Issue 73, Indian Institute of World Culture, 1987, p. 5</ref> while [[Xuanzang]] mentions he was from south [[Kosala Kingdom|Kosala]].<ref name=":3" />

Traditional religious hagiographies also associate Nāgārjuna with the teaching of the [[Prajnaparamita|Prajñāpāramitā]] sūtras, as well as with having revealed these scriptures to the world after they had remained hidden for some time. The sources differ on where this happened and how Nāgārjuna retrieved the sutras. Some sources say he retrieved the sutras from the land of the [[nāga]]s, which is located either in the Himalayas or at the bottom of the ocean.<ref>Walser (2005), pp. 69, 74.</ref> [[File:Nagarjuna%2C_Tibet%2C_1644-1911_AD_-_Sichuan_Provincial_Museum_-_Chengdu%2C_China_-_DSC04486.jpg|thumb|A Tibetan depiction of Nagarjuna; the snakes are depicted as protectors around Nagarjuna's head and the [[Nāga|nagas]] rising out of the water are offering Buddhist sutras.]]
[[File:Nagarjuna_Conqueror_of_the_Serpent.jpg|right|thumb|[[Nicholas Roerich]] "Nagarjuna Conqueror of the Serpent" (1925)]]

Nāgārjuna himself is often depicted in composite form comprising human and [[nāga]] characteristics. Nāgas are snake-like supernatural beings of great magical power that feature in [[Hindu mythology|Hindu]], [[Buddhist mythology|Buddhist]] and [[Jainism|Jain mythology]].<ref>Walser (2005), p. 74.</ref> Nāgas are found throughout Indian religious culture, and typically signify intelligent serpents or dragons that are responsible for rain, lakes, and other bodies of water. In Buddhism, a naga can be a symbol of a realised [[arhat]] or wise person.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Berger|first=Douglas|title=Nagarjuna (c. 150—c. 250)|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/nagarjun/|access-date=2 May 2017|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

Tibetan and Chinese Esoteric sources also associate Nāgārjuna with the use of mantras, and with the [[Vajrayana]] tradition in general. For example, [[Yijing (monk)|Yijing]] (635–713) writes that Nāgārjuna had passed down the teachings of the Vidyādharapiṭaka ("Canon of the Spell-Wielders"), which was a legendary source of Buddhist [[Dharani|dhāraṇī]] and mantra incantations, to his disciple Nanda, placing him at the beginning of the [[Chinese Esoteric Buddhism|East Asian Buddhist esoteric tradition]], which soon began to see him as their founding patriarch.<ref name=":7" /> In a similar fashion, the [[Pure Land Buddhism|Pure Land tradition]] also considers Nāgārjuna to be its first patriarch, basing itself on the Chinese translation of the ''[[Dasabhumika-vibhāsā|Dasabhumikavibhāsā]]'' (''Commentary on the [[Ten Stages Sutra]]'') which discusses how to be born in the Sukhāvatī pure land of Amitābha Buddha. To authenticate their view of Nāgārjuna as patriarch, Pure Land authors drew on this and other classic sources, like a prophecy found in the ''[[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra|Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra]]'' of Nāgārjuna's rebirth in [[Sukhavati|Sukhāvatī]], and the [[Amitabha Pure Land Rebirth Dharani|''Pure Land Rebirth Dhāraṇī'']] (T. 368) which is said to have been received by Nāgārjuna in a dream, according to a [[Colophon (publishing)|colophon]] to the dhāraṇī.<ref name=":7" />

Traditional sources also claim that Nāgārjuna practised [[Ayurveda|ayurvedic]] alchemy ([[Rasayana|rasāyana]]), creating elixirs of long life, among other substances. The Longshu pusa zhuan, for example, depicts Nāgārjuna making an elixir of invisibility, and [[Buton Rinchen Drub]], [[Taranatha]] and [[Xuanzang]] all state that he could turn rocks into gold.<ref name=":7" /><ref>Walser (2005), pp. 75-76.</ref>

Tibetan hagiographies also state that Nāgārjuna studied at [[Nalanda mahavihara|Nālanda Mahavihara]]. However, according to Walser, this university was not a strong monastic center until about 425. Also, as Walser notes, "Xuanzang and [[Yijing (monk)|Yijing]] both spent considerable time at Nālanda and studied Nāgārjuna’s texts there. It is strange that they would have spent so much time there and yet chose not to report any local tales of a man whose works played such an important part in the curriculum."<ref>Walser (2005), p. 78</ref>

Some sources ([[Buton Rinchen Drub]] and the other Tibetan historians) claim that in his later years, Nāgārjuna lived on the mountain of Śrīparvata near the city that would later be called [[Nagarjunakonda|Nāgārjunakoṇḍa]] ("Hill of Nāgārjuna").<ref name="hirakawa">Hirakawa, Akira. Groner, Paul. ''A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna.'' 2007. p. 242</ref><ref>Walser (2005), p. 72.</ref> The ruins of Nāgārjunakoṇḍa are located in [[Guntur district]], [[Andhra Pradesh]]. The [[Caitika]] and [[Bahuśrutīya]] nikāyas are known to have had [[vihara|monasteries]] in Nāgārjunakoṇḍa.<ref name="hirakawa" /> The archaeological finds at Nāgārjunakoṇḍa have not resulted in any evidence that the site was associated with Nagarjuna. The name "Nāgārjunakoṇḍa" dates from the medieval period, and the 3rd–4th century inscriptions found at the site make it clear that it was known as "Vijayapuri" in the ancient period.<ref>{{cite book |author = K. Krishna Murthy |url = https://books.google.com/books?id=4gBSWyLTSzkC&pg=PA1 |title = Nāgārjunakoṇḍā: A Cultural Study |publisher=Concept Publishing Company |year=1977|page=1|oclc=4541213 }}</ref>

=== Other Nāgārjunas ===
There are a multitude of texts attributed to "Nāgārjuna", many of these texts date from much later periods. This has caused much confusion for the traditional Buddhist biographers and [[Doxography|doxographers]]. Modern scholars are divided on how to classify these later texts and how many later writers called "Nāgārjuna" existed (the name remains popular today in Andhra Pradesh).<ref name=":4">Walser (2005), p. 69.</ref>

Some scholars have posited that there was a separate Aryuvedic writer called Nāgārjuna who wrote numerous treatises on [[Rasayana]]. Also, there is a later Tantric Buddhist author by the same name who may have been a scholar at [[Nalanda|Nālandā]] University and wrote on [[Vajrayana|Buddhist tantra]].<ref>Hsing Yun, Xingyun, Tom Manzo, Shujan Cheng Infinite Compassion, Endless Wisdom: The Practice of the Bodhisattva Path Buddha's Light Publishing Hacienda Heights California</ref><ref name=":4" /> According to [[Donald S. Lopez Jr.]], he originally belonged to a Brahmin family from eastern India and later became Buddhist.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Lopez|first=Donald S. Jr.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=emWMDwAAQBAJ|title=Seeing the Sacred in Samsara: An Illustrated Guide to the Eighty-Four Mahasiddhas|date=28 May 2019|publisher=Shambhala Publications|isbn=978-0-8348-4212-0|pages=75|language=en}}</ref>

There is also a [[Jainism|Jain]] figure of the same name who was said to have travelled to the Himalayas. Walser thinks that it is possible that stories related to this figure influenced Buddhist legends as well.<ref name=":4" />

==Works==
{{Buddhist Philosophy sidebar}}

There exist a number of influential texts attributed to Nāgārjuna; however, as there are many [[pseudepigrapha]] attributed to him, lively controversy exists over which are his authentic works. The Chinese Canon includes over 22 texts attributed to Nāgārjuna, while the Tibetan Tanjur contains over 140 works attributed to Nāgārjuna.<ref name=":8" />     

===''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā''===
{{Main|Mūlamadhyamakakārikā}}

The ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'' (MMK, ''Root Verses on the Middle'' ''Way'') is Nāgārjuna's best-known work. It is a rich philosophical text made up of concise aphoristic Sanskrit ''[[Karika|kārikā]]'' verses which explains the theory of emptiness through numerous topics and arguments. The bulk of the verses focus on defeating and deconstructing arguments for [[Substance theory|substance theories]]. The work also relies on earlier sources like the ''[[Kātyāyana (Buddhist)|Kātyāyana]] Sutra'' and the Perfection of Wisdom sutras to expound on the theory of dependent arising and the universal emptiness of all things.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1994|p=161}}{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=120}} 

The earliest translation of and commentary on the MMK is found in the Chinese translation of Kumārajīva, called the ''Madhyamakaśāstra'' (Zhong lun 中論; T. 1564), which merges the root text with a commentary attributed to a certain Qingmu (青目, *Piṅgala).<ref name=":8" /> 

===Major attributed works===
[[file:201 Nagarjuna Composes the Madhyamaka Texts.jpg|thumb|Nagarjuna composing texts in front of his disciples, relief at [[Buddhavanam|Buddhavanam Stupa]], [[Telangana]].]]
According to [[David Seyfort Ruegg]], the ''Madhyamakasastrastuti'' attributed to [[Chandrakirti|Candrakirti]] (<abbr>c.</abbr> 600 – c. 650) refers to eight texts by Nagarjuna:<blockquote>the ''(Madhyamaka)karikas'', the ''Yuktisastika'', the ''Sunyatasaptati'', the ''Vigrahavyavartani'', the ''Vidala'' (i.e. ''Vaidalyasutra/Vaidalyaprakarana''), the ''Ratnavali'', the ''Sutrasamuccaya'', and ''Samstutis'' (Hymns). This list covers not only much less than the grand total of works ascribed to Nagarjuna in the Chinese and Tibetan collections, but it does not even include all such works that Candrakirti has himself cited in his writings.<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 8.</ref></blockquote>According to one view, that of Christian Lindtner, the works definitely written by Nāgārjuna are:<ref>Lindtner, C. (1982). ''Nagarjuniana: studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna'', Copenhagen: Akademisk forlag, p. 11.</ref>

*''Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā'' (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way, MMK), available in three [[Sanskrit]] manuscripts and numerous translations.<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 9.</ref>
*''Śūnyatāsaptati'' (Seventy Verses on Emptiness), accompanied by a prose commentary ascribed to Nagarjuna himself.
*''Vigrahavyāvartanī'' (The End of Disputes).
*{{IAST|''Vaidalyaprakaraṇa''}} (Pulverizing the Categories), a prose work critiquing the [[Nyaya#Sixteen categories (padārthas)|categories used by Indian Nyaya philosophy]]. 
*''Vyavahārasiddhi'' (Proof of Convention).
*{{IAST|''Yuktiṣāṣṭika''}} (Sixty Verses on Reasoning).
*{{IAST|''Catuḥstava''}} (Four Hymns):  ''Lokātīta-stava'' (Hymn to transcendence), ''Niraupamya-stava'' (to the Peerless), ''Acintya-stava'' (to the Inconceivable), and ''Paramārtha-stava'' (to Ultimate Truth).<ref>Fernando Tola & Carmen Dragonetti, ''Nagarjuna's Catustava, Journal of Indian Philosophy'' 13 (1):1-54 (1985)</ref>
*''Ratnāvalī'' (Precious Garland), subtitled (''rajaparikatha''), a discourse addressed to an Indian king (possibly a [[Satavahana dynasty|Satavahana]] monarch).<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 24.</ref> 
*{{IAST|''Pratītyasamutpādahṝdayakārika''}} (Verses on the heart of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|Dependent Arising]]), along with a short commentary (''Vyākhyāna'').
*[[Sutrasamuccaya|''Sūtrasamuccaya'']], an anthology of various sutra passages. 
*{{IAST|''Bodhicittavivaraṇa''}} (Exposition of the [[Bodhicitta|awakening mind]]).
*{{IAST|''Suhṛllekha''}} (Letter to a Good Friend).
*{{IAST|''Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra''}} (Requisites of [[Enlightenment in Buddhism|awakening]]), a work the path of the Bodhisattva and [[Pāramitā|paramitas]], it is quoted by Candrakirti in his commentary on [[Aryadeva]]'s four hundred. Now only extant in Chinese translation ([[Taishō Tripiṭaka|Taisho]] 1660).<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 29.</ref>

Other scholars have challenged and argued against some of the above works being Nagarjuna's. David F. Burton notes that Christian Lindtner is "rather liberal" with his list of works and that other scholars have called some of these into question. He notes how Paul Williams argued convincingly that the {{IAST|''Bodhicittavivaraṇa''}} must be a later text.<ref name=":2">Burton, David F. (2015). ''Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nagarjuna's Philosophy,'' pp. 13-14. Routledge.</ref> In his study, Burton relies on the texts that he considers "least controversial": ''Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā, Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati,'' {{IAST|''Yuktiṣāṣṭika''}}, {{IAST|''Catuḥstava''}}, {{IAST|''Vaidalyaprakaraṇa''}} and ''Ratnāvalī''.<ref name=":2" />

Similarly, Jan Westerhoff notes how there is uncertainty about the attribution of Nagarjuna's works (and about his life in general). He relies on six works: MMK, ''Vigrahavyāvartanī, Śūnyatāsaptati,'' {{IAST|''Yuktiṣāṣṭika''}}, {{IAST|''Vaidalyaprakaraṇa''}} and ''Ratnāvalī,'' all of which "expound a single, coherent philosophical system", and are attributed to Nagarjuna by a variety of Indian and Tibetan sources.<ref>Westerhoff (2009), pp. 5-6.</ref>

The Tibetan historian [[Buton Rinchen Drub|Buston]] considers the first six to be the main treatises of Nāgārjuna (this is called the "yukti corpus", ''rigs chogs''), while according to [[Taranatha|Tāranātha]] only the first five are the works of Nāgārjuna. TRV Murti considers ''Ratnāvalī'', ''Pratītyasamutpādahṝdaya'' and ''Sūtrasamuccaya'' to be works of Nāgārjuna as the first two are quoted profusely by Chandrakirti and the third by [[Shantideva]].<ref>TRV Murti, ''Central philosophy of Buddhism'', pp. 89–91</ref>

=== Other attributed works ===
In addition to works mentioned above, numerous other works are attributed to Nāgārjuna, many of which are dubious attributions and later works. There is an ongoing, lively controversy over which of those works are authentic. Christian Lindtner divides the various attributed works as "1) correctly attributed, 2) wrongly attributed to him, and 3) those which may or may not be genuine."<ref>Lindtner 1982, p. 10.</ref>

Lindtner further divides the third category of dubious or questionable texts into those which are "perhaps authentic" and those who are unlikely to be authentic.

Those which he sees as ''perhaps'' being authentic include:<ref>Lindtner 1982, pp. 12-14.</ref>

* ''Mahāyānavimsika'', it is cited as Nagarjuna's work in the ''[[Tattvasamgraha]]'' as well as by Atisha'','' Lindtner sees the style and content as compatible with the yukti corpus. Survives in Sanskrit. 
* ''Bodhicittotpādavidhi,'' a short text that describes the sevenfold write for a bodhisattva,
* ''Dvadasakāranayastotra,'' a madhyamaka text only extant in Tibetan, 
* ''(Madhyamaka-)Bhavasamkrānti,'' a verse from this is attributed to Nagarjuna by [[Bhāviveka|Bhavaviveka]]. 
* ''Nirālamba-stava,'' 
* ''Sālistambakārikā,'' only exists in Tibetan, it is a versification of the ''[[Salistamba Sutra|Śālistamba Sūtra]]''
* ''Stutytitastava,'' only exists in Tibetan
* ''Danaparikatha,'' only exists in Tibetan, a praise of giving (dana)
* ''Cittavajrastava,'' 
* ''Mulasarvāstivadisrāmanerakārikā,'' 50 karikas on the Vinaya of the [[Mulasarvastivada|Mulasarvastivadins]]
* ''[[Dasabhumika-vibhāsā|Dasabhumikavibhāsā]],'' only exists in Chinese, a commentary on the [[Ten Stages Sutra|''Dashabhumikasutra'']] 
* ''Lokapariksā,'' 
* ''Yogasataka,'' a medical text
* ''Prajñadanda''
* ''Rasavaisesikasutra,'' a [[rasayana]] (biochemical) text
* ''Bhāvanākrama,'' contains various verses similar to the ''[[Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra|Lankavatara]]'', it is cited in the ''Tattvasamgraha'' as by Nagarjuna
* ''Rasaratnākara'' deals with the formation of mercury compounds.
Ruegg notes various works of uncertain authorship which have been attributed to Nagarjuna, including the ''Dharmadhatustava'' (Hymn to the [[Dharmadhatu]], which shows later influences), ''Mahayanavimsika, Salistambakarikas,'' the ''Bhavasamkranti,'' and the ''Dasabhumtkavibhāsā.''<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, pp. 28-46.</ref> Furthermore, Ruegg writes that "three collections of stanzas on the virtues of intelligence and moral conduct ascribed to Nagarjuna are extant in Tibetan translation": ''Prajñasatakaprakarana'', ''Nitisastra-Jantuposanabindu'' and ''Niti-sastra-Prajñadanda.''<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 27.</ref>

=== Attributions which are likely to be false ===
Meanwhile, those texts that Lindtner considers as questionable and likely inauthentic are: <blockquote>''Aksarasataka, Akutobhaya (Mulamadhyamakavrtti), Aryabhattaraka-Manjusriparamarthastuti, Kayatrayastotra, Narakoddharastava, Niruttarastava, Vandanastava, Dharmasamgraha, Dharmadhatugarbhavivarana, Ekaslokasastra, Isvarakartrtvanirakrtih (A refutation of God/Isvara), Sattvaradhanastava, Upayahrdaya, Astadasasunyatasastra, Dharmadhatustava, Yogaratnamala.''<ref>Lindtner 1982, pp. 14-17.</ref></blockquote>Meanwhile, Lindtner's list of outright wrong attributions is: <blockquote>''[[Da zhidu lun|Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa]] (Dà zhìdù lùn), Abudhabodhakaprakarana'', ''Guhyasamajatantratika'', ''Dvadasadvaraka'', ''Prajñaparamitastotra,'' and ''Svabhavatrayapravesasiddhi.''<ref>Lindtner 1982, pp. 11-12.</ref></blockquote>Notably, the ''[[Mahāprajñāpāramitāupadeśa|Dà zhìdù lùn]]'' ([[Taishō Tripiṭaka|Taisho]] 1509, "Commentary on the great [[Prajnaparamita|prajñaparamita]]") which has been influential in Chinese Buddhism, has been questioned as a genuine work of Nāgārjuna by various scholars including [[Étienne Lamotte|Lamotte]]. This work is also only attested in a Chinese translation by [[Kumārajīva]] and is unknown in the Tibetan and Indian traditions.<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 32.</ref>

Other works are extant only in Chinese, one of these is the ''Shih-erh-men-lun'' or 'Twelve-topic treatise' (*''Dvadasanikaya'' or *''Dvadasamukha-sastra''); one of the three basic treatises of the Sanlun school ([[East Asian Mādhyamaka|East Asian Madhyamaka]]).<ref>Ruegg, David Seyfort, ''<nowiki>''The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India,''</nowiki>'' Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981, p. 28.</ref>

Several works considered important in [[Vajrayana|esoteric Buddhism]] are attributed to Nāgārjuna and his disciples by traditional historians like Tāranātha from 17th century Tibet. These historians try to account for chronological difficulties with various theories, such as seeing later writings as mystical revelations. For a useful summary of this tradition, see Wedemeyer 2007. Lindtner sees the author of some of these tantric works as being a tantric Nagarjuna who lives much later, sometimes called "Nagarjuna II".<ref>Lindtner 1982, p. 11.</ref>

==Teaching and philosophy==
[[file:Великий учитель Нагарджуна. Буддийский храм «Золотая обитель Будды Шакьямуни». Элиста. - panoramio.jpg|thumb|Statue of Nāgārjuna in front of a [[Buddhism in Russia|Buddhist]] temple in [[Elista]], [[Kalmykia]], [[Russia]]]]
Nāgārjuna's teachings bring together key Buddhist doctrines, particularly [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]], [[Anattā|not-self]] and [[pratītyasamutpāda]] ("dependent origination"), to refute the metaphysics of some of his contemporaries and present a coherent [[Mahayana]] Buddhist worldview. The core of his thought is based on refuting all [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]] theories of [[Svabhava|svabhāva]] (substances), which leads to the [[Middle Way|middle way]] (madhyamā pratipad), which avoids metaphysically extreme views of existence (astitva/bhāva) and views of nonexistence (nāstitva/abhāva), also known as the views of eternalism (śāśvata) and [[Ucchedavada|annihilationism]] (uccheda). Because of this, Nāgārjuna's philosophical teaching is called the "middling" or "centrist" view (Madhyamaka), though this term was first introduced by [[Bhāviveka|Bhavaviveka]] in the sixth century.<ref name=":8" /> 

Apart from the more famous rational works which focus on emptiness (called the "yukti" corpus), Nāgārjuna also wrote various texts which discuss other aspects of the Buddhist religion, including texts that discuss the [[bodhisattva]] path such as the ''[[Ratnāvalī]]'' (Precious Garland), ''[[Suhṛllekha]]'' (Letter to a Good Friend), and the ''Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra'' (Requisites of Awakening). These sources contain most of his discussions on ethics and religious practice and are forerunners to later Mahayana treatises on the bodhisattva path.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Santina |first=Peter Della |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Causality_and_Emptiness/pzNoAQAACAAJ?hl=en |title=Causality and Emptiness: The Wisdom of Nagarjuna |date=2002 |publisher=Buddhist Research Society |pages=5 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":5" /> Furthermore, there is a set of four religious hymns (the ''Catuḥstava'') widely attributed to Nāgārjuna. These describe the ultimate truth in more poetic and positive ways than the rationalistic writings.<ref name=":5" />  

Some scholars such as [[Fyodor Shcherbatskoy]] and [[Tiruppattur R. Venkatachala Murti|T.R.V. Murti]] held that Nāgārjuna was the inventor of the emptiness doctrine; however, more recent work by scholars such as Choong Mun-keat, [[Yin Shun]] and Dhammajothi Thero argue that Nāgārjuna was the main defender of a doctrine already found in earlier sources, including early Buddhist works as well as [[Mahayana sutras]].<ref>Yìn Shùn, An Investigation into Emptiness (Kōng zhī Tànjìu 空之探究) (1985)</ref><ref>Choong, The Notion of Emptiness in Early Buddhism (1999)</ref><ref>Medawachchiye Dhammajothi Thero, The Concept of Emptiness in Pali Literature</ref><ref>Shi huifeng: “Dependent Origination = Emptiness”—Nāgārjuna’s Innovation?</ref>

===Emptiness===
{{main|Śūnyatā}}

[[file:198 Nagarjuna Retrieves the Prajnaparamita Texts.jpg|thumb|Nagarjuna Retrieves the [[Prajnaparamita|Prajñaparamita]] Sutras, relief at [[Buddhavanam|Buddhavanam Stupa]], [[Telangana]]. The Prajñaparamita texts are a major source for the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness.]]
A central theme of Nāgārjuna's writings, especially his philosophical texts, is the key [[Mahayana]] concept of [[śūnyatā]] (Sanskrit, translated into English as "emptiness"), which for Nāgārjuna means that all things are empty of [[Svabhava|svabhāva]] (inherent existence, intrinsic nature).<ref name=":5">Westerhoff, Jan Christoph, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/nagarjuna/ Nāgārjuna]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)</ref> 

Jan Westerhoff notes that the meaning of svabhāva has metaphysical and cognitive dimensions. Metaphysically it is a kind of unchanging [[Substance theory|substance]], a primary existent (''dravyasat''), an "objective and irreducible constituent of the world" which exists independently and by itself, without depending on anything else. This concept, which was defended in some way or another by Buddhist schools like [[Vaibhāṣika]] and by non-buddhist schools like [[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]], is the main target of Nāgārjuna's arguments.<ref name=":5" /> Regarding the cognitive aspect, this relates to how sentient beings reify objects by mentally superimposing svabhāva, contributing to craving and suffering. It is only by deconstructing and letting go of our cognitive faults that we can attain liberation from suffering. Thus, Nāgārjuna's philosophy of emptiness is always done with this [[Soteriology|soteriological]] goal in mind.<ref name=":5" />

For Nāgārjuna, it is not merely [[Sentient beings (Buddhism)|sentient beings]] that are without an unchanging self ([[Ātman (Hinduism)|ātman]]); all phenomena (dharmas) are without any svabhāva and thus without any underlying unchanging [[essence]] or substance. This is so because all things always arise dependent on other causes and conditions: not by their own power. Indeed, for Nāgārjuna, emptiness is just another way of speaking about the Buddhist doctrine of [[Pratītyasamutpāda|dependent arising]] (Sanskrit: pratītyasamutpāda). All phenomena are thus ''empty'' of being independently existent or having any independent being or nature. Nāgārjuna's "argumentative" or "reasoning" works (Sanskrit: yukti) focus on defending the doctrine of emptiness and refuting any substantialist or [[Foundationalism|foundationalist]] theories of svabhāva, which include any nature that is not produced by causes (akrtaka), and which is not dependent on anything else.<ref name=":5" /><ref>S.Radhakrishnan, ''Indian philosophy'' Volume 1, p. 607</ref>

To say that all things are 'empty' is to deny any kind of ontological foundation; therefore Nāgārjuna's view is often seen as a kind of ontological [[anti-foundationalism]] or a metaphysical [[anti-realism]] by modern philosophers.<ref>Siderits, Mark. Nagarjuna as anti-realist, Journal of Indian Philosophy December 1988, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 311-325.</ref><ref>Westerhoff, Jan. Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction.</ref>

=== Arguments against svabhāva theory ===
In Nāgārjuna's central philosophical work, the ''[[Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' (MMK), he provides numerous arguments against svabhāva theory. Nāgārjuna never provides a single "master argument", instead he dismantles various arguments for svabhāva one by one throughout the various chapters of the MMK, which discuss topics such as [[Causation (law)|causation]], [[time]], movement, change, [[mereology]], [[personal identity]], and conceptual dependence. This is what later came to be called the [[Svatantrika–Prasaṅgika distinction|prāsaṅgika]] method, which relies on refutations that seek to show the unintended consequences (Sanskrit: "prāsaṅga") of the opponent's arguments and positions. In each of the chapters of the MMK, various substantialist theories on different philosophical topics are analysed, deconstructed and attacked.<ref name=":5" />

Nāgārjuna is known for his use of the Indian logical tool of the tetralemma (Sanskrit: [[catuṣkoṭi]], "four corners") to attack versions of substance theory. This schema relies on four propositions: something can be said to [1] exist (or be true), [2] not exist (or be false), [3] both 1 and 2 are affirmed together, or [4] 1 and 2 are both rejected. Nāgārjuna's arguments usually work systematically to negate all "corners" of this logical schema, leaving us without any views to hold on to, and ideally with a sense of [[Apophatic theology|apophatic]] peace.<ref name=":12" /><ref>Dumoulin, Heinrich (1998) Zen Buddhism: a history, India and China, Macmillan Publishing, 43</ref>

=== Causation ===
{{See also|Causality}}

Nāgārjuna begins his MMK with a discussion of causation. He analyses various ways of understanding cause and effect through the lens of svabhāva theory and shows how they are logically unsatisfactory. Nāgārjuna then applies similar types of arguments for other concepts in later chapters of the MMK. Understanding the arguments on causation used in the first chapter of the MMK then allows us to see how Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka method functions and how the theory of emptiness is to be understood.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Garfield|first1=Jay L|title=Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness: Why Did Nāgārjuna Start with Causation?|journal=Philosophy East and West|date=April 1994|volume=44|issue=2|pages=219–50|doi=10.2307/1399593|jstor=1399593|s2cid=51932733 |url=https://scholarworks.smith.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1023&context=phi_facpubs|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":5" /> 

For Nāgārjuna, causes and effects are not completely distinct and independent objects or things, and they also do not function independently of the mind.<ref name=":5" /> His most famous analysis of causation distinguishes between four possible ways any thing or [[phenomenon]] ([[dharmas|dharma]]) could arise or be produced, and then refutes each of these. These four possibilities are:<ref name=":5" />

* '''Things arise from themselves''' (i.e. they are self-caused). This view was usually defended by arguing that the effect was already contained in the cause, or by saying that the effect and the cause are the same thing. Nāgārjuna argues against both views. In particular, he notes that since one does not observe effects within causes, this view is unfounded.
* '''Things arise from other things''' (causation from another). This is the most natural understanding of causation, defended by Abhidharma Buddhists and non-buddhists alike. But Nāgārjuna also rejects this position, arguing that cause and effect cannot be distinct in a substantial sense. This is because, the effect depends on the cause for its existence, and the cause also depends on the effect (at least conceptually, for it to be a cause, it must have an effect). Furthermore, he argues that if causes and effects truly were different substances then they could not be connected to each other, since two distinct substances cannot have a dependence relation.
* '''Things arise from both themselves and from other things'''. This can be explained as holding that a cause (e.g. marble) contains a potentiality (e.g. the potential to become a statue) within that is realised through supporting external conditions (like the actions of a sculptor). But Nāgārjuna argues that these distinctions do not exist substantially either, since the supporting conditions and the result do not exist apart from the cause, and thus they cannot be said to exist substantially and independently.
* '''Things arise from neither themselves nor from other things.''' This is usually presented as the view that things arise without causes. But this must be rejected because nothing appears to arise without some causal order. Thus this view would mean that knowledge of the world would be impossible even conventionally.

After showing the inadequacy of all four alternatives, Nāgārjuna posits that any substantialist view of cause and effect must be wrong. Rather than seeing causes and effects as independent, they must be seen as mutually interdependent, both notionally and existentially. That is to say, just as effects depend on their causes to exist, the very [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of being a cause existentially depends on the property of it having effects (i.e. its existence as a cause depends on its effects, see MMK 4.3).<ref name=":5" /> Further, causes and conditions also depend on living beings and their concepts about the world, for it is living beings who cognitively carve up the world into things and their relations. Indeed, this notional and conceptual kind of dependence is seen as one of the most important dimensions of emptiness, since a common view of Mahayana is that all things are in some sense conceptual constructions ([[Prajñaptivāda|prajñapti]]).<ref name=":5" />

Westerhoff observes that while causal relations imply lack of ''svabhāva'' in some way, Nāgārjuna's argument cannot stop there. After all, [[Abhidharma|Ābhidharmikas]] saw no conflict between causation and ''svabhāva,'' and the dependence of effects upon causes does not necessarily mean that causation itself is a conceptual construction, i.e. it may still exist independently of human cognition. Therefore, for Nāgārjuna, the most profound understanding of emptiness is not merely that cause and effect are dependent on each other, but more importantly, that they are not independent of human cognition and conceptualization. As Westerhoff explains, "since the causal relation does not exist from its own side, is conceptually constructed, and therefore empty, each causally related object must be so constructed and therefore empty in the most profound sense of being conceptually constructed."<ref>Westerhoff, Jan Christoph, "[https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/nagarjuna/ Nāgārjuna]", ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''  (Summer 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.)</ref>

At the same time, rather than seeing emptiness as being a kind of [[nihilism]] which rejects that anything exists or functions at all, Nāgārjuna posits that emptiness and dependent arising are precisely the best explanation for how there can be anything at all. His arguments often turn the tables on the substance theorist by attempting to show that svabhāva theories actually lead to absurd conclusions and thus cannot explain how the world works. This idea that emptiness is the proper understanding of dependent arising and that only through the lack of svabhāva can one properly explain the central teachings of Buddhism, including the origin and cessation of suffering, is the basis of a famous verse in MMK Chapter 24 (verse 14) which states:<ref name="siderits">{{cite book | last1 = Siderits | first1 = Mark | last2 = Katsura | first2 = Shoryu | title = Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika (Classics of Indian Buddhism) | publisher = Wisdom Publications | year = 2013 | isbn = 978-1-61429-050-6 | pages=275–76}}</ref>

{{blockquote|''sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate<br />sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyaṃ yasya na yujyate''<br />

All is possible when emptiness is possible.<br />Nothing is possible when emptiness is impossible.}}

=== Knowledge ===
Another major philosophical topic which Nāgārjuna discusses is how to assess the proper instruments of [[epistemology]], or the means of knowledge (Sanskrit: [[Pramana|pramāṇa]]). This was a key topic in the philosophy of his time, and a major theme discussed by the non-buddhist [[Nyaya]] school. As with Nyaya thinkers, Nāgārjuna discusses four epistemic instruments: perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy or comparison (upamāna), and reliable testimony (āgama), which are held to be able to establish the existence epistemic objects (prameyas). His main concern is how any set of epistemic instruments can be established or grounded. That is to say, how do we know that any epistemic instrument is a good guide for the existence of things in the world?<ref name=":5" /> 

In Indian thought, there were various theories of how to ground epistemic instruments or pramāṇas. One view was that they were established by mutual coherence (see: [[coherentism]]). Nāgārjuna does not spend much time assaulting this view, since his Nyaya opponents generally rejected it, on the grounds that stories and fairy tales could be coherent while also being false. The second view is that pramāṇas are self-justified, or grounded in themselves, a view which avoids [[Regress argument (epistemology)|epistemic infinite regresses]]. Nāgārjuna argues against this view by pointing out that if this was true, a pramāṇa like visual perception could exist independently of all visual objects. But if this were the case then it would be able to perceive itself, functioning as its own object (for without an object, it would not be perception at all). But this leads to a problem: as with motion, perception takes time. Thus, "vision cannot see something that exists simultaneously with it (such as itself), since vision takes time too" (as per MMK 3:2–3). Nāgārjuna further argues that if pramāṇas were self-grounding or self-establishing, we would have no way to choose valid pramāṇas among the various possible means of knowledge found in the world. For example, if we were offered five different types of cameras, the only way to truly know if they were accurate instruments of photography would be to test them by photographing various objects in different ways. Then we would be able to know which physical qualities and properties are best for photography. In the same way, pramāṇas cannot be assessed and established independently of their epistemic objects (prameya).<ref name=":5" /> 

The final position that Nāgārjuna deconstructs is that pramāṇas and prameyas establish each other. In this view, epistemic instruments establish an object and grant us knowledge of it. In turn, the objects establish the instruments via our interactions with the objects and our assessment of success in our pragmatic goals. The problem with this is that though it makes sense to say that an object like an apple might be justified by its epistemic instrument (visual perception), it is hard to see how the visual perception is established by an apple etc. Furthermore this creates a vicious circle of justification, since we would need previous access to the object before accepting that it can establish our visual perception, and this access can only be granted by our epistemic instrument that we seek to ground in the object. Thus, Nāgārjuna has his opponent present another view of mutual justification, which is to say that, as Westerhoff puts it "because the epistemic object is perceived, there must be something bringing about such a perception, and this is the epistemic instrument." In this view, the repeated successful knowings of apples now and in the past justifies our acceptance of visual perception as a useful perceiver of apples.<ref name=":5" /> 

One issue with this view however is that now we need an epistemic instruments that grounds epistemic success in the first place, as we could have always have been having apple [[Hallucination|hallucinations]] which feel and taste like real apples. Nothing logically rules out that we have always been deceived by every apple we have ever experienced, though pragmatically we can argue that if we avoid procedures which are suspect and which we know have been unsuccessful in the past, we might be close to knowledge. A further and more serious problem is that this does not provide an account of epistemic instruments where pramāṇas exist substantially, with an inherent nature. The epistemic success of these procedures cannot just be based on successful action, since some cognitions are never acted upon. Thus we need to marry this theory with some account of coherence with other beliefs and cognitions, such as memories of past apples or of buying an apple. But now we would need a select set of fixed cognitions or beliefs to use to evaluate other cognitions, and here we now need to find a way to ground these other evaluative cognitions. The entire project has now become an epistemic regress where every element requires further grounding, and none of these elements seem to be able to have any svabhāva or independent existence of their own, even if they can be assessed as being pragmatically useful under certain circumstances.<ref name=":5" /> 

Nāgārjuna’s epistemology is a key part of his theory of emptiness, since to acquire any knowledge of emptiness, we need to understand how to acquire knowledge in the first place and also what an object of knowledge even is. Nāgārjuna's major opponent is [[Nyaya|Nyāya]] epistemology, which argues that through certain epistemic procedures we can come to know that reality is made up of objective, mind-independent substances which can bear specific qualities. For Nāgārjuna meanwhile, nothing can be an epistemic instrument or object intrinsically, by its own powers.  As Westerhoff explains, "the two have to be mutually established: the instrument establishes the object by giving us cognitive access to it, our successful interaction with the object establishes the instrument as a trustworthy route to the object." As such, epistemic instruments and objects are not so due to any intrinsic natures, but due to a relative process of conceptual construction and mental reflection. We form views about objects through percetions etc, and test them through action, and then we reassess our understanding of the object accordingly. Since pramāṇas and prameyas mutually establish each other in this relative and mutually dependent way, neither of them can exist by svabhāva.<ref name=":5" />  

===Two truths===
{{main|Two truths doctrine}}

Nāgārjuna was also instrumental in the development of the [[two truths doctrine]], which claims that there are two levels of truth in Buddhist teaching, the ultimate truth (''paramārtha satya'') and the conventional or superficial truth (''saṃvṛtisatya''). As Nāgārjuna writes in the twenty fourth chapter of the MMK:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Siderits |first=Mark |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Nagarjuna_s_Middle_Way/1Y8vdpqzOg8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=siderits+nagarjuna&printsec=frontcover |title=Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika |last2=Katsura |first2=Shoryu |date=22 April 2013 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-61429-061-2 |pages=272-273 |language=en}}</ref> <blockquote>8. The Dharma teaching of the Buddha rests on two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth.
9. Who do not know the distinction between the two truths, they do not understand reality in accordance with the profound teachings of the Buddha.

10. The ultimate truth is not taught independently of customary ways of talking and thinking. Not having acquired the ultimate truth, nirvana is not attained.</blockquote>For Nāgārjuna, the ultimate truth is the fact that that everything is empty,<ref>Garfield, Jay. Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-cultural Interpretation, p. 91.</ref> and this includes emptiness itself ("the emptiness of emptiness"). While some (Murti, 1955) have interpreted this by positing Nāgārjuna as a [[Neo-Kantianism|neo-Kantian]] and thus making ultimate truth a metaphysical [[noumenon]] or an "ineffable ultimate that transcends the capacities of discursive reason",<ref name="Siderits, Mark 20032">Siderits, Mark, ''On the Soteriological Significance of Emptiness, Contemporary Buddhism'', Vol. 4, No. 1, 2003.</ref> the more traditional and standard interpretation, defended by modern scholars like Westerhoff, Mark Siderits and [[Jay L. Garfield]] holds that Nāgārjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth" (Siderits) and that Nāgārjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.<ref name="Siderits, Mark 20032" />

Hence as Garfield explains:<blockquote>Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...]. So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness [...]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table's lack of inherent existence. [...]. To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent.<ref>Garfield, J. L. (2002). ''Empty words'', pp. 38–39</ref></blockquote>Thus, when we understand the ultimate truth, "all one is left with is conventional truth" (Westerhoff), which is based on commonly accepted practices, conventions, language and concepts. While these inevitably distort and veil reality itself, there is no other way of perceiving and investigating the world but through these conventions, since it is these very conventional processes which generate the very idea of a world in the first place.<ref name=":5" /> This does not mean that one cannot pragmatically treat such conventions as being related to the world in some way and that one could not seek to further improve our understandings of the world. But ultimately these are still just convenient and useful fictions to the Madhyamaka anti-realist, since they would never accept that such conventional truths are grounded in a world that is independent of our concepts, cognition and interests.<ref name=":5" /> 

Where does this leave emptiness? Is it not the ultimate truth that explains how things really always are? For Nāgārjuna, emptiness should never be seen as a ground, foundation or even an ultimate account of things that is independent of human concepts and conventions. Its real purpose is to dissolve our conceptual impositions of svabhāva on all phenomena. This absence of svabhāva has no existence of its own, apart from all empty things or sentient minds, nor is it a quality inherent in things. Thus, it is merely a corrective to wrong views, and, once it has dissolved all such wrong views, it then dissolves itself.<ref name=":5" /> Nāgārjuna thus states that holding a false view of emptiness by seeing it as an ultimate metaphysical reality is dangerous, "like a serpent wrongly held or a spell wrongly executed," it destroys the dull witted.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Siderits |first=Mark |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Nagarjuna_s_Middle_Way/1Y8vdpqzOg8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=siderits+nagarjuna&printsec=frontcover |title=Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika |last2=Katsura |first2=Shoryu |date=22 April 2013 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-61429-061-2 |pages=274 |language=en}}</ref> 

In articulating this view of the two truths doctrine in the ''Mūlamadhyamakakārikā'', Nāgārjuna draws on and quotes an early Buddhist source ([[Kaccānagotta Sutta|Kātyāyanagotrasūtra]]), which distinguishes definitive meaning (''nītārtha'') from interpretable meaning (''neyārtha'') and discusses a "teaching via the middle" between the extremes of existence and non-existence.{{efn|Kātyāyanagotrasūtra: “Generally, Kātyāyana, this world relies on a duality of existence and non-existence. This world which relies on existence and non-existence is attached, grasping and bound. And this obstinate tendency of the mind to grasp and cling they don’t hold, they don’t accept, insist on or have a tendency to say: this is my self. This arising is disappointment arising; ceasing is disappointment ceasing—here he has no doubt, no uncertainty, and has independent knowledge of this.”  “In this way there is right-view, Kātyāyana. In this way the Tathāgata teaches the understanding of right-view.”  “Why is that? Arising in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no non-existence in the world. Cessation in the world, Kātyayana, seen and correctly understood just as it is, shows there is no permanent existence in the world.”  “Thus avoiding both extremes the Tathāgata teaches a dharma by the middle path.  “That is: this being, that becomes; with the arising of this, that arises. With ignorance as condition there is volition ...” as before for arising and cessation.<ref>Jayarava (trans) [https://suttacentral.net/sf168/en/jayarava?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false Kātyāyanagotrasūtra (translated from Sanskrit)]</ref>}}<ref>A.K. Warder, ''A Course in Indian Philosophy.'' Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 1998, pp. 55–56</ref><ref>For the full text of both versions with analysis see pp. 192–95 of Choong Mun-keat, ''The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism: A comparative study based on the Sutranga portion of the Pali Samyutta-Nikaya and the Chinese Samyuktagama''; Harrassowitz Verlag, Weisbaden, 2000.</ref>{{sfn|Kalupahana|1986|p=232}}

=== Ethics ===
[[file:200 Nagarjuna Gives a Bowl to Aryadeva.jpg|thumb|Nagarjuna and his pupil [[Aryadeva]], Buddhavanam Stupa Drum Reliefs, Telangana]]
While Nāgārjuna is most well known for his philosophical theories, he also wrote numerous religious works, like the ''[[Ratnāvalī]]'' (Precious Garland), ''[[Suhṛllekha]]'' (Letter to a Good Friend) and ''Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra'' (Requisites of Awakening). These texts discuss [[Mahayana]] Buddhism more broadly and present an overall ethical and religious framework in which ethics and faith are paramount''.''<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Nāgārjuna|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Nagarjuna_s_Precious_Garland/_Q3zEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0|title=Nagarjuna's Precious Garland: Ratnavali|last2=McClintock|first2=Sara L.|date=5 March 2024|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1-61429-846-5|pages=27–29, 77|language=en}}</ref>

Nāgārjuna's religious ethics focus on the [[bodhisattva]] path, the religious path of those who have set out to attain [[Buddhahood]] for the sake of all beings.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Stepien|first=Rafal K.|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Buddhism_Between_Religion_and_Philosophy/Te78EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0|title=Buddhism Between Religion and Philosophy: Nāgārjuna and the Ethics of Emptiness|date=2024|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-777130-3|pages=201–210|language=en}}</ref> The ''[[Ratnāvalī]]'' discusses ethics mainly from the point of view of a layperson, promoting classic Mahayana Buddhist virtues like generosity, non-harming and the six perfections ([[pāramitā]]s). In this work, he makes a crucial distinction between two dimensions or aspects of the Dharma: (1) the Dharma of ascendance (abhyudaya, "rising up", success, prosperity), which refers to all the ways to gain happiness and good rebirths; and (2) the Dharma of transcendence or the Supreme Good (naiḥśreyasa), which he glosses as liberation ([[moksha]]) obtained through wisdom.<ref name=":02" /> These two aspects have a close hierarchical relationship, since the practice of the first leads to the second, as Nāgārjuna says in the beginning of the ''[[Ratnāvalī]]'':<ref>Verse 1.3, McClintock trans. p. 77</ref><poem>In whom there is first the Dharma of ascendance,
afterward arises the highest good,
since after reaching ascendance,
one proceeds gradually to the highest good.</poem>

Nāgārjuna continues, associating faith with the path of ascendance and wisdom with the path of the Supreme Good'':''<ref name=":02" /> 

<poem>Here we maintain that ascendance is happiness (sukha),
and the highest good is liberation (moksha).
In brief, faith and wisdom are
the concise method for attaining them.

Through faith one partakes of the Dharma;
through wisdom, one truly understands. 
Of these two, wisdom is foremost, 
yet faith is its prerequisite.</poem>

Thus, while much of Nāgārjuna's writings focus on the wisdom aspect, i.e. understanding the doctrine of emptiness and dependent arising, he remains a religious writer for whom faith and ethics is a central part of the graduated path of the bodhisattva. For it is through [[faith]] ([[Faith in Buddhism|śraddhā]]) in the Dharma that one is led to perform acts of [[Buddhist ethics|virtue]] (such as [[Dana (Buddhism)|generosity]]) and gain [[Merit (Buddhism)|merit]]. This in turn leads to good [[Rebirth (Buddhism)|rebirths]] and other requisites for the cultivation of [[Prajñā (Buddhism)|wisdom]] (such as health, access to Buddhist teachings, etc). Through the cultivation of wisdom, one can then attain the transcendent supreme good of [[Nirvana (Buddhism)|nirvana]].<ref name=":02" /> The Dharma of ascendance then, is understood to function more on the level of conventional truth, while the Dharma of transcendence relates to the ultimate truth of emptiness. Nāgārjuna also links these to the two accumulations of merit (puṇya-saṃbhāra) and knowledge (jñāna-saṃbhāra) respectively. The ''[[Ratnāvalī]]'' oscillates back and forth between these two central topics, showing how the Mahāyāna path includes these two interrelated aspects of Dharma and how they work together''.''<ref name=":02" />  

Rafal Stepien notes that Nāgārjuna's ethical teachings follow standard Mahāyāna Buddhist formulations such as the [[Buddhist ethics#Ten wholesome actions|ten wholesome actions]] and are quite conventional in that regard. What makes his ethical system unique is how he explains ethics through his philosophy of emptiness, which attempts to do away with all "views" and any kind of metaphysical foundation.<ref name=":12" /> Nāgārjuna's ethics is thus based on emptiness itself, as well as on the [[Soteriology|soteriological]] efficacy of Buddhist virtues that, informed by the wisdom of emptiness, lead to [[nirvana]]. Stepien calls this an ''eirenic'' ethics (ethics of peace), grounded in emptiness, which is the very lack of foundations and is understood through the lack of all views (and thus, it is actually ''groundless'').<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Stepien|first=Rafal K.|url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Buddhism_Between_Religion_and_Philosophy/Te78EAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0|title=Buddhism Between Religion and Philosophy: Nāgārjuna and the Ethics of Emptiness|date=2024|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-777130-3|language=en|pages=211–231}}</ref> For Nāgārjuna, it is precisely this philosophy of emptiness which is uniquely adequate for the ethics of universal compassion, because emptiness dissolves the division between self and others and thus abandons the very possibility of selfish thoughts.<ref name=":22" /> For Nāgārjuna, virtuous actions are also skilful means ([[upaya]]), which lead one to nirvana, a state in which there is no action ([[karma]]) at all. Thus, like his metaphysics, Nāgārjuna's ethical system is one which ultimately dissolves itself in the end.<ref>Stepien (2024), p. 246.</ref> That is to say, truly virtuous and compassionate actions unravel all action (all karma), including craving and attachment, just like the wisdom of emptiness unravels all views.<ref>Stepien (2024), pp. 255-256.</ref>

=== Relativity ===
{{see also|Relativism}}
Nāgārjuna also taught the idea of relativity; in the Ratnāvalī, he gives the example that shortness exists only in relation to the idea of length. The determination of a thing or object is only possible in relation to other things or objects, especially by way of contrast. He held that the relationship between the ideas of "short" and "long" is not due to intrinsic nature (svabhāva). This idea is also found in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas, in which the idea of relativity is expressed similarly: "That which is the element of light ... is seen to exist on account of [in relation to] darkness; that which is the element of good is seen to exist on account of bad; that which is the element of space is seen to exist on account of form."{{sfn|Kalupahana|1975|loc=96-97: "In the Nikayas the quote is found at SN 2.150."}} 

=== Buddhahood and nirvana ===
The bulk of Nāgārjuna's writings discuss the emptiness of all sorts of conventional phenomena, such as the [[Skandha|five aggregates]], [[the self]], change, desire, [[Duḥkha|suffering]] and [[karma]]. However, Nāgārjuna also outlines the emptiness of even the highest Buddhist ideals, explaining that even the supreme goals of [[Nirvana (Buddhism)|nirvana]] and [[buddhahood]] are empty of self-existence. Therefore, nothing whatsoever escapes Nāgārjuna's analysis of emptiness. That is to say, there is nothing at all which is not empty of svabhāva.<ref name=":10" /> 

As such, chapter twenty two of the MMK begins by subjecting the Buddha to the same examination that the emptiness of the person was analysed with. By showing that the Buddha is neither identical with the [[Skandha|five aggregates]] (body, feelings, perceptions, intentions, consciousness) nor distinct from them, and that the aggregates are not in the Buddha, nor is he in them, we can see that there is ultimately no Buddha. The Buddha is dependent on the aggregates, which are themselves empty and dependently arisen, thus Buddha is empty of any substantial existence, having the same status as any other phenomena.<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Siderits |first=Mark |url=https://www.google.com/books/edition/Nagarjuna_s_Middle_Way/1Y8vdpqzOg8C?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=mulamadhyamakakarika+siderits&printsec=frontcover |title=Nagarjuna's Middle Way: Mulamadhyamakakarika |last2=Katsura |first2=Shoryu |date=22 April 2013 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-61429-061-2 |pages=241-247 |language=en}}</ref> Thus, according to Nāgārjuna, "The [[Tathāgata|Tathagata]] is devoid of intrinsic nature; this world is devoid of intrinsic nature."<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 251</ref> Ultimately, the Buddha is also beyond all conceptualisations and linguistic distinctions, thus we cannot describe the Buddha as eternal, non-eternal, as both or neither. Likewise, we cannot say after his nirvana the Buddha exists, does not, both or neither.<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), pp. 249-250</ref>

As with the Buddha, so with nirvana, the supreme goal of Buddhism. Thus, in chapter twenty five of the MMK, Nāgārjuna analyses nirvana to show that it cannot have svabhāva. He further argues that nirvana cannot be accurately described with any statement that could apply ultimately, stating that nirvana is neither an existent (bhāva), a non-existence (abhāva), both or neither.<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 289</ref> Nirvana cannot be an existent thing because then it would dependent and conditioned, and nirvana is always described as unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). Nirvana also cannot be non-existent because then it would also be dependent, since absences depend on existence, they are defined by what they are not.<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 294-295</ref> Once he has rejected all possible views on the ontological status of nirvana, Nāgārjuna affirms that the status of the Buddha after death is an indeterminate question ([[The unanswerable questions|avyakrta]]), relying on a classic Buddhist category.<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 301</ref>

Finally, in this nirvana chapter, Nāgārjuna also applies the same logic to the realm of suffering itself, [[Saṃsāra|samsara]], arguing that the ultimate ontological status of both samsara and nirvana are equal in a famous passage (ch. 22, verses 19-20):<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 302</ref><poem>There is no distinction whatsoever between samsara and nirvana.
There is no distinction whatsoever between nirvana and samsara. 
What is the limit of nirvana, that is the limit of samsara.
There is not even the finest gap to be found between the two.</poem>Thus one cannot say that samsara and nirvana exist in some ultimate sense. Likewise we cannot say they do not exist, nor can we affirm nor reject both positions either. At this point, we reach of apophatic peace in which nothing can be said and our need to conceptualise everything stops. Nāgārjuna closes with the following key verse:<ref>Siderits & Katsura (2013), p. 304</ref><blockquote>This stopping of cognising everything, of [[Conceptual proliferation|prapañca]], is blissful.

No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone.</blockquote>

=== Pure Land teaching ===
Nāgārjuna caps the ''[[Suhṛllekha]]'' with a dedication of merit towards rebirth in higher realms, ultimately towards birth in [[Amitābha]] Buddha's [[Sukhavati]] [[Pure Land|pure land]]: "May you be born in a buddhafield, freed from illness, old age, attachment, and hatred, and may you become equal to Amitāyus, Protector of Worlds, with the Bhagavān [[Amitābha]]" (Verse 122).<ref>Translated from Sanskrit for this article. Sanskrit: jātaḥ san vyādhijarārāgadveṣād vimucya buddhakṣetre | nātho bhava lokānām amitāyur bhagavatāmitābhena samaḥ || 122 || [https://www.academia.edu/61531143/The_Suh%E1%B9%9Bllekha_of_N%C4%81g%C4%81rjuna_editio_minor_2_0]</ref><ref>compare with the translation from the Tibetan in ''Nagarjuna's Letter to a Friend: With Commentary By Kangyur Rinpoche''. Shambhala Publications. 2006. ISBN 978-1-55939-850-3. [https://www.google.com/books/edition/Nagarjuna_s_Letter_to_a_Friend/cZaYAQAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0]</ref> Further details of this pure land rebirth ideal are discussed in other sources attributed to Nāgārjuna, especially the ''Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Stages'' (''[[Dasabhumika-vibhāsā]]''). This text is an important work in East Asian [[Pure Land Buddhism]], where it is seen as a foundational treatise establishing the Pure Land path and the distinction between the "easy" path and the "difficult" path. In the “Chapter on Easy Practice”, Nāgārjuna explains how relying on Amitābha Buddha to attain birth in the pure land of [[Sukhavati]] can be an "easy" method for attaining non-retrogression on the bodhisattvas path.<ref name=":42">Stefania Travagnin (2013) Yinshun's Recovery of Shizhu Piposha Lun 十住毗婆沙論: a Madhyamaka-based Pure Land practice In twentieth-century Taiwan, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 14:2, 320-343, DOI: 10.1080/14639947.2013.832497</ref><ref>Jones, Charles B. (2019). ''Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, Understanding a Tradition of Practice,'' pp. 37, 65. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.</ref> 

According to Nāgārjuna, a [[Pure Land|pure land]] (a pure buddhafield, Sanskrit: viśuddha-buddhakṣetra) is a realm of purification (vyavadāna) where there is no impurities, including the impurities of wrong views, conceptual proliferation ([[Conceptual proliferation|prapañca]]), and the impurity of [[Karma in Buddhism|karma]], and where instead there is the pure wisdom of emptiness.<ref>Yamaguchi, Susumu. (1966) [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/358790881_The_Concept_of_the_Pure_Land_in_the_Teaching_of_Nagarjuna_1966 The Concept of the Pure Land in the Teaching of Nāgārjuna]. In: ''Listening to Shin Buddhism: Starting Points of Modern Dialogue'' (2012), pp.161-172. 10.1558/equinox.20366.</ref> In chapter five of the ''Dasabhumika'', Nāgārjuna gives a general description of the qualities of the pure lands of the buddhas which includes "the complete presence of the dharmas associated with a buddha’s meritorious qualities and powers; The complete presence of the Dharma; The complete presence of [[Śrāvakayāna|śrāvaka]] disciples; The completeness of the bodhi tree; A world that is adorned; Beings that are well-endowed with good fortune; The abundant presence of beings capable of achieving liberation; The gathering of an immense congregation; And completeness in the [[Abhijñā|powers of a buddha]]."<ref>Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds,'' p. 121. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref> Other qualities of the pure lands include: "rapid achievement of realization" for bodhisattvas, the complete presence of bodhisattvas which visit pure lands from throughout the cosmos, the absence of demonic [[Mara (demon)|maras]], the presence of amazing [[Miracles of Gautama Buddha|miracles]], the presence of an immeasurable radiance which heals all [[Four Noble Truths|suffering]] and [[Kleshas (Buddhism)|affliction]].<ref>Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds,'' p. 121-123. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref>

Nāgārjuna also explains that on being born in a pure land, "there are beings who, upon seeing a buddha, become immediately able to dwell on [[Bodhisattva#Avaivartika (non-retrogression)|the ground of irreversibility]]", since "when these beings see the body of a buddha, their minds are filled with great delight, joy, and pure happiness. Their minds immediately become focused and acquire a bodhisattva [[Samadhi|samādhi]] of this sort. Due to the power of this samādhi, they achieve a penetrating understanding of the true character of all dharmas."<ref name=":6">Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds,'' p. 124. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref> He also mentions that there beings who can enter the stage of certainty when they hear the name of a buddha. This occurs because "a buddha may have made an [[Original Vow|original vow]]" which helps beings achieve this.<ref name=":6" /> Chapter five also discusses how sentient beings may also attain rebirth in a pure land through hearing the name of a buddha, which may happen "if a person is possessed of much power arising from his resolute [[Faith in Buddhism|faith]], if his roots of goodness have become completely developed, and if his karmic obstacles have already become exhausted, where this corresponds to the causes and conditions of the original vows of buddhas, when such a person hears the name of one of these buddhas, he will then be able to go forth to rebirth [in accordance with his wishes]."<ref>Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds,'' p. 125. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref>

In its influential chapter nine, the ''Dasabhumika'' explains how difficult following the eons long bodhisattva path can be and then compares the easy path to taking a boat:<blockquote>There are innumerable gates to the [[Buddhism|buddha-dharma]]. Just as there are difficult and easy paths in this world, going over land being wearying while taking a boat over water is pleasant, just so are the bodhisattva paths.<ref>Jones, Charles B. (2019). ''Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, Understanding a Tradition of Practice,'' pp. 73. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press.</ref></blockquote>The ''Treatise'' then discusses various buddhas and their pure lands, teaching the practice of [[Nianfo|reciting the names of the buddhas]].<ref>Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds'' (Vol One), pp. 301-311. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref> Nāgārjuna singles out [[Amitābha]], explains the qualities of his buddhafield of Sukhavati and provides a set of verses in praise of Amitābha.<ref>Dharmamitra, Bhiksu (tr.). ''Nāgārjuna’s Treatise on the Ten Bodhisattva Grounds'' (Vol One), pp. 315-316. Seattle, WA: Kalavinka Press, 2012.</ref> This passage later became a foundational text for [[Pure Land Buddhism]], where Nāgārjuna (Chinese: 龍樹                    lóng shù, lit. Dragon Tree) is considered a patriarch of the school.<ref name=":42" />

== Influence of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Vedic Traditions ==

=== The Madhyamaka Engagement with Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika Realism ===

Nāgārjuna’s (c. 150–250 CE) Madhyamaka philosophy developed as a systematic internal critique of the epistemological and ontological frameworks of the [[Nyaya|Nyāya]] and [[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]] schools.<ref>Westerhoff, Jan (2009). ''Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka: A Philosophical Introduction''. Oxford University Press.</ref> These traditions defined the dominant standards of rational justification in classical Indian philosophy through theories of valid cognition ''[[pramāṇa]]'', inference ''[[anumāna]]'', and ontological classification. Nāgārjuna’s principal works—including the ''[[Mulamadhyamakakarika|Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'', the ''Vigrahavyavartani'', and the ''Vaidalyaprakaranam''—are structured as engagements with these shared epistemic and metaphysical assumptions rather than external refutations.

Madhyamaka does not reject these systems at the level of conventional reasoning; rather, it interrogates whether their categories can sustain claims to intrinsic ontological grounding ''[[svabhāva]]''.

=== Epistemology, Pramāṇa, and the Problem of Justification ===

The ''[[Nyaya Sutras|Nyāya Sūtras]]'' articulate a theory of valid cognition ''[[Pramana|pramāṇa-vāda]]'' in which knowledge ''[[jñāna]]'' is valid ''[[Pramana|pramā]]'' when it is non-defective and corresponds to its object ''[[Arthapatti|arthavattā]]''. The pramāṇas—perception, inference, comparison, and testimony—are treated as structurally distinct and normatively reliable means of accessing reality.

Nāgārjuna’s analysis in the ''Vigrahavyāvartanī'' targets the justificatory structure of this system. If a ''[[pramāṇa]]'' is validated by another ''[[pramāṇa]]'', justification leads to infinite regress ''[[Anavastha|anavasthā]]''. If it is self-validating, the distinction between validating cognition and validated object collapses, undermining Nyāya’s internal differentiation of epistemic roles.

This is not a denial of cognition, but a critique of the possibility of non-relational epistemic foundations.<ref>Matilal, B.K. (1986). ''Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge''. Oxford University Press.</ref>

Thus, ''[[pramāṇas]]'' are reinterpreted as conventionally effective cognitive structures lacking intrinsic grounding.

=== Dialectical Method and the Reorientation of Debate ===

Nāgārjuna’s engagement with [[Nyaya|Nyāya]] dialectics preserves inferential structure while transforming its philosophical aim. Classical Nyāya seeks determinate ontological conclusions through structured inference. Madhyamaka instead uses inference to expose the instability of all claims to intrinsic existence.

This methodological shift is expressed in the "''[[Nihilism|no thesis]]''" argument:

{{quote|
“If I had a thesis, I would be at fault. But I have no thesis; therefore I am without fault.”
}}

Nyāya commentators such as [[Vatsyayana|Vātsyāyana]] interpret this as self-refuting, arguing that the denial of thesis functions as a thesis. Madhyamaka responds that its reasoning operates only within conventional discourse and does not assert ultimate ontological commitments.

=== Ontological Deconstruction: Vaiśeṣika Atomism and Substance Theory ===

The [[Vaisheshika|Vaiśeṣika]] system posits atoms ''[[Paramanu|paramāṇu]]'', substances ''[[dravya]]'', qualities ''[[guṇa]]'', and inherence ''[[Inherence|samavāya]]'' as ultimately real constituents of the world, unified by intrinsic nature ''[[svabhāva]]''.

Nāgārjuna’s critique demonstrates internal instability in this framework. If atoms possess spatial extension, they must have parts; if they lack extension, they cannot form composites. Substance likewise cannot be separated from qualities in experience, undermining its independent status.

Later Nyāya responses, including those of [[Uddyotakara]] and [[Vācaspati Miśra]], refine realist accounts of causation and cognition in response to these objections, but Madhyamaka maintains that such refinements remain dependent on conceptual imputation rather than ontological necessity.<ref>Murti, T.R.V. (1955). ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism''. Allen & Unwin.</ref>

=== Svabhāva and Dependent Origination ===

At the centre of Nāgārjuna’s critique is ''[[svabhāva]]'' (intrinsic nature). Against this, he reinterprets [[Pratityasamutpada|dependent origination]] as a principle of ontological dependence rather than causal succession.<ref>Garfield, Jay L. (1995). ''The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way''. Oxford University Press.</ref>

Nāgārjuna argues that whatever arises dependently lacks intrinsic nature, and whatever lacks intrinsic nature cannot serve as an independent ontological ground. Therefore all phenomena are empty ''[[śūnya]]'' of ''[[svabhāva]]''.

This is not a metaphysical claim about emptiness as an entity, but a logical consequence of relational dependence.

=== Causality and Brahmanical Theories of Production ===

Nāgārjuna’s analysis of causality in Chapter 1 of the ''[[Mulamadhyamakakarika|Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' engages both ''[[Satkaryavada|satkāryavāda]]'' (effect pre-exists in cause) and ''[[Satkaryavada|asatkāryavāda]]'' (effect is entirely new).

{{quote|
“If the effect already exists in the cause, production is redundant. If it does not exist, no relation between cause and effect can be established. Thus both identity and difference models of causation fail.”
}}

Causality is therefore reinterpreted not as a relation between independently existing substances, but as a conventional designation applied to interdependent processes lacking intrinsic origination.<ref>Lindtner, Christian (1982). ''Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna''. Akademisk Forlag.</ref>

=== Classical Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika Responses ===

Later Nyāya philosophers develop sustained responses to Madhyamaka critique:

* [[Vatsyayana|Vātsyāyana]] argues that denial of ''[[pramāṇa]]'' undermines the possibility of philosophical discourse itself.
* [[Uddyotakara]] strengthens inferential theory to resist regress-based objections.
* [[Vācaspati Miśra]] develops refined accounts of error ''[[Illusion|bhrānti]]'' and cognition to preserve realism.
* [[Jayanta Bhatta|Jayanta Bhaṭṭa]] argues that Madhyamaka emptiness, if extended beyond convention, collapses practical intelligibility.

These responses show that Madhyamaka operates not as a marginal scepticism but as a persistent pressure that forces systematic refinement of realist epistemology.

=== Historical and Philosophical Consequences ===

The significance of Nāgārjuna’s engagement with [[Nyāya]] and [[Vaiśeṣika]] lies in its role as a structural dialectical force within Indian philosophy. Rather than replacing realist ontology, [[Madhyamaka]] destabilises the assumption that ontology must be grounded in intrinsic existence.

This produces a sustained reciprocal dynamic in which both Buddhist and [[Brahmanical]] systems refine their accounts of cognition, inference, and metaphysical explanation in response to each other.

== Comparative philosophy ==

=== Hinduism ===
Nāgārjuna was fully acquainted with the classical Hindu philosophies of [[Samkhya]], [[Nyaya]] and [[Vaiseshika]].<ref>TRV Murti, ''The central philosophy of Buddhism'', p. 92</ref> Nāgārjuna assumes a knowledge of the definitions of the sixteen categories as given in the ''[[Nyaya Sutras]]'', the chief text of the Nyaya school, and wrote a treatise on the pramanas where he reduced the [[syllogism]] of five members into one of three. In the ''Vigrahavyavartani,'' Nāgārjuna criticises the Nyaya theory of ''pramanas'' (means of knowledge).<ref>S.Radhakrishnan, ''Indian Philosophy'' Volume 1, p. 644</ref>

=== Buddhism ===
Nāgārjuna was conversant with the scholasticism of the non-Mahayana [[Schools of Buddhism|Buddhist schools]] of [[Abhidharma]] and with the [[Mahayana sutras|Mahāyāna sutra]] tradition. His arguments often attack positions held by the realist [[Sarvastivada]] [[Vaibhāṣika]] school, and some modern scholars like Walser have argued that Nāgārjuna was associated with the [[Mahāsāṃghika|Mahāsāṃghikas]].<ref name=":9" /> However, determining Nāgārjuna's affiliation with a specific [[nikāya]] is difficult, since his texts do not defend sect specific doctrines and never mention any specific Buddhist sect as being Nāgārjuna's. If the most commonly accepted attribution of texts (that of Christian Lindtner) holds, then Nāgārjuna was clearly a Māhayānist, as he references Mahāyāna texts, but his philosophy also closely relies on Sanskrit [[Early Buddhist texts|Śrāvaka texts]] ( [[Āgama (Buddhism)|Āgamas]]). Nāgārjuna may have arrived at his positions from a desire to achieve a consistent exegesis of the Buddha's doctrine as recorded in the Sanskritic [[āgama (Buddhism)|Āgamas]] and [[Prajnaparamita|Prajñaparamita]] texts. In the eyes of Nāgārjuna, the Buddha was not merely a forerunner, but the very founder of the Madhyamaka system.<ref>Christian Lindtner, ''Master of Wisdom.'' Dharma Publishing 1997, p. 324.</ref> [[David Kalupahana]] sees Nāgārjuna as a philosophical successor to the scholar-monk [[Moggaliputta-Tissa]] in being a champion of the middle-way and a reviver of the original ideals of the Buddha.<ref>David Kalupahana, ''Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way.'' Motilal Banarsidass, 2005, pp. 2, 5.</ref>

=== Pyrrhonism ===
{{see also|Similarities between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism}}
Because of the high degree of similarity between Nāgārjuna's philosophy and [[Pyrrhonism]], particularly the surviving works of [[Sextus Empiricus]],<ref>Adrian Kuzminski, ''Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism'' 2008</ref> According to [[Thomas McEvilley]] this is because Nagarjuna was likely influenced by Greek Pyrrhonist texts imported into India.<ref>Thomas McEvilley, ''The Shape of Ancient Thought'' 2002 pp 499-505</ref> [[Pyrrho of Elis]] (c. 360–270 BCE), the founder of this school of [[Philosophical skepticism|sceptical philosophy]], was himself influenced by Indian philosophy. Pyrrho travelled to India with [[Alexander the Great]]'s army and studied with Indian sages he termed [[gymnosophist]]s. According to [[Christopher I. Beckwith]], Pyrrho's teachings are based on [[Buddhism]], because the Greek terms ''adiaphora'', ''astathmēta'' and ''anepikrita'' in the ''Aristocles Passage'' resemble the Buddhist [[three marks of existence]].{{sfn|Beckwith|2015|p=28}} According to him, the key innovative tenets of Pyrrho's scepticism were only found in Indian philosophy at the time and not in Greece.{{Sfn|Beckwith|2015|p=221}} However, other scholars, such as [[Stephen Batchelor (author)|Stephen Batchelor]]<ref>[[Stephen Batchelor (author)|Stephen Batchelor]] "Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's encounter with early Buddhism in central Asia", ''Contemporary Buddhism'', 2016, pp 195-215</ref> and Charles Goodman<ref>Charles Goodman, "Neither Scythian nor Greek: A Response to Beckwith's Greek Buddha and Kuzminski's "Early Buddhism Reconsidered"", ''Philosophy East and West'', University of Hawai'i Press Volume 68, Number 3, July 2018 pp. 984-1006</ref> question Beckwith's conclusions about the degree of Buddhist influence on Pyrrho.

=== Modern thinkers ===
Nāgārjuna came to the attention of modern university scholarship through the modern field of [[Buddhist studies]]. Numerous interpretations of Nāgārjuna were offered by Buddhist studies scholars, East and West, including [[Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] idealism ([[Fyodor Shcherbatskoy|Stcherbatsky]] and [[Tiruppattur R. Venkatachala Murti|T. R. V. Murti]]), nihilism, relativism, and [[pragmatism]] ([[David Kalupahana|Kalupahana]]). More recently, modern Western philosophers and thinkers have begun to study Nāgārjuna's works from the point of view of [[philosophy]] and even physics, rather than from a purely [[Buddhist studies]] perspective.

Several modern English language [[Analytic philosophy|analytical philosophers]] like [[Graham Priest]], [[Jay L. Garfield]], Mark Siderits and [[Jan Westerhoff]] have studied Nāgārjuna and drawn on his insights for their own philosophical work. Westerhoff's ''The Non-Existence of the Real World'' (2020) is a modern take on Nāgārjunian [[anti-foundationalism]], while Priest's ''Beyond the limits of thought'' (2002) contains a chapter on Nāgārjuna.

In his book ''[[Helgoland (book)|Helgoland]],'' the Italian theoretical physicist [[Carlo Rovelli]] mentions how Nāgārjuna influenced his thinking on his [[Relational quantum mechanics|relational interpretation]] of quantum mechanics.<ref name="wapo">{{cite web |last1=Bozzi|first1=Ida|title="Helgoland" di Carlo Rovelli, l'isola e gli amici geniali: la fisica dei ventenni|url=https://www.corriere.it/cultura/20_settembre_01/bozzi-fisica-rovelli-adelphi-scienze-saggio-heisenberg-quantistica-1cb61d6c-ec75-11ea-a43c-ac43602f1ffa.shtml|website=[[Corriere della Sera]]|accessdate=2 September 2020|language=it|date=2 September 2020}}</ref> Another modern physicist who was influenced by Nāgārjuna is the American [[David Finkelstein|David Ritz Finkelstein]]. In particular, Finkelstein developed a theory of "universal [[Theory of relativity|relativity]]" which saw all physical phenomena was relative.<ref name=":19">Finkelstein, David Ritz. Emptiness and relativity. Georgia Institute of Technology in ''Meeting at the Roots: Essays on Tibetan'' ''Buddhism and the Natural Sciences'' B. Alan Wallace (ed.) Berkeley, CA: University of California Press (2001) 2000.08.16 rev 2003.12.15</ref>

== See also ==
{{col div |colwidth = 35em }}
* [[Acharya Nagarjuna University]]
* [[Aryadeva]]
* [[Buddhapālita]]
* [[Buddhism]]
* [[Kamalasila]]
* [[Middle Way]]
* [[Śāntarakṣita]]
* [[Sun Simiao]]
* [[Śūnyatā]]
* [[Yogachara-Madhyamaka]]
{{colend}}

==Notes==
{{Notelist|refs=}}

== References ==
=== Citations ===
{{Reflist}}

=== Sources ===
{{refbegin|40em}}
* {{cite book |last = Beckwith |first = Christopher I. |title = Greek Buddha: Pyrrho's Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2015 |url = http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10500.pdf |isbn=9781400866328 }}
* Garfield, Jay L. (1995), ''The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Garfield, Jay L. and Graham Priest (2003), “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of Thought”, ''Philosophy East and West'' 53 (January 2003): 1-21.
* Jones, Richard H. (2014), ''Nagarjuna: Buddhism's Most Important Philosopher'', 2nd ed. New York: Jackson Square Books.
* {{Citation | last = Kalupahana | first = David J. | year =1975| title =Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism | publisher = The University Press of Hawaii | isbn = 9780824802981 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GOYGAAAAYAAJ}}
* {{Citation | last = Kalupahana | first = David J. | year =1986 | title = The Philosophy of the Middle Way |location=Albany | publisher = SUNY Press | isbn = 9780887061486 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0O6_coQ1odMC}}
* {{Citation | last = Kalupahana | first = David J. | year = 1992 | title = The Principles of Buddhist Psychology |url= | location = Delhi | publisher =Sri Satguru Publications }}
* {{Citation | last = Kalupahana | first = David J. | year = 1994 | title =A history of Buddhist philosophy | location = Delhi | publisher = Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited | isbn = 9780824814021 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SlDArya3YvcC}}
* Lamotte, E., ''Le Traite de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse'', Vol I (1944), Vol II (1949), Vol III (1970), Vol IV (1976), Institut Orientaliste: Louvain-la-Neuve.
* Lindtner, Christian (1982).'' Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna'' Akademisk forlag.
* Mabbett, Ian, (1998), “The problem of the historical Nagarjuna revisited”, ''Journal of the American Oriental Society'', 118(3): 332–46.
* Murti, T. R. V. (1955), ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism''. George Allen and Unwin, London. 2nd edition: 1960.
* Murty, K. Satchidananda (1971), ''Nagarjuna''. National Book Trust, New Delhi. 2nd edition: 1978.
* Ramanan, K. Venkata (1966), ''Nāgārjuna's Philosophy''. Charles E. Tuttle, Vermont and Tokyo. Reprint: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. 1978.
* Ruegg, D. Seyfort (1981), ''The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (A History of Indian literature)'', Harrassowitz, {{ISBN|978-3-447-02204-0}}.
* Sastri, H. Chatterjee, ed. (1977), ''The Philosophy of Nāgārjuna as contained in the Ratnāvalī''. Part I [ Containing the text and introduction only ]. Saraswat Library, Calcutta.
* [[Frederick Streng|Streng, Frederick J.]] (1967), ''Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning''. Nashville: Abingdon Press.
* Tuck, Andrew P. (1990), ''Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: on the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna'', Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Walser, Joseph (2002), [https://web.archive.org/web/20150403235727/http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Nagarjuna-and-the-Ratnavali.pdf Nagarjuna And The Ratnavali: New Ways To Date An Old Philosopher], ''Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies'' 25 (1–2), 209–262
* Walser, Joseph (2005), ''Nāgārjuna in Context: Mahāyāna Buddhism and Early Indian Culture''. New York: Columbia University Press.
* Westerhoff, Jan (2010), ''The Dispeller of Disputes: Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Westerhoff, Jan (2009), ''Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
* Wedemeyer, Christian K. (2007), ''Āryadeva's'' Lamp that Integrates the Practices: ''The Gradual Path of Vajrayāna Buddhism according to the Esoteric Community Noble Tradition''. New York: AIBS/Columbia University Press.
{{refend}}

== External links ==
{{Commons category|Nagarjuna}}
{{Wikiquote}}
{{Wikisource|Saṃyukta Āgama 301: Kātyāyana Gotra Sūtra}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=nagarjuna |title=Nāgārjuna |last=Westerhoff |first=Jan Christoph }}
* {{cite EB1911 |author = Rhys Davids, T. W. |author-link = Thomas William Rhys Davids |wstitle=Nāgārjuna |volume=19 |page=151 }}
* {{cite IEP |url-id=nagarjun |title = Nagarjuna }}
* [http://indica-et-buddhica.org/repositorium/nagarjuna Nāgārjuna – Sanskrit Buddhist texts: Acintyastava, Bodhicittavivaraṇa, Ratnāvalī, Mūlamadhyamakakārikās &c.]
* [https://www.sacred-texts.com/journals/ia/banav.htm#pp_2 Overview of traditional biographical accounts]
* [http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Nagarjuna/Garland_of_Ratnavali.html Online version of the Ratnāvalī (Precious Garland) in English] Translated by Prof. Vidyakaraprabha and Bel-dzek
* [https://studybuddhism.com/en/tibetan-buddhism/original-texts/sutra-texts/letter-to-a-friend Online version of the Suhṛllekha (Letter to a Friend) in English] Translated by Alexander Berzin
* {{Internet Archive author |sname=Nāgārjuna}}
* {{Librivox author |id=4413}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110207215921/http://www.byomakusuma.org/Articles/tabid/55/Default.aspx Nārāgjuna vis-à-vis the Āgama-s and Nikāya-s] Byoma Kusuma Nepalese Dharmasangha (archived)
* [http://www.thezensite.com/MainPages/nagarjuna.html ZenEssays: Nagarjuna and the Madhyamika]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20130728183514/http://www.stephenbatchelor.org/index.php/en/verses-from-the-center Mula madhyamaka karika] online Tibetan and English version translated by Stephen Batchelor (archived)

{{Indian Philosophy}}
{{Bodhisattvas}}
{{Buddhism topics}}

{{Authority control}}

[[Category:150 births]]
[[Category:250 deaths]]
[[Category:Mahayana Buddhist writers]]
[[Category:2nd-century Buddhist monks]]
[[Category:3rd-century Buddhist monks]]
[[Category:3rd-century Indian philosophers]]
[[Category:Indian scholars of Buddhism]]
[[Category:People from Guntur district]]
[[Category:Mahayana Buddhists]]
[[Category:3rd-century Indian writers]]
[[Category:Madhyamaka scholars|*]]
[[Category:Mahasiddhas]]
[[Category:Ontologists]]
[[Category:Tibetan Buddhist spiritual teachers]]
[[Category:Buddhist yogis]]
[[Category:Converts to Buddhism from Hinduism]]
[[Category:Bodhisattvas]]
[[Category:Rangtong]]
[[Category:Monks of Nalanda]]
[[Category:Scholars from Maharashtra]]
[[Category:2nd-century Indian philosophers]]
[[Category:Scholars from Andhra Pradesh]]
[[Category:2nd-century Indian writers]]
[[Category:Indian male writers]]
[[Category:Indian Buddhist monks]]
[[Category:Founders of Buddhist sects]]
[[Category:Sanron-shū]]
[[Category:Jōdo Shin patriarchs]]
[[Category:3rd-century Indian monks]]