{{Short description|Political power sharing among cultural groups}}
{{Corporatism sidebar}}

'''Consociationalism''' ({{IPAc-en|k|ən|ˌ|s|oʊ|ʃ|i|ˈ|eɪ|ʃ|ən|əl|ɪ|z|əm}} {{respell|kən|SOH|shee|AY|shən-əl-iz-əm}}) is a form of democratic [[power sharing]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=O'Leary|first1=Brendan|title=From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies|editor=Noel, Sid JR|publisher=McGill-Queen's Press|location=Montreal |year=2005|pages=3–43|chapter=Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments|isbn=0-7735-2948-9|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oQHX2Xz185EC}}</ref> [[Political science|Political scientists]] define a consociational [[State (polity)|state]] as one which has major internal divisions along ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, but which remains stable due to consultation among the [[elite]]s of these groups. Consociational states are often contrasted with states with [[majoritarian|majoritarian electoral systems]].

The goals of consociationalism are governmental stability, the survival of the power-sharing arrangements, the survival of [[democracy]], and the avoidance of [[violence]]. When consociationalism is organised along religious confessional lines, as in [[Lebanon]], it is known as [[confessionalism (politics)|confessionalism]]. Consociationalism is sometimes seen as analogous to [[corporatism]],<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McRae|first=Kenneth D.|date=September 1979|title=Comment: Federation, Consociation, Corporatism—An Addendum to Arend Lijphart|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0008423900051726/type/journal_article|journal=[[Canadian Journal of Political Science]]|language=en|volume=12|issue=3|pages=517–522 at 520|doi=10.1017/S0008423900051726|s2cid=154995368 |issn=0008-4239|quote=… [[federalism]], consociationalism, and neo-corporatism can be viewed as alternative institutional devices for alleviating strain or overload on central governments and for distributing part of the burden among other sectors of the political system.|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=du Toit|first=Pierre|date=July 1987|title=Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=19|issue=4|pages=419–430 at 425|doi=10.2307/421815|jstor=421815|quote=While consociational democracy applies to joint decision making among societal groups, neither of which has a dominant power position, corporatism (especially 'state' corporatism) describes a decision making model where the state is the dominant participant in joint decision making. Both models, however, describe the decision making as characterized by consensus and bargaining.}}</ref> and some scholars consider consociationalism a form of corporatism. Others claim that economic corporatism was designed to regulate [[class conflict]], while consociationalism developed on the basis of reconciling societal fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines.<ref>{{cite book|author = Anke Hassel |title= Wage setting, Social Pacts and the Euro: A New Role for the State |url = https://archive.org/details/wagesettingsocia00hass |url-access = limited |location= Amsterdam, Netherlands |publisher= Amsterdam University Press | year= 2006 | page= [https://archive.org/details/wagesettingsocia00hass/page/n281 281]|jstor = j.ctt46mxdx|isbn= 9789053569191 }} ([[Open access]])</ref>

[[Concurrent majority]] can be a precursor to consociationalism. A consociational democracy differs from [[consensus democracy]] (e.g. in [[Switzerland]]), in that consociational democracy represents a consensus of representatives with minority veto, while consensus democracy requires consensus across the electorate.<ref>{{cite journal | url=https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12363 | doi=10.1111/spsr.12363 | title=The United States as a Plural Society: Towards a Consociational Solution? | date=2019 | last1=Howe | first1=Philip J. | journal=[[Swiss Political Science Review]] | volume=25 | issue=4 | pages=476–497 }}</ref> The idea has received significant criticism in its applicability to democratic political systems, especially with regard to power-sharing.

==Origins==
Consociation was first discussed in the [[17th century]] [[New England Confederation]].  It described the interassociation and cooperation of the participant self-governing [[Congregational church]]es of the various colonial townships of the [[Massachusetts Bay Colony]]. These were empowered in the civil legislature and magistracy.<ref>W.H. Whitmore (ed.), ''The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts'' (Rockwell and Churchill, Boston 1890): 'The Body of Liberties of 1641', [https://archive.org/details/coloniallawsofma1890mass/page/n77 at pp. 29-68]; 'Records of the Court of Assistants, 1641-1644', [https://archive.org/details/coloniallawsofma1890mass/page/n23 pp. xix-xliii] (Google).</ref> It was debated at length in the [[Boston, Massachusetts|Boston]] Synod of 1662.<ref>J. Mitchel, ''Propositions concerning the subject of baptism and consociation of churches, collected and confirmed out of the word of God, by a synod of elders and messengers of the churches in Massachusetts-Colony in New England. Assembled at Boston, ... in the year 1662'' (Printed by S.G. [i.e., Samuel Green] for Hezekiah Usher at Boston in New-England, Cambridge Mass., 1662). Page views at [https://archive.org/details/propositionsconc00cong Internet Archive]. Full text at [https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;rgn=div2;view=toc;idno=N00035.0001.001;node=N00035.0001.001%3A4.2 Evans/tcp] (open).</ref> This was when the Episcopalian [[Act of Uniformity 1662]] was being introduced in [[England]]. Consociationalism was originally discussed in academic terms by the [[political science|political scientist]] [[Arend Lijphart]]. However, Lijphart has stated that he "merely discovered what political practitioners had repeatedly &ndash; and independently of both academic experts and one another &ndash; invented years earlier".<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Arend|last1=Lijphart|s2cid=19665603|year=2004|url=http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/lijphart%20Constitutional_Design.pdf|title=Constitutional design for divided societies|journal=[[Journal of Democracy]]|volume=15|issue=2|pages=96–109 [97]|doi=10.1353/jod.2004.0029|access-date=2008-07-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061028102639/http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/lijphart%20Constitutional_Design.pdf|archive-date=2006-10-28|url-status=dead}}</ref> Theoretically, consociationalism was [[Inductive reasoning|inducted]] from Lijphart's observations of political accommodation in the Netherlands, after which Lijphart argued for a generalizable consociational approach to ethnic conflict regulation.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lijphart |first1=Arend |title=The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands |date=1968 |publisher=University of California Press |location=Berkeley |isbn=9780520007512}}</ref>

The Netherlands, as a consociational state, was between 1857 and 1967 divided into four non-territorial [[Pillarisation|pillar]]s: [[Christian democracy in the Netherlands|Calvinist]], [[Christian democracy in the Netherlands|Catholic]], [[Socialism in the Netherlands|socialist]], and [[Liberalism in the Netherlands|liberal]], although until 1917 there was a [[plurality voting system|plurality]] ("first past the post") [[electoral system]] rather than a [[Proportional representation|proportional]] one. In their heyday, each comprised tightly organised groups, schools, universities, hospitals and newspapers, all divided along a [[Balkanised]] social structure. The theory, according to Lijphart, focuses on the role of social elites, their agreement and co-operation, as the key to a stable democracy. Based on this initial study of consociational democracy, [[John McGarry]] and [[Brendan O'Leary]] trace consociationalism back to 1917, when it was first employed in the [[Netherlands]], while [[Gerhard Lehmbruch]] suggests "precursors" of consociationalism as early as the [[Peace of Augsburg|1555 Peace of Augsburg]].<ref>{{cite book|first1=John|last1=McGarry|author2=O'Leary, Brendan|year=1993|chapter=Introduction: The macro-political regulation of ethnic conflict|editor=McGarry, John|editor2=O'Leary, Brendan|title=The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts|location=London|publisher=Routledge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/politicsofethnic0000unse/page/n18 1]–40|isbn=0-415-07522-X|url=https://archive.org/details/politicsofethnic0000unse|url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Lehmbruch |first1=Gerhard |title=Consociational Democracy in the International System |journal=European Journal of Political Research |date=December 1975 |volume=3 |issue=4 |page=383 |doi=10.1111/j.1475-6765.1975.tb01252.x}}</ref>

== State-building ==
While Lijphart's initial theory drew primarily from Western European democracies in its formulation of consociationalism, it has gained immense traction in post-conflict [[state-building]] contexts in the past decades.<ref name="A culture of power sharing">{{Cite book |title=Consociational Theory |date=2009-03-20 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-203-96256-5 |pages=222–236 |language=en |chapter=A culture of power sharing |doi=10.4324/9780203962565-19 |chapter-url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/culture-power-sharing-michael-kerr/10.4324/9780203962565-19}}</ref><ref name="auto">{{Cite journal |last1=McGarry |first1=J. |last2=O'Leary |first2=B. |date=2007-09-28 |title=Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political prescription |journal=International Journal of Constitutional Law |volume=5 |issue=4 |pages=670–698 |doi=10.1093/icon/mom026 |issn=1474-2640 |doi-access=free}}</ref> This development has been reflected in the expansion of the favourable conditions to external factors in the literature as well.<ref name="auto"/><ref name="A culture of power sharing" /><ref name="auto1">{{Cite journal |last=Zuercher |first=Christoph |date=2006-04-01 |title=Is More Better? Evaluating External-Led State Building After 1989 |url=https://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/is_more_better_evaluating_externalled_state_building_after_1989 |journal=CDDRL Working Papers |language=en}}</ref> Rather than internally constructed by state elites, these recent examples have been characterised by external facilitation, and at times imposition, through international actors.<ref name="auto1"/><ref name="auto"/><ref name="A culture of power sharing" /> In the process, consociational arrangements have frequently been used to transform immediate violent conflict and solidify peace settlements in extremely fragile contexts of deeply divided societies.<ref name="McGarry 2019 538–555">{{Cite journal |last=McGarry |first=John |date=2019 |title=Classical Consociational Theory and Recent Consociational Performance |journal=[[Swiss Political Science Review]] |language=en |volume=25 |issue=4 |pages=538–555 |doi=10.1111/spsr.12378 |issn=1662-6370 |s2cid=211380638 |doi-access=free}}</ref>

The volatile environments in which these recent examples have been implemented have exhibited the need for external interference not only for their initial implementation but also for their continued existence.<ref name="auto1"/><ref name="A culture of power sharing" /> As such, a range of international actors have assumed mediating and supporting roles to preserve power-sharing agreements in targeted states. Most prominently in [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia-Herzegovina]], this has involved an "international regulating body" in the form of a [[High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina|High Representative]] who in one period frequently intervened in the domestic political affairs of the state to implement legislation on which domestic elites were reluctant to come to an agreement.<ref name="Merdzanovic 22–35">{{Cite journal |last=Merdzanovic |first=Adis |date=2017-01-02 |title='Imposed consociationalism': external intervention and power sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1264918 |journal=Peacebuilding |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=22–35 |doi=10.1080/21647259.2016.1264918 |issn=2164-7259 |s2cid=157355747|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

While the current results of consociational arrangements implemented in post-conflict [[state-building]] endeavours have been mixed, scholars such as O'Leary and McGarry maintain that they have often proven to be the most practical approach to ending immediate conflict and creating the necessary stability for peace-building to take place.<ref name="McGarry 2019 538–555" /> Its utility has been seen in its transformative aspect, flexibility, and "realist" approach to existing identity formations that are difficult to incorporate in a majoritarian system.<ref name="McGill-Queen's University Press">{{Cite book |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt801dg |title=From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies |date=2005 |publisher=McGill-Queen's University Press |isbn=978-0-7735-2947-2 |jstor=j.ctt801dg}}</ref>

== Characteristics ==
Lijphart identifies four key characteristics of consociational democracies:<ref name="Lijphart 1977">{{cite book|first1=Arend|last1=Lijphart|year=1977|title=Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration|url=https://archive.org/details/democracyinplura0000lijp|url-access=registration|location=New Haven, CT|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=0-300-02494-0}}</ref>

{| class="wikitable" border="1"
|-
!Name
!Explanation
|-
|Grand coalition
|Elites of each pillar come together to rule in the interests of society because they recognize the dangers of non-cooperation.
|-
|Mutual veto
|Consensus among the groups is required to confirm the majority rule.  Mutuality means that the [[minority group|minority]] is unlikely to successfully block the majority.  If one group blocks another on some matter, the latter are likely to block the former in return.
|-
|Proportionality
|Representation is based on population. If one pillar accounts for 30% of the overall society, then they occupy 30% of the positions on the police force, in civil service, and in other national and civic segments of society.
|-
|Segmental autonomy
|Creates a sense of individuality and allows for different culturally-based community laws.
|}

Lijphart has also written, "The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to stabilize the system."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lijphart |first=Arend |date=1969 |title=Consociational Democracy |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/consociational-democracy/BB47BF2A5A4EBAE341FD3FA4E262410F |journal=World Politics |language=en |volume=21 |issue=2 |pages=207–225 |doi=10.2307/2009820 |issn=1086-3338|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Consociational policies often have these characteristics:<ref>Lijphart, Arend; Crepaz, Markus M. L. : Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical
Linkages; British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 235–46</ref>
*[[Coalition government|Coalition cabinets]], where executive power is shared between parties, not concentrated in one. Many of these cabinets are oversized, meaning they include parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority;
*Balance of power between [[executive (government)|executive]] and [[legislative]];
*Decentralized and federal government, where (regional) [[minorities]] have considerable independence;
*Incongruent [[bicameralism]], where it is very difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses. Normally one chamber represents regional interests and the other [[national interest]]s;
*[[Proportional representation]], to allow (small) [[minorities]] to gain representation too;
*Organized and [[corporatism|corporatist]] interest groups, which represent [[minorities]];
*A [[Rigid Constitution|rigid constitution]], which prevents government from changing the [[constitution]] without consent of minorities;
*[[Judicial review]], which allows [[minorities]] to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust;
*Elements of [[direct democracy]], which allow [[minorities]] to enact or prevent legislation;
*Proportional employment in the [[public sector]];
*A neutral [[head of state]], either a [[monarchy|monarch]] with only ceremonial duties, or an [[indirectly elected]] president, who gives up his or her party affiliation after being elected;
*[[Referendum]]s are only used to allow [[minorities]] to block legislation: this means that they must be a [[Popular initiative|citizen's initiative]] and that there is no compulsory voting.
*Equality between ministers in cabinet, the [[prime minister]] is only ''[[primus inter pares]]'';
*An independent [[central bank]], where experts and not politicians set out monetary policies.

==Favourable conditions==
Lijphart also identified a number of "favourable conditions" under which consociationalism is likely to be successful. He has changed the specification of these conditions somewhat over time.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bogaards|first1=Matthijs|year=1998|title=The favourable factors for consociational democracy: A review|journal=European Journal of Political Research|pages=475–96|doi=10.1111/1475-6765.00392|volume=33|issue=4|s2cid=144101944 }}</ref> Michael Kerr summarised Lijphart's most prominent favourable factors as:<ref name=Kerr>{{cite book|last1=Kerr|first1=Michael|title=Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon|publisher=Irish Academic Press|location=Dublin|pages=27–28|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bAHTAAAACAAJ&q=Imposing+Power-sharing:+Conflict+and+Coexistence+in+Northern+Ireland+and+Lebanon | isbn=978-0-7165-3383-2|year=2006}}</ref>
*Segmental isolation of ethnic communities
*A multiple balance of power
*The presence of external threats common to all communities
*Overarching loyalties to the state
*A tradition of elite accommodation
*Socioeconomic equality
*A small population size, reducing the policy load
*A moderate multi-party system with segmental parties

Lijphart stresses that these conditions are neither indispensable nor sufficient to account for the success of consociationalism.<ref name="Lijphart 1977"/> This has led Rinus van Schendelen to conclude that "the conditions may be present and absent, necessary and unnecessary, in short conditions or no conditions at all".<ref name="van Schendelen">{{Cite journal |last1=van Schendelen|first1=M.C.P.M. | title = The views of Arend Lijphart and collected criticisms | journal = [[Acta Politica]] | volume = 19 | issue = 1 | pages = 19–49 | publisher = Palgrave Macmillan | date = 1984 | url = http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ap }}</ref> [[John McGarry]] and [[Brendan O'Leary]] argue that three conditions are key to the establishment of democratic consociational power-sharing: elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation; elites must lead deferential segments; and there must be a multiple balance of power, but more importantly the subcultures must be stable.<ref>{{cite book|last1=McGarry|first1=John|author2=O'Leary, Brendan|title=Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images|publisher=Blackwell|location=Oxford|year=1995|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RPtXDMarWTEC&q=Explaining+Northern+Ireland&pg=PP1|page=339 | isbn=978-0-631-18349-5}}</ref> Michael Kerr, in his study of the role of external actors in power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, adds to McGarry and O'Leary's list the condition that "the existence of positive external regulating pressures, from state to non-state actors, which provide the internal elites with sufficient incentives and motives for their acceptance of, and support for, consociation".<ref name="Kerr" />

==Arguments in favor==
In a consociational state, all groups, including minorities, are represented on the political and economic stages. Supporters of consociationalism argue that it is a more realistic option in deeply divided societies than [[Social integration|integrationist]] approaches to [[conflict management]].<ref>{{cite journal|first1=John|last1=McGarry|author2=O'Leary, Brendan|year=2006|title=Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's conflict, and its agreement 2: What critics of consociation can learn from Northern Ireland|journal=Government and Opposition|volume=41|issue=2|pages=249–77|doi=10.1111/j.1477-7053.2006.00178.x|s2cid=51859873}}</ref>

==Criticisms==
Many criticisms have been levelled against the deployment of consociationalism in state-building. It has been criticised as institutionalising and deepening existing divisions,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=McCulloch|first=Allison|date=2014-04-16|title=Consociational settlements in deeply divided societies: the liberal-corporate distinction|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2012.748039|journal=Democratization|volume=21|issue=3|pages=501–518|doi=10.1080/13510347.2012.748039|s2cid=144946531|issn=1351-0347|url-access=subscription}}</ref> being severely dependent on external support for survival,<ref name="McGarry 2019 538–555"/><ref name="A culture of power sharing"/> and temporarily freezing conflicts but not resolving them.<ref name="McGill-Queen's University Press"/> Given the apparent necessity for external regulation of these agreements, many scholars have characterised these state-building projects as deeply invasive.<ref name="Merdzanovic 22–35"/><ref name="CHANDLER 2006">{{Cite book|last=Chandler|first=David|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt18fs393|title=Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-Building|date=2006|publisher=Pluto Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctt18fs393 |jstor=j.ctt18fs393|isbn=978-0-7453-2428-9}}</ref> A recurring concern therein is the erosion of the governing elite's accountability towards its population and the fostering of clientele politics.<ref name="Merdzanovic 22–35"/><ref>{{Cite web|title=Power Sharing in Lebanon: Foreign Protectors, Domestic Peace, and Democratic Failure {{!}} Request PDF|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308345107|access-date=2021-01-27|website=ResearchGate|language=en}}</ref><ref name="CHANDLER 2006"/> These dynamics have been pointed to as obstacles to the resolution of the deep divisions consociations are meant to alleviate.<ref name="McGill-Queen's University Press"/><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Dodge|first=Toby|date=2020|title=Iraq's Informal Consociationalism and Its Problems|journal=Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism|language=en|volume=20|issue=2|pages=145–152|doi=10.1111/sena.12330|issn=1754-9469|doi-access=free}}</ref> Further critiques have pointed out that  consociations have at times encouraged conditions of "[[fragile state]]s", which state-building is meant to prevent.<ref name="CHANDLER 2006"/>

===Brian Barry===
[[Brian Barry]] has questioned the nature of the divisions that exist in the countries that Lijphart considers to be "classic cases" of consociational democracies. For example, he makes the case that in the Swiss example, "political parties cross-cut cleavages in the society and provide a picture of remarkable consensus rather than highly structured conflict of goals".<ref name="Barry 1975a">{{cite journal|first1=Brian|last1=Barry|year=1975|title=Political accommodation and consociational democracy|journal=British Journal of Political Science|volume=5|issue=4|pages=477–505|jstor=193439|doi=10.1017/S0007123400008322|s2cid=155019866 }}</ref> In the case of the Netherlands, he argues that "the whole cause of the disagreement was the feeling of some Dutchman ... that it mattered what all the inhabitants of the country believed. Demands for policies aimed at producing religious or secular uniformity presuppose a concern ... for the state of grace of one's fellow citizens". He contrasts this to the case of a society marked by conflict, in this case [[Northern Ireland]], where he argues that "the inhabitants ... have never shown much worry about the prospects of the adherents of the other religion going to hell".<ref name="Barry1975b">{{cite journal|first1=Brian|last1=Barry|year=1975|title=The consociational model and its dangers|journal=European Journal of Political Research|volume=3|issue=4|pages=393–412|doi=10.1111/j.1475-6765.1975.tb01253.x}}</ref> Barry concludes that in the Dutch case, consociationalism is [[Tautology (rhetoric)|tautological]] and argues that "the relevance of the 'consociational' model for other divided societies is much more doubtful than is commonly supposed".<ref name="Barry 1975a"/>

===Rinus van Schendelen===

[[Rinus van Schendelen]] has argued that Lijphart uses evidence selectively. [[Pillarisation]] was "seriously weakening", even in the 1950s, cross-denominational co-operation was increasing, and formerly coherent political sub-cultures were dissolving. He argued that elites in the Netherlands were not motivated by preferences derived from the general interest, but rather by self-interest. They formed coalitions not to forge consociational negotiation between segments but to improve their parties' respective power. He argued that the Netherlands was "stable" in that it had few protests or riots, but that it was so before consociationalism, and that it was not stable from the standpoint of government turnover. He questioned the extent to which the Netherlands, or indeed any country labelled a consociational system, could be called a democracy, and whether calling a consociational country a democracy isn't somehow ruled out by definition. He believed that Lijphart suffered severe problems of rigor when identifying whether particular divisions were cleavages, whether particular cleavages were segmental, and whether particular cleavages were cross-cutting.<ref name="van Schendelen"/>

===Lustick on hegemonic control===
[[Ian Lustick]] has argued that academics lack an alternative "control" approach for explaining stability in deeply divided societies and that this has resulted in the empirical overextension of consociational models.<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Ian|last1=Lustick|year=1979|jstor=2009992|title=Stability in deeply divided societies: Consociationalism versus control|journal=World Politics|volume=31|issue=3|pages=325–44|doi=10.2307/2009992|s2cid=145353881 }}</ref> Lustick argues that Lijphart has "an impressionistic methodological posture, flexible rules for coding data, and an indefatigable, rhetorically seductive commitment to promoting consociationalism as a widely applicable principle of political engineering",<ref name="Lustick 1997">{{cite journal|first1=Ian|last1=Lustick|year=1997|title=Lijphart, Lakatos, and consociationalism|journal=World Politics|volume=50|issue=1|pages=88–117|doi=10.1017/S0043887100014738|jstor=25054028|s2cid=143123926 }}</ref> that results in him applying consociational theory to case studies that it does not fit. Furthermore, Lustick states that "Lijphart's definition of 'accommodation' ... includes the elaborately specified claim that issues dividing polarized blocs are settled by leaders convinced of the need for settlement".<ref name="Lustick 1997"/>

=== Horowitz and centripetal criticism of consociationalism ===
Consociationalism focuses on diverging identities such as ethnicity instead of integrating identities such as class, institutionalizing and entrenching the former. Furthermore, it relies on rival co-operation, which is inherently unstable. It focuses on intrastate relations and neglects relations with other states. [[Donald L. Horowitz]] argues that consociationalism can lead to the reification of ethnic divisions, since "grand coalitions are unlikely, because of the dynamics of intraethnic competition. The very act of forming a multiethnic coalition generates intraethnic competition – flanking – if it does not already exist".<ref>{{cite book|last1=Horowitz|first1=Donald|url=https://archive.org/details/ethnicgroupsinco00horo|title=Ethnic Groups in Conflict|publisher=University of California Press|year=1985|isbn=0-520-22706-9|location=Berkeley, CA|page=[https://archive.org/details/ethnicgroupsinco00horo/page/575 575]|url-access=registration}}</ref>

Consistent with Horowitz's claims, Dawn Brancati finds that federalism/territorial autonomy, an element of consociationalism, strengthens ethnic divisions if it is designed in a way that strengthens regional parties, which in turn encourage ethnic conflict.<ref>Dawn Brancati, ''Peace by Design: Managing Intrastate Conflict through Decentralization'', Oxford University Press, 2009.</ref> James Anderson also supports Horowitz's contention that consociational powersharing built around diverging identities can entrench and sharpen these divisions. Citing the example of [[Northern Ireland]], Anderson argues such approaches tend to "prioritise the same general type of territorial identity as the ethno-nationalists". Nonetheless, Anderson concedes difficulty lies in the fact such identities cannot simply be wished away, as he argues is attempted when focusing only on individual rights at the expense of group rights.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Anderson|first=James|date=2008|title= Partition, consociation, border-crossing: some lessons from the national conflict in Ireland/Northern Ireland
|url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00340.x|journal=Nations and Nationalism|language=en|volume=14|issue=1|pages=85–104|doi=10.1111/j.1469-8129.2008.00340.x |url-access=subscription}}</ref> As an alternative of consociationalism Horowitz suggested an alternative model – [[Centipetalism|centripetalism]]. Centripetalism aims to depoliticize ethnicity and to encourage multi-ethnic parties instead of reinforcing ethnic divides through political institutions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reilly|first=Benjamin|date=June 2012|title=Institutional Designs for Diverse Democracies: Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Communalism Compared|url=http://link.springer.com/10.1057/eps.2011.36|journal=European Political Science|language=en|volume=11|issue=2|pages=259–270|doi=10.1057/eps.2011.36|s2cid=144295799|issn=1680-4333|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

===Other criticisms===
In 2022, Yascha Mounk argued that the case for consociationalism and power-sharing had weakened significantly since first proposed based on experiments and real-life observations. He argues that in some cases it can bring short-term peace, but that it is always temporary and is likely to worsen tensions in the long-run.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mounk |first=Yascha |title=The great experiment: why diverse democracies fall apart and how they can endure |date=2022 |publisher=Penguin Press |isbn=978-0-593-29681-3 |location=New York}}</ref>

Critics point out that consociationalism is dangerous in a system of differing [[antagonist]]ic [[ideologies]], generally [[conservatism]] and [[communism]].{{Citation needed|date=November 2009}} They state that specific conditions must exist for three or more groups to develop a multi- system with strong leaders. This philosophy is dominated by elites, with those masses that are sidelined with the elites having less to lose if war breaks out. Consociationalism cannot be imperially applied. For example, it does not effectively apply to [[Austria]]. Critics also point to the failure of this line of reasoning in [[Lebanon]], a country that experienced civil war, and where the consociational arrangement was used by the post-war elite to capture state institutions and resources.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Salloukh |first=Bassel F. |date=2024-01-02 |title=The State of Consociationalism in Lebanon |url=https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2023.2187970 |journal=Nationalism and Ethnic Politics |volume=30 |issue=1 |pages=8–27 |doi=10.1080/13537113.2023.2187970 |issn=1353-7113}}</ref> It only truly applies in [[Switzerland]], [[Belgium]] and the Netherlands, and not in more deeply divided societies. If one of three groups gets half plus one of the vote, then the other groups are in perpetual opposition, which is largely incompatible with consociationalism.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}} 

Consociationalism assumes that each group is cohesive and has strong leadership.  Although the minority can block decisions, this requires 100 per cent agreement. Rights are given to communities rather than individuals, leading to over-representation of some individuals in society and under-representation of others. Grand coalitions are unlikely to happen due to the dynamics of ethnic competition.  Each group seeks more power for itself. Consociationalists are criticized for focusing too much on the set up of institutions and not enough on transitional issues which go beyond such institutions. Finally, it is claimed that consociational institutions promote [[sectarianism]] and entrench existing identities.{{Citation needed|date=May 2025}} 

==Examples==
The political systems of a number of countries operate or used to operate on a consociational basis, including [[Politics of Belgium|Belgium]], [[Politics of Italy|Italy]], [[Politics of Cyprus#United Cyprus|Cyprus]] (effective 1960–1963),<ref>{{cite book|last1=Wolff|first1=Stefan|title=Disputed Territories: The Transnational Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict Settlement|date=2004 |publisher=Berghahn Books|pages=30–31|isbn=9781571817181|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QYTKZ0z6QygC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Wippman|first1=David|editor1-last=Wippman|editor1-first=David|title=International Law and Ethnic Conflict|date=1998|publisher=Cornell University Press|page=220|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uy1CCqO6qUIC|chapter=Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing|isbn=9780801434334}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Bahcheli|first1=Tozun|last2=Noel|first2=Sid|editor1-last=Noel|editor1-first=Sid|title=Relations of Ruling: Class and Gender in Postindustrial Societies|date=2005|publisher=McGill-Queen's University Press|page=215|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oQHX2Xz185EC|chapter=Power Sharing for Cyprus (Again)? European Union Accession and the Prospects for Reunification|isbn=9780773529489}}</ref> the [[First Czechoslovak Republic]],<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lorman |first1=Thomas |title=The Making of the Slovak People's Party: Religion, Nationalism and the Culture War in Early 20th-Century Europe |date=2019 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |location=London |isbn=978-1-350-10938-4 |language=en|page=225|quote=... an interwar Czechoslovak regime that sought to accommodate the SĽS <nowiki>[</nowiki>[[Slovak People's Party]]<nowiki>]</nowiki> within a system that is best described in modern times as 'conscociational'.}}</ref> [[Status quo (Israel)|Israel]], [[Politics of Lebanon|Lebanon]], the [[Politics of the Netherlands|Netherlands]] (1917–1967), [[Politics of Northern Ireland|Northern Ireland]], [[Politics of Switzerland|Switzerland]] (consultation mostly across ideological lines), [[Politics of Ethiopia|Ethiopia]], [[Zimbabwe Rhodesia|Zimbabwe-Rhodesia]], and [[Politics of South Africa|South Africa]]. Some academics have also argued that the [[European Union]] resembles a consociational democracy, with consultation across ideological lines.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Gabel|first1=Matthew J.|year=1998|title=The endurance of supranational governance: A consociational interpretation of the European Union|jstor=422334|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=30|issue=4|pages=463–75|doi=10.2307/422334}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bogaards|first1=Matthijs|author2=Crepaz, Markus M.L.|s2cid=155088134|year=2002|title=Consociational interpretations of the European Union|journal=[[European Union Politics]]|volume=3|issue=3|pages=357–81|doi=10.1177/1465116502003003004}}</ref> Additionally, a number of peace agreements are consociational, including:

* The [[Dayton Agreement]] that ended the 1992–1995 [[war in Bosnia and Herzegovina]], which is described as a "classic example of consociational settlement" by [[Sumantra Bose]]<ref>{{cite book|first1=Sumantra|last1=Bose|year=2002|title=Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention|location=Oxford |publisher=Oxford University Press|page=216|isbn=1-85065-585-5}}</ref> and "an ideal-typical consociational democracy" by Roberto Belloni.<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Roberto |last1=Belloni|s2cid=144376666|year=2004|title=Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina|journal=International Peacekeeping|volume=11|issue=2|pages=334–53 [336]|doi=10.1080/1353331042000237300}}</ref>
* The [[Good Friday Agreement]] of 1998 in [[Northern Ireland]]<ref>{{cite book|last1=O'Leary|first1=Brendan|year=2001|chapter=The character of the 1998 Agreement: Results and prospects|pages=49–83|editor=Wilford, Rick|title=Aspects of the Belfast Agreement|location=Oxford|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=0-19-924262-3}}</ref> (and its subsequent reinforcement with 2006's [[St Andrews Agreement]]), which Brendan O'Leary describes as "power-sharing plus".<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Brendan|last1=O'Leary|year=1999|title=The 1998 British-Irish Agreement: Power-sharing plus|journal=Scottish Affairs|volume=26|pages=14–35|doi=10.3366/scot.1999.0003}}</ref>
* The [[Ohrid Agreement]] of 2001 setting the constitutional framework for power-sharing in [[North Macedonia]].<ref name="Fontana2016">{{cite book|last=Fontana|first=Giuditta|title=Education Policy and Power-Sharing in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Macedonia|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KJTlDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA102|year=2016|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-3-319-31426-6|page=102}}</ref>

The [[Islamic Republic of Afghanistan]]'s political system was also described as consociational,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lijphart|first1=Arend|title=Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice|publisher=Routledge|location=Abingdon|year=2008|page=5|isbn=978-0-415-77268-6|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YC_EvUn5inkC&pg=PA5}}</ref> although it lacked ethnic quotas.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Adeney|first1=Katharine|year=2008|title=Constitutional design and the political salience of 'community' identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the post-Taliban era|journal=Asian Survey|volume=48|issue=4|pages=535–57|doi=10.1525/as.2008.48.4.535}}</ref> In addition to the [[two-state solution]] to solve the [[Arab–Israeli conflict]], some have argued for a [[one-state solution]] under a consociational democracy in the state of [[Israel]], but this solution is not very popular, nor has it been discussed seriously at peace negotiations.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cohen |first=Asher |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fSQQBdRFmwIC&dq=Israeli+Consociationalism&pg=PA127 |title=Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse |last2=Susser |first2=Bernard |date=2000-06-16 |publisher=JHU Press |isbn=978-0-8018-6345-5 |language=en}}</ref>

During the 1980s, the South African government attempted to reform [[apartheid]] into a consociational democracy. The [[South African Constitution of 1983]] applied Lijphart's powersharing ideas by establishing a [[Tricameral Parliament]].  During the [[Negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa|1990s negotiations to end apartheid]] the [[National Party (South Africa)|National Party]] (NP) and [[Inkatha Freedom Party]] (IFP) proposed a settlement based upon consociationalism. The [[African National Congress]] (ANC) opposed consociationalism and proposed instead a settlement based upon majoritarian democracy. The NP abandoned consociationalism when the [[United States Department of State|U.S. Department of State]] came out in favor of the majoritarian democracy model in 1992.<ref>{{cite journal|first1=James|last1=Hamill|year=2003|title=A disguised surrender? South Africa's negotiated settlement and the politics of conflict resolution |journal=Diplomacy & Statecraft|volume=14|issue=3 |pages=17–18|doi=10.1080/09592290312331295546 }}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Conflict management]]
* [[Consensus democracy]]
* [[Corporative federalism]]
* [[Directorial system]]
* [[Horizontalidad]]
* [[Minority groups]]
* [[Minority rights]]
* [[Negarchy]]
* [[Pillarisation]]
* [[Plural society]]
* [[Polycentric law]]
* ''[[Sui iuris]]''

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==

* O'Leary, Brendan. 2020. "[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12385 Consociation in the Present.]" [[Swiss Political Science Review]].
* Bogaards, Matthijs; Helms, Ludger; Lijphart, Arend. 2020. "[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/spsr.12384 The Importance of Consociationalism for Twenty‐First Century Politics and Political Science.]" [[Swiss Political Science Review]].
* Selway, Joel and K. Templeman. 2012. "[https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414011425341 The Myth of Consociationalism]." ''Comparative Political Studies'' 45: 1542–1571.
* {{cite journal | last1 = Issacharoff | first1 = S. | author-link = Samuel Issacharoff | title = Constitutionalizing Democracy in Fractured Societies | journal = Texas Law Review | volume = 82 | page = 2004 }}

{{Wiktionary|consociationalism|consociation}}

{{Ethnicity}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Comparative politics]]
[[Category:Democracy]]
[[Category:Political concepts]]
[[Category:Concepts in political philosophy]]
[[Category:Ethnicity in politics]]
[[Category:Political theories]]
[[Category:Power sharing]]
[[Category:Corporatism]]